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It is a Thursday evening and I am preparing a soup for tomorrow. When the soup starts to 
simmer, I turn on the television to watch my favorite show. All the ins and outs of what 
is happening to the contestants of the show will be discussed at length during our lunch 
break at work tomorrow. I then receive a message from a friend, asking how I am doing 
and how the thesis-writing is going. After some messages back and forth, she starts telling 
me about her week. I am switching between paying attention to the television show and 
my friend’s story. Suddenly the story becomes more interesting, and I now fully focus 
on the story, forgetting about the show. In the middle of reading one of her messages, it 
starts to smell like something is burning, and I quickly run to the stove to save my soup. 
Managing our goals, such as preparing a soup, watching television and texting with 
a friend, is an important aspect of our daily life. At one moment we need to focus on 
one goal, while at the next moment we need to switch to another, more urgent goal. 
Sometimes we need to focus on long-term goals, even though other short-term goals 
seem more appealing. 
This thesis is about how we manage our goals, specifically cognitive goals. It is about 
how well we perform cognitive tasks, but also about how motivated we are to perform 
well. It is about how we focus on a task, how we prioritize one task over another and 
how and when we switch between tasks. From now on I will refer to this as cognitive 
control, a term I will further explain in the next section. Many people with psychiatric 
or neurological disorders, such as Parkinson’s disease, attention-deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD), obsessive compulsive disorder or addiction, experience problems 
with cognitive control. However, healthy people also experience failures of cognitive 
control from time to time. Some people more than others, and sometimes more on one 
type of task than on another.  
I aim to shed light on the cognitive and neural mechanisms that link motivation and 
cognitive control, and how this varies across people and tasks. More specifically, in the 
experiments I present in this thesis I test the effects of pharmacological manipulations, 
various modulations of how people are rewarded for completing cognitive tasks, and 
modulations of task context on both cognitive control and the motivation for cognitive 
control. This first chapter serves to introduce key concepts and give an overview of the 
literature to provide a rationale for empirical chapters 2 to 6. 
Cognitive control and working memory
Cognitive control refers to a set of mechanisms required for adaptively pursuing a (long 
term) goal, involving preparation and maintenance of rules to bias action and attention 
General introduction
12
(Egner, 2017; Fuster, 1989; Monsell, 2003). It is an umbrella term that involves linking 
goals with prior knowledge and context information to direct action. If we go back to 
the example above, my primary goal might be to prepare a soup for the following day 
before I go to bed. As I don’t want to miss out on the conversation with my colleagues 
about our favorite show the following day, I have the additional goal to focus on what is 
happening on the television, all the while keeping up with updates on my friend’s story. 
Managing these goals and knowing when to focus on which goal is guided by prior 
knowledge. For example, I know I need to go back to the stove when I hear it boiling to 
lower the heat and bring it back to a simmer. I also know that my friend usually sends 
multiple short messages rather than one long one. So I know that I do not need to read 
each message as it comes in, but I can wait until she has sent at least five messages 
before I turn my attention away from the television. However, this all changes when 
my friend’s story suddenly becomes more interesting. This change of context shifts my 
priorities. The story becomes my primary goal, while I totally forget to pay attention to 
the television and my soup. Only when it starts to smell like something is burning, my 
attention is brought back to the soup.    
What are the mechanisms that allow us to use prior knowledge and contexts to update 
our goals and guide our behavior? Information about the current context must be 
actively maintained to decide what prior knowledge, out of our vast life experience, is 
relevant and which goals need to be prioritized over others. Our working memory is 
essential to maintain that information in mind. Our working memory serves to maintain 
small amounts of information for a short period of time, manipulate it and act upon 
it. It is widely accepted that the prefrontal cortex is important for maintaining task 
or contextual information in working memory. Multiple studies have shown enhanced 
activity or firing rates of neurons in the prefrontal cortex during various phases of 
working memory tasks, including the encoding of stimuli, the delay period and the 
retrieval of stimuli (Cohen et al., 1994; Fuster & Alexander, 1971; Goldman-Rakic, 1995; 
Miller et al., 1996). Importantly, the prefrontal cortex does not act in isolation during 
these tasks. Its activation is associated with activation in other brain regions, including 
temporal and parietal regions, suggesting that connectivity between these regions 
enhances sensory stimulus information or motor plans (Braver et al., 1997; Curtis & 
D’Esposito, 2003; J. B. Rowe et al., 2000).
Our working memory capacity is limited. We cannot hold in memory all the input 
around us, and not all input is relevant to a current task. Thus, we need some kind 
of a selection process to decide what information should enter our working memory 
and what information should be shut out. Moreover, this process needs to be dynamic, 
because what is relevant at one moment, might be less relevant at the next moment. I 











but it became very relevant when I started to smell the burning smell. This means that 
we constantly need to balance the extent to which we focus on one task (cognitive 
stability) versus the extent to which we flexibly switch between tasks (cognitive 
flexibility), depending on ever changing inputs and goals. How does the brain decide 
when to focus and when to allow new input and demands to enter our working 
memory?
The process by which stimuli are granted access to our working memory is called 
working memory gating (Braver & Cohen, 2000). When no new inputs are gated into 
working memory, our task representations are very stable, we can resist distractions 
and can strongly focus on the task at hand. When the gates open to new inputs, new 
context or task information enters our working memory and we can shift our goals 
and switch tasks. Thus, we need control over which information enters working 
memory. The system that is considered to control the input to working memory is 
the cortico-basal ganglia system (Frank et al., 2001; Hazy et al., 2007)(Box 1). The 
prefrontal cortex is innervated by a structure deep in the brain called the thalamus, 
which is considered the relay-station of the brain, relaying sensory input to the cortex 
for further processing. However, the thalamus, and thereby the connection with the 
prefrontal cortex, is usually suppressed by other neurons. When this suppression 
is removed, information can be gated into the prefrontal cortex and our working 
memory. There are two main basal ganglia pathways influencing this gating system. 
Activation of the first one reduces the suppression of the thalamus, resulting in an 
increased connection between the thalamus and the prefrontal cortex. Because this 
allows information to access the prefrontal cortex, this pathway is often referred to as 
the direct Go pathway. The second basal ganglia pathway strengthens the suppression 
of the thalamus, resulting in reduced information flow between the thalamus and the 
prefrontal cortex, thus closing the gate to working memory. This pathway is therefore 
often referred to as the indirect NoGo pathway. These Go and NoGo pathways receive 
input from various brain regions to decide whether the gates to working memory 
should open or close, including input from sensory structures and feedback from the 
prefrontal cortex. Importantly, there are many parallel connections in the cortico-basal 
ganglia system. This way, specific input can be gated while other input is suppressed. 
When the system suppresses most input, activity in the prefrontal cortex promotes 
cognitive stability, or the maintenance of current task information. Conversely, when 
the system allows input to enter working memory, cognitive flexibility is promoted by 
new information updating task rules or goals. In the next section, I will go deeper into 
the neurochemistry of these processes and ways in which we could modulate them 
using medication. 
General introduction
Box 1 | Cortico-basal ganglia system
 
FIGURE 1.1 | Depiction of the cortico-basal ganglia system. Activating connections are depicted in 
green, inhibiting connections are depicted in red, and dopaminergic connections are depicted in 
black. NB: The direct (left) and indirect (right) pathway can be found in both hemispheres, but are 
here presented lateralized for illustrative purposes. 
The cortico-basal ganglia system is important for allowing new information to enter 
the prefrontal cortex and working memory. The thalamus relays information from 
other brain regions to the prefrontal cortex. However, the thalamus is inhibited by the 
internal globus pallidus (GPi). 
The Go pathway releases this inhibition: A structure called the striatum inhibits the 
internal globus pallidus. This is termed disinhibition, resulting in activation of the 
thalamus. The NoGo pathway strengthens the inhibition of the thalamus by the internal 
globus pallidus: The striatum inhibits the external globus pallidus (GPe), which in turn 
inhibits the subthalamic nucleus (STN), which innervates the internal globus pallidus. 
This results in activation of the internal globus pallidus, and thus stronger inhibition 
of the thalamus. This means that the Go pathway facilitates information to enter the 
prefrontal cortex, promoting cognitive flexibility, whereas the NoGo pathway prevents 
information from entering the prefrontal cortex, promoting cognitive stability. 
The Go and NoGo pathways receive information from different brain regions, including 
feedback from the prefrontal cortex and dopaminergic input from the substantia nigra 
pars compacta (SN). Dopamine increases activity of the Go pathway via D1 receptors 
(D1R), while it inhibits activity of the NoGo pathway via D2 receptors (D2R). The net 
input to the Go and NoGo pathway determines which pathway wins the competition, 












The role of dopamine in cognitive control 
The pathways of the neurotransmitter dopamine have their starting point in the 
midbrain, specifically in the substantia nigra and the ventral tegmental area (Figure 
1.2). Dopaminergic connections run from the midbrain to both the prefrontal cortex 
and the basal ganglia and are therefore well suited to play a role in cognitive control. 
Drugs that alter dopamine transmission are used as first-line treatment for disorders 
that are accompanied by deficits in cognitive control, such as methylphenidate to 
treat ADHD (Arnsten & Plizska, 2011; Prince, 2008) and levodopa to treat Parkinson’s 
disease (Connolly & Lang, 2014). Dopaminergic drugs such as methylphenidate are also 
commonly used as smart drugs by healthy people to enhance cognition (Greely et al., 
2008; Husain & Mehta, 2011; Schelle et al., 2015). However, it is still unknown how 
exactly these drugs work. For example, do these drugs enhance stability, flexibility, or 
perhaps both? 
FIGURE 1.2 | Major dopamine projections. The mesocortical pathway originates in the ventral 
tegmental area and projects to the prefrontal cortex. The mesolimbic pathway originates in 
the ventral tegmental area and primarily projects to mesolimbic regions including the nucleus 
accumbens. The nigrostriatal pathway originates in the substantia nigra and primarily projects to 
the dorsal striatum (caudate nucleus and putamen).
Dopamine has long been implicated in cognitive control and prefrontal cortex 
functioning (Brozoski et al., 1979; Goldman-Rakic, 1995; Robbins, 2000; Robbins & 
Arnsten, 2009; Servan-Schreiber et al., 1990). Using chemicals, researchers depleted 
dopamine in the prefrontal cortex of monkeys, which led to impairments in working 
memory almost to the same degree as completely removing the prefrontal cortex 
(Brozoski et al., 1979). Moreover, optimal levels of dopamine in the prefrontal cortex 
of monkeys have been found to suppress processing of non-relevant information 
during a working memory task, increasing the signal to noise ratio of relevant 











to the additional suppression of relevant information, resulting in poorer performance. 
Although it is still an open question how exactly, these studies suggest that dopamine 
in the prefrontal cortex is important for increasing the signal-to-noise ratio of 
information, thereby enhancing cognitive stability (Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008).   
In addition to its role in prefrontal functioning, dopamine has also been implicated in 
striatal functioning. Dopaminergic connections from the midbrain to the striatum affect 
the Go and NoGo pathways in the basal ganglia, which are part of the gating system 
of working memory. Striatal cells belonging to the Go pathway receive dopaminergic 
signals via a type of dopamine receptors called D1 receptors, which activate the 
pathway, whereas cells belonging to the NoGo pathway receive dopaminergic signals 
via D2 receptors, which inhibit the pathway (Box 1). This results in an overall Go 
bias and thereby a greater readiness for information to enter the prefrontal cortex 
and working memory (Frank et al., 2001; Hazy et al., 2007). Thus, striatal dopamine 
enhances cognitive flexibility. 
Is sum, dopamine can have different effects depending on the neural region it 
modulates: Dopamine in the prefrontal cortex is expected to enhance cognitive stability 
whereas dopamine in the striatum is expected to enhance cognitive flexibility (Cools, 
2019; Cools & D’Esposito, 2011). Indeed, dopamine depletion in the prefrontal cortex of 
marmosets caused increased distractibility by task-irrelevant stimuli on a task testing 
attentional performance, whereas dopamine depletion in the dorsal striatum decreased 
distractibility (Crofts et al., 2001). For obvious reasons, such direct manipulations of 
dopamine transmission in specific brain areas are not allowed in human participants. In 
humans, dopaminergic drugs are given systemically, for example through intravenous 
administration or in the form of a pill or capsule. After crossing the blood-brain barrier, 
these drugs can potentially influence multiple brain regions, restricting drawing firm 
conclusions about local specificity. Thus, even though dopaminergic drugs such as 
methylphenidate are often used, we do not yet fully understand how they work. What 
are their effects on stability versus flexibility? Moreover, do they affect cognitive 
control directly or indirectly? As I will lay out below, cognitive control is not just about 
ability, but is also affected by our motivation to exert cognitive control. For example, 
cognitive and attentional deficits often associated with ADHD may be related to effort 
and motivational deficits, such as altered reward sensitivity, in agreement with a 
cognitive-energetic model of ADHD (Sergeant, 2000, 2005; Volkow et al., 2011). Other 
questions are therefore whether dopaminergic drugs also alter the willingness, rather 
than the ability, to exert cognitive tasks and whether and how they modulate reward 
sensitivity? In this thesis, I aim to advance our understanding on the role of dopamine 
in linking motivation and cognitive control. In the following sections, I will discuss the 











herein. Throughout the text, I will refer to specific chapters examining certain sub-
questions, finishing with an outline of this thesis. 
Motivation and cost-benefit analyses
In the previous sections I explained how cognitive control depends on working memory 
processes, and how the cortico-basal ganglia gating system allows information to 
enter our working memory. I will now discuss how this gating system is affected by 
motivation. Going back to our example, as soon as my friend’s story turned interesting, 
the context in which I was watching television, reading my messages, and preparing 
my soup changed. Reading messages became more valuable to me. This led me to focus 
on my messages, while suppressing input from the television or the boiling soup. When 
I started to smell something burning, the context changed yet again. The soup became 
more valuable. Or rather, the potential cost of staying focused on my messages and not 
attending to my soup became too high, upon which I decided to run to my soup. Thus, 
cognitive control and working memory gating can be framed as involving a decision 
about the costs and benefits associated with different tasks (Cools, 2016). 
The benefit of a task can comprise a promised reward upon successful completion of 
a task. This could be the motivation of a participant of one of my studies, whom I pay 
for their participation. It can also be that someone decides to participate in a study 
because they are curious to try out methylphenidate (also known by its tradename 
Ritalin®), which they were asked to do in one of my experiments (Chapter 2). Someone 
might also be genuinely interested in a task, such as participating in a scientific study, 
or enjoy the process, such as when I try to solve a crossword puzzle. 
The cost of a task can be associated with the mental effort you need to engage in to 
complete a task, which is often experienced as aversive (Kool & Botvinick, 2014; Massar 
et al., 2016; Westbrook et al., 2013). Although it is still an open question what exactly 
constitutes this aversiveness or cost of engaging in cognitive control, it has been 
suggested that intrinsic costs such as task demands, response conflict, error-likelihood 
and risk play a role (Apps et al., 2015; Cavanagh et al., 2014; Dunn et al., 2019; Kool & 
Botvinick, 2013). Another source of cost is that one can only deploy cognitive resources 
for a limited number of simultaneous tasks. This means that by focusing on a certain 
task, you forego benefits you could have obtained by spending the same amount of time 
or resources on an alternative task. The notion of foregone benefits or ‘opportunity 
costs’ has been important in relation to foraging (Charnov, 1976; Kolling et al., 2012). 
When an animal is foraging in a certain food patch, it cannot simultaneously forage 
in another potentially valuable patch. The Marginal Value Theorem describes that an 
General introduction
18
animal should leave the current patch to explore other patches as soon as the reward 
rate, or the rate at which food is encountered, falls below the average reward rate of 
alternative patches (Charnov, 1976). This theory has been corroborated by research 
in human participants, showing that people indeed more readily switch to alternative 
options when either the average reward rate of these alternative options is higher or 
when the current option becomes less valuable (Constantino & Daw, 2015; Kolling et al., 
2012; Le Heron et al., 2020). 
Insights from the foraging literature have been leveraged for our understanding of cost-
benefit decision-making about cognitive effort. By using cognitive resources for one 
task, one foregoes the opportunity to use these resources for other cognitive tasks. It 
has been argued that the subjective feeling of effort during a task is the felt consequence 
of these opportunity costs, such that we experience a task as more effortful when it 
carries higher opportunity costs (Boureau et al., 2015; Kurzban et al., 2013). This higher 
opportunity cost or stronger feeling of effort should then lead people to quit focusing on 
the current task and switch to an alternative, more valuable task. However, calculating 
the opportunity costs of a task is usually not straightforward: You have to take into 
account all other possible tasks you could have been doing, which is quite a large 
number of alternatives in our complex world. This computation itself would demand a 
lot of cognitive resources and would thus be very costly. Therefore, a simpler way to 
approximate these costs is to keep track of the long-term average reward rate of rewards 
received over time (Boureau et al., 2015; Niv et al., 2007). Over time, we encounter tasks 
that are highly rewarding or less rewarding. When we keep track of the average value of 
the rewards we have received over time for completing these tasks, we can compare the 
reward we expect to receive for the current task with this average value. If the current 
task has greater value than the long-term average, it is worth focusing on that task. 
Otherwise, if the current task’s value falls below the average, we should abandon the 
task and explore alternative tasks with potentially higher values (Charnov, 1976).  
Thus, to decide whether and how strongly to focus on a task or to update our working 
memory and flexibly explore other options, we need to continuously engage in cost-
benefit analyses to compute the expected net value of control (Shenhav et al., 2013, 
2017). Based on these computed values, we select tasks or cognitive strategies that 
maximize our expected reward rate. 
So far, I have discussed that cognitive control and working memory rely on the 
prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia for the maintenance and updating of information, 
and that motivation and rewards play a role in deciding which information is valuable 
enough to attend to. In the next section, I will review how motivation modulates 











The role of dopamine in linking motivation and 
cognitive control 
In addition to its role in cognitive control directly, dopamine has also been implicated 
in motivation and reward processing. Using a paradigm where monkeys received a 
reward in the form of a juice after hearing a tone, it was found that midbrain dopamine 
cells got activated upon receiving the reward (Schultz, 1997). Later in the experiment, 
when the animals had learned the association between the tone and the reward, the 
midbrain dopamine cells did not respond to the reward anymore, but rather to the 
tone predicting the reward. Interestingly, activity in the dopamine cells was suppressed 
when the tone sounded, but no reward arrived. This has been interpreted as a reward 
prediction error signal, which is the difference between the reward received and the 
reward predicted (Montague et al., 1996). Early in the experiment, the reward was 
unexpected, leading to a positive prediction error and increased dopamine activity. 
Later, the monkey expected to receive a reward after hearing the tone, so there was no 
difference between the expected and the received reward and no change in dopamine 
activity. When the monkey did not receive the expected reward after hearing the 
tone, this resulted in a negative prediction error and a dip in dopamine activity in 
the midbrain. In the subsections below I will review the role of dopamine in linking 
motivation and cognitive control from two different perspectives. First, how does 
dopamine affect our choices about exerting cognitive control? This will also be the 
topic of the first experimental chapter, chapter 2. Second, how does dopamine interact 
with reward effects on cognitive control? Chapters 3-6 ultimately aim to investigate 
this latter question, with a special emphasis on the balance between stable and flexible 
cognitive control.   
Dopamine and cost-benefit decision-making
As we have seen above, cognitive performance is governed by cost-benefit analyses. 
How then, does dopamine affect the choices we make about exerting cognitive control? 
In the animal literature it has repeatedly been shown that dopaminergic manipulations, 
such as neuronal lesions or pharmacological interventions, affected the willingness to 
choose a more effortful option (such as climbing a barrier) for more reward versus a 
less effortful option (without a barrier) for less reward. Decreasing dopamine made 
the animals choose the high effort/high reward option less often, which could not be 
attributed to motor deficiencies (Salamone et al., 2009). Similar findings have been 
observed in humans, with the indirect dopamine agonist amphetamine increasing 
participant’s willingness to exert physical effort (button pressing) for reward (Wardle 
et al., 2011). Moreover, participants with Parkinson’s disease, characterized by striatal 
dopamine depletion, chose to exert less physical effort (squeezing a handgrip) in return 
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for reward than healthy control participants. This motivational deficit was eliminated 
when they took their medication, restoring dopamine levels (Chong et al., 2015; Le 
Bouc et al., 2016). These findings were replicated using a cognitive attentional task, 
rather than a physical task, showing that Parkinson’s patients off their dopaminergic 
medication were less willing to opt for a high effort/high reward option than healthy 
control participants, but this was ameliorated when they were on their medication 
(Mcguigan et al., 2019). 
Thus, dopamine appears to increase the balance of benefits over cost. This is captured 
by a neurocomputational framework of striatal dopamine: Activity in the Go pathway 
is argued to signal the benefits of an action, whereas activity in the NoGo pathway 
in argued to signal the costs of an action. Dopamine emphasizes processing in the 
Go pathway through D1 receptors and suppresses processing in the NoGo pathway 
through D2 receptors (Box 1). Striatal dopamine therefore increases the sensitivity to 
differences in benefits between options and decreases the sensitivity to differences 
in costs between options, resulting in more high effort/high reward choices (Collins 
& Frank, 2014). Later experimental and computational work has corroborated this by 
showing that reward cues enhanced both speed and accuracy on a task requiring rapid 
saccades to a target. This effect of reward cues was smaller in patients with Parkinson’s 
diseases, which could computationally be accounted for by a higher cost for increasing 
the signal-to-noise ratio, or precision, in patients, being suggestive of an important role 
for dopamine in the reduction of effort costs (Manohar et al., 2015). 
Open questions are whether and how dopaminergic medication plays a role in the 
valuation of cognitive control or in decision-making about whether to exert control in 
healthy, human participants. Does dopamine indeed increase sensitivity to the benefits 
and decrease sensitivity to the costs, thereby biasing people to engage in cognitive 
effort? I will address this in chapter 2, where I examine the effect of the dopamine 
transporter blocker methylphenidate (Box 2) on decision-making about engaging in 
cognitive effort in healthy participants. This is societally relevant, as methylphenidate 
is not only clinically prescribed to patients with ADHD to enhance cognitive control but 
also widely used as a smart drug by the healthy population. 
Dopamine, reward and the stability-flexibility balance
Midbrain dopamine cells, which are activated in response to reward, project to both the 
prefrontal cortex and the striatum. As we have seen, dopamine might have differential 
effects, arguably depending on its locus of control. This poses the question what will 
happen to the stability-flexibility balance when we encounter a reward or are highly 











At first sight, and perhaps also in line with intuition, incentive motivation (motivation 
activated by external reward cues, such as a promised monetary reward upon 
successful completion of task) generally improves focus and cognitive control (Pessoa, 
2017). For example, participants performed faster (and as accurate) on a working 
memory task when they could earn a reward, compared with when they could not 
earn a reward (Krawczyk et al., 2007). At the neural level, high reward trials enhanced 
activation in task relevant brain areas in the prefrontal cortex and in brain regions 
representing stimuli that should be attended to, and reduced activation in brain 
regions representing stimuli that should be ignored, indicating increased attention and 
distractor resistance. Similar results were found in a study testing response conflict, 
where participants had to respond whether a picture depicted a house or another type 
of building, while ignoring an overlaid word “house” or “bldng” which could either 
be congruent or incongruent with the picture (Padmala & Pessoa, 2011). Participants 
exhibited reduced conflict at the behavioral level, indicated by faster response times, 
and stronger neural activation of frontoparietal attentional networks on reward versus 
no-reward trials. Interestingly, however, they also found stronger coupling between 
striatal regions and frontoparietal regions during the reward condition, suggesting that 
increased focus is not a result of merely increased frontal activity. Correspondingly, a 
study directly comparing flexible updating and distractor resistance found increased 
activity in and connectivity between the ventral striatum and prefrontal cortex on trials 
in which participants received a performance-independent reward compared with a 
loss, which was associated with better distractor resistance and poorer updating at the 
behavioral level (Fallon & Cools, 2014). In a later study, the authors aimed to assess 
the effect of de dopamine transporter blocker methylphenidate on these reward-
related neural effects (Fallon et al., 2017). They found that, at the behavioral level, 
methylphenidate increased distractor resistance at the expense of updating. At the 
neural level, methylphenidate increased activity in the prefrontal cortex during trials 
requiring distractor resistance while reducing them during trials requiring updating. 
Methylphenidate also increased activity in the striatum, independent of trial-type. This 
task-general increase in striatal activity was hypothesized to be a prerequisite for the 
task-specific effect in the prefrontal cortex, although connectivity between the areas 
was not analyzed. Importantly, though, these methylphenidate-induced effects did not 
interact with the effect of reward, neither on the behavioral nor on the neural level. 
These studies indicate that motivation improves attention and focus through increased 
connectivity between striatal and prefrontal areas. 
Results more in line with motivation improving flexibility have also been found (Aarts 
et al., 2010; van Holstein et al., 2011). For example, incentive motivation improved task 
switching, indicative of improved flexibility, in people with a genetic polymorphism 
associated with high striatal dopamine levels (Aarts et al., 2010), suggesting that 
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incentive motivation and dopamine transmission in the striatum have an interactive 
effect on cognitive control. At the behavioral level, other researchers have found that 
inducing performance-independent positive affect, for example by having participants 
listen to happy or pleasant music, increased susceptibility to distracting information 
(G. Rowe et al., 2007) and reduced focus after a trial with conflicting information 
(van Steenbergen et al., 2010). Similarly, simply observing positive affective pictures 
promoted cognitive flexibility, while increasing distractibility in a set-switching 
paradigm (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) and reducing maintenance of information in a 
Continuous Performance Test (Dreisbach, 2006). 
These contrasting results illustrate that it is still unclear whether rewards primarily 
act on the prefrontal cortex to enhance cognitive stability, or on the striatum to 
enhance cognitive flexibility (Aarts et al., 2011; Cools & Robbins, 2004), or perhaps 
alter the connectivity between striatal and prefrontal regions. Additionally, it is still 
unknown how dopaminergic medication interacts with the effect of reward, both at 
the behavioral and the neural level. In chapters 3-5 I address these open questions 
by aiming to establish a paradigm to assess reward effects on cognitive stability 
versus flexibility, with the ultimate goal to investigate the effect of dopamine on 
these reward effects. In these chapters I will also address other open issues regarding 
reward effects. For example, it is unclear how task contexts influence the effect of 
rewards on the stability/flexibility balance (Dreisbach & Fröber, 2019; Goschke & Bolte, 
2014). The prospect of a reward has been argued to increase a form of meta-control, 
which facilitates preparation (Chiew & Braver, 2016). This increased meta-control 
would then enhance cognitive stability in tasks requiring maintenance and distractor 
resistance, but can also enhance flexibility when tasks require updating (Goschke & 
Bolte, 2014). I will address this potential interaction between task requirements and 
reward in chapter 3 of this thesis by investigating whether incentive motivation 
indeed improves meta-control over the stability/flexibility balance. Yet another open 
issue is that performance-dependent and performance-independent rewards seem to 
have different effects. Notably, Braem et al. found different effects of performance-
dependent versus performance-independent rewards on the stability/flexibility 
balance, with performance-dependent rewards improving flexibility over stability 
but performance-independent rewards having the reverse effect (Braem et al., 2013). 
Therefore, I will specifically focus on performance-independent rewards in chapter 
4. Moreover, individual differences in baseline dopamine levels might play a role in 
reward-related effects, as I will discuss in more detail below. In chapter 5 I will assess 
whether effects of incentive motivation on the stability/flexibility balance indeed 











Individual differences in the effects of reward and 
dopamine manipulations
So far, I have reviewed the effects of rewards and dopamine manipulations on 
cognitive control and decision-making about exerting cognitive control across 
individuals. However, there is large individual variation, with the effects depending 
on baseline conditions. For example, administration of amphetamine to rodents 
decreased cognitive task avoidance in ‘slackers’, while increasing it in ‘workers’ (Cocker 
et al., 2012). By analogy, the effects of the stimulant methylphenidate on cognitive 
demand avoidance in young healthy human volunteers depended on trait impulsivity, 
with high impulsive participants becoming more avoidant of cognitive control than low 
impulsive participants (Froböse et al., 2018). Such contrasting effects on cognitive task 
avoidance are reminiscent of the variable effects of methylphenidate (and dopamine 
receptor agonists, such as bromocriptine) on task performance, with greater beneficial 
effects in participants with higher trait impulsivity (Clatworthy et al., 2009; Cools et al., 
2007). Effects of dopamine medication on cognitive task performance have also been 
shown to depend on working memory capacity under baseline conditions (Kimberg et 
al., 1997; Kimberg & D’Esposito, 2003; Mehta et al., 2000). These individual variations 
in drug responses are hypothesized to reflect variation in baseline dopamine levels 
(Cools & D’Esposito, 2011), as trait impulsivity is associated with low (presynaptic) 
dopamine receptor availability and high striatal dopamine release (Buckholtz et 
al, 2010; Lee et al, 2009; Kim et al, 2014; Reeves et al, 2012), and working memory 
capacity is associated with dopamine synthesis capacity (Cools et al, 2008; Landau 
et al, 2009). Prior work indeed suggests that individual variation in the effects of 
dopamine medication and reward on cognitive control depends on baseline dopamine-
related functioning, such as dopamine cell loss in Parkinson’s disease (Aarts et al., 
2012), dopamine transporter genotype (Aarts et al., 2010, 2015; van Holstein et al., 
2011), dopamine receptor availability (Samanez-Larkin & Buckholtz, 2013) and 
dopamine synthesis capacity (Aarts et al., 2014; Cools et al., 2009). This principle of 
baseline-dependency postulates that increases in dopamine, in response to dopamine 
medication or reward, have positive effects when baseline dopamine levels are low by 
shifting dopamine levels from suboptimal to optimal, but even negative effects when 
baseline levels are already high by shifting dopamine levels from optimal to supra-
optimal (Cools & D’Esposito, 2011). These negative effects are conceived to occur 
because supra-optimal dopamine levels in the prefrontal cortex drive noise reduction 
to the point where not only irrelevant but also relevant information is suppressed. 
Supra-optimal dopamine levels in the striatum would drive the updating of information 
to the point where it is no longer selective. However, there is also prior evidence for 
the opposite direction of baseline-dependency, with greater effects of dopamine 
enhancing drugs in high baseline-dopamine individuals (or individuals scoring high on 
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dopamine-proxy measures)(Samanez-Larkin & Buckholtz, 2013; Swart et al., 2017; van 
Der Schaaf et al., 2013; Volkow et al., 2002). 
Thus, variation in the effects of rewards and dopamine manipulation might be 
explained by individual differences in baseline dopamine conditions. I will delve into 
these aspects in several chapters: In chapter 1 I assess effects of dopaminergic drugs 
on cognitive motivation as a function of an individual’s baseline dopamine synthesis 
capacity and in chapters 5 and 6 I investigate the effects of incentive motivation 
on cognitive control as a function of trait impulsivity and as a function of baseline 
dopamine synthesis capacity, respectively.  
Summary and thesis outline
In the literature review above, we have seen that our cognitive control system involves 
linking goals with prior knowledge and task context. I have reviewed that the updating 
and maintenance of new information in working memory are important facets of 
cognitive control. I have discussed that cognitive control is not just about the ability 
to execute tasks, but also about willingness, such that we prioritize some tasks over 
others based on a cost-benefit analysis. I have also reviewed that the neuromodulator 
dopamine plays an important role in both the updating and the maintenance of 
information, as well as in the motivation for cognitive control, but that different studies 
have provided contrasting results as to the direction and the strength of these effects. 
Lastly, the effects of dopamine and rewards are hypothesized to depend on both 
baseline dopamine levels and task demands.  
The aim of this thesis is to provide a deeper understanding of the role of dopamine in 
the motivation for cognitive control. I approach this issue from two different angles: i) 
By assessing the role of dopamine in decision-making about whether to exert cognitive 
effort (chapter 2) and ii) by assessing the effect of reward and incentive motivation on 
cognitive performance and its modulation by dopamine (chapters 3-6). 
In chapter 2 I assessed whether the stimulant methylphenidate, often used to enhance 
cognitive performance in both clinical and healthy populations, also affects people’s 
valuation of cognitive effort. Specifically, I assessed the effect on their motivation for 
completing a cognitive working memory task versus leisure and whether the extent 
of this effect depends on baseline dopamine synthesis capacity. To that end, fifty 
healthy participants were tested on methylphenidate and placebo. To investigate the 
hypothesis that methylphenidate selectively affects dopaminergic signaling (rather 











dopamine D2-receptor agent sulpiride. Furthermore, they underwent a PET scan using 
the radiotracer [18F]DOPA, a radioactive precursor of dopamine, to quantify striatal 
dopamine synthesis capacity. The findings indicate that methylphenidate boosts 
choices of cognitive effort over leisure across the group, and that this effect is stronger 
in participants with more striatal dopamine synthesis capacity. The effects of sulpiride 
did not reach significance.
After assessing the effect of dopamine medication on the valuation of a cognitive task, I 
then focus on developing a paradigm with the goal to assess the role of dopamine in the 
incentivization of stable versus flexible cognitive control in the subsequent chapters. 
In chapter 3 I assessed whether contextual aspects modulate incentive effects on the 
stability/flexibility balance. I tested whether reward cues improve strategic meta-
control using a working memory paradigm that distinguishes between two different 
trial-types, one requiring cognitive stability and the other requiring flexibility. I 
manipulated the extent to which participants could exert strategic meta-control by 
varying the frequency of one trial-type over the other, allowing participants to prepare 
for the high-frequent trial type. I expected participants to be better prepared for 
demands for flexibility or stability when either is, respectively, more frequent, and 
that higher reward cues strengthen this effect.
As the results in chapter 3 were inconclusive, I examined the effect of a different reward 
manipulation in chapter 4. In contrast with the reward manipulation in chapter 3, where 
rewards were contingent on how well the participant performed the task, rewards 
in chapter 4 were independent of performance. I tested whether highly rewarding 
environments are associated with improved cognitive flexibility but reduced cognitive 
stability. I predicted that high non-contingent reward not only improves cognitive 
flexibility in terms of performance, but also reduces the subjective cost of cognitive 
flexibility versus stability, measured with a subsequent cognitive effort discounting 
procedure.
As chapters 3 and 4 did not yield significant effects of our reward manipulations, I 
wondered whether any effects could be exposed when taking into account individual 
differences in chapter 5. Specifically, I asked whether reward cues enhance performance 
on a task requiring cognitive flexibility at the expense of performance on a task 
requiring cognitive stability, and whether this effect depends on trait impulsivity, a 
supposed proxy of dopamine signaling. Again, this provided inconclusive results. 
The inconclusive results regarding the effects of reward on working memory 
performance in chapters 3 to 5 could potentially be due to the working memory 
paradigm being insensitive to reward manipulations, rather than reward having no 
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effect on cognitive control in general. Moreover, individual differences in dopamine 
transmission could play a role, which is not accounted for in chapters 3 and 4, and 
only indirectly assessed using a proxy-measure in chapter 5. Therefore, I asked 
whether I could recover previously found effects of incentive motivation on cognitive 
control as a function of a direct measure of dopamine levels, using an established 
paradigm in chapter 6. I aimed to replicate earlier findings by Aarts and colleagues 
(2014), who demonstrated, in 14 individuals, that the effect of reward cues depended 
on individual differences in striatal dopamine synthesis capacity, measured with 
[18F]FMT-PET: High reward cues improved cognitive control in low-dopamine 
individuals, while impairing it in high-dopamine individuals. These findings were 
attributed to an overdosing of already high baseline dopamine levels by further 
dopamine increases elicited by reward cues. In chapter 6, I assessed this same effect in 
44 participants, who had previously undergone an [18F]DOPA-PET scan (chapter 2) to 
quantify dopamine synthesis capacity. However, I show that the cognitive effects of a 
high reward cue do not depend on dopamine synthesis capacity in this new study. 
I summarize the main findings of those experiments in chapter 7 and discuss them in 











Box 2 | Dopamine transmission
 
FIGURE 1.3 | Depiction of dopamine transmission.  
Dopamine is released from dopamine vesicles in the presynaptic neuron (upper 
neuron) into the synaptic cleft. Dopamine can then stimulate D1 receptors on the 
postsynaptic neuron (lower neuron), facilitating activation of the postsynaptic neuron, 
or D2 receptors, inhibiting the activation of the postsynaptic neuron. Dopamine can 
also stimulate D2 receptors on the presynaptic neuron, providing negative feedback to 
inhibit dopamine transmission. Dopamine action can be terminated by reuptake into 
the presynaptic neuron by dopamine transporters. 
In chapter 2, we used methylphenidate and sulpiride to alter dopamine transmission. 
Methylphenidate is a dopamine transporter blocker, blocking the reuptake of dopamine 
and thereby increasing dopamine transmission. 
However, this transporter is also responsible for the reuptake of another 
neurotransmitter, noradrenaline. To test whether the effects of methylphenidate were 
dopaminergic rather than noradrenergic, we also looked at the effect of sulpiride, 
which has a selective action on dopamine transmission. Sulpiride is a D2 receptor 
antagonist, meaning that it blocks the D2 receptor, inhibiting the action of dopamine. 
When sulpiride binds postsynaptically, it blocks the activation of the postsynaptic D2 
receptors. However, when binding to presynaptic D2 receptors, it increases dopamine 
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Abstract
The cognitive enhancing effects of methylphenidate are well established, but the 
mechanisms remain unclear. We recently demonstrated that methylphenidate 
boosts cognitive motivation by enhancing the weight on the benefits of a cognitive 
task in a manner that depended on striatal dopamine. Here we considered the 
complementary hypothesis that methylphenidate might also act by changing the 
weight on the opportunity cost of a cognitive task, that is, the cost of foregoing 
alternative opportunity. To this end, fifty healthy participants (25 women) completed 
a novel cognitive effort discounting task that required choices between task and 
leisure. They were tested on methylphenidate, placebo as well as the selective D2-
receptor agent sulpiride, the latter to strengthen inference about dopamine receptor 
selectivity of methylphenidate’s effects. Furthermore, they also underwent an [18F]
DOPA PET scan to quantify striatal dopamine synthesis capacity. Methylphenidate 
boosted choices of cognitive effort over leisure across the group, and this effect was 
greatest in participants with more striatal dopamine synthesis capacity. The effects of 
sulpiride did not reach significance. This study strengthens the motivational account of 
methylphenidate’s effects on cognition and suggests that methylphenidate reduces the 












The brain catecholamines have long been implicated in a wide range of cognitive 
functions, including  working memory and cognitive control (Arnsten et al., 2015; Cools 
& D’Esposito, 2011; Goldman-Rakic, 1997). Drugs altering catecholamine transmission 
are first-line treatment for disorders accompanied by deficits in working memory and 
cognitive control, such as attention deficit/ hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) (Arnsten 
& Plizska, 2011; Prince, 2008) and are commonly used for cognitive enhancement in 
healthy people (Greely et al., 2008; Husain & Mehta, 2011; Schelle et al., 2015). Various 
studies have demonstrated that acute administration of psychostimulants, like the 
dopamine and noradrenaline transporter blocker methylphenidate, enhances working 
memory and cognitive control and decreases feelings of fatigue in healthy individuals 
(Elliott et al., 1997; Fallon et al., 2017; Repantis et al., 2010; Roehrs et al., 1999; Rogers 
et al., 1999; Samanez-Larkin & Buckholtz, 2013; Spronk et al., 2013; Ter Huurne et al., 
2015).
Such cognitive effects of catecholaminergic drugs have been most commonly attributed 
to a modulation of the ability to implement cognitive control, often associated with the 
prefrontal cortex (Arnsten et al., 2015). However, recent progress suggests that cognitive 
control might also be altered by changing motivation, that is the willingness to engage 
with a cognitive task, rather than ability alone (Manohar et al., 2015; Mcguigan et al., 
2019). Specifically, we have posited that the cognitive enhancing effects of drugs like 
methylphenidate, which act by blocking the dopamine and noradrenaline transporters, 
reflect changes in cost/benefit-based decision making about cognitive control, elicited 
by striatal dopamine (Cools, 2015; Froböse & Cools, 2018). While prior evidence, 
for example from medication withdrawal studies in Parkinson’s disease, generally 
concurred with this hypothesis (Clark et al., 1986; Froböse et al., 2018; Mcguigan et al., 
2019; Wardle et al., 2011) (but see (Hosking et al., 2015)), there was, until recently, no 
direct evidence for a specific role for dopamine in the striatum. To definitively test this 
role for striatal dopamine in cognitive motivation, we set up two separate cognitive 
effort discounting experiments in the context of a large pharmacological PET study 
with 100 healthy volunteers. In this study we directly quantified striatal dopamine 
synthesis capacity with PET, while also measuring effects of methylphenidate and 
sulpiride. In both experiments, participants completed a working memory task prior to 
drug administration and a cognitive effort discounting task after drug administration, 
allowing us to isolate drug effects on motivation in a manner that was not confounded 
by drug effects on performance. In a separate session, participants underwent an [18F]
DOPA PET scan to quantify dopamine synthesis capacity. Uptake of the radiotracer 
[18F]DOPA indexes the degree to which dopamine is synthesized in (the terminals of) 
midbrain dopamine neurons, providing a relatively stable trait index of dopamine 
Striatal dopamine-dependent effects of methylphenidate
40
transmission that is less sensitive to state-dependent changes in dopamine levels 
(Egerton et al., 2010) (but see (Schabram et al., 2014)) than other dopamine PET tracers 
such as [11C]raclopride or [18F]fallypride, which reflect D2/3-receptor availability. 
To substantiate the hypothesis that the effects of the non-specific catecholamine 
enhancer methylphenidate (which increases both dopamine and noradrenaline in both 
striatum and cortex) reflect modulation of striatal dopamine, we compared the effects 
of methylphenidate with the effects of the selective D2-receptor antagonist sulpiride, 
which acts primarily on the striatum where D2-receptors are disproportionately 
abundant (Hall et al., 1994; Mehta et al., 2003; Westerink et al., 2001). 
The two experiments in this large overarching pharmacological PET study were set 
up to test two complementary hypotheses about dopamine’s role in cognitive effort. 
The first experiment was inspired by neurocomputational modeling work of striatal 
dopamine (Opponent Actor Learning: OpAL model; (Collins & Frank, 2014)), according to 
which striatal dopamine increases the weight on the benefit versus cost of options by 
shifting the balance of activity towards the direct Go pathway away from the indirect 
NoGo pathway of the basal ganglia. To test this hypothesis, half of the participants 
included in our study completed an experiment that we recently reported in Westbrook 
et al. (Westbrook et al., 2020), where participants chose between high-effort and low-
effort options while we tracked their eye gaze. In line with the OpAL model (Collins & 
Frank, 2014), this experiment demonstrated that both methylphenidate and sulpiride 
boosted the selection of a high- versus low-effort task by increasing the weight on 
the benefits (monetary payoff) of the high-effort task. This drug effect was present 
only in participants with lower striatal dopamine synthesis capacity, in line with the 
hypothesis that dopaminergic drug effects depend on variability in striatal dopamine 
(Cocker et al., 2012; Cools & D’Esposito, 2011; Froböse et al., 2018). 
The other half of the participants included in the large pharmacological PET study 
completed the experiment reported here. This experiment was motivated by a 
different hypothesis, derived from the recent opportunity cost theory of cognitive 
effort (Kurzban et al., 2013; Otto & Daw, 2019), stating that performance of cognitive 
control tasks is costly, because it requires task focus and persistent task engagement, 
which interferes with performing potentially rewarding alternative tasks. Inspired by 
the proposal that the opportunity cost of physical effort, equal to the average reward 
rate of the environment, corresponds to levels of tonic dopamine (Niv et al., 2007), the 
opportunity cost of cognitive effort was argued to also be carried by tonic dopamine 
(Cools, 2015; Kurzban et al., 2013) (but see (Grogan et al., 2020; Zénon et al., 2016)). 
To test this hypothesis, the current paradigm maximizes sensitivity to the opportunity 
cost of task engagement by allowing participants to choose between task engagement 











our previous experiment reported in Westbrook et al. (Westbrook et al., 2020) required 
choices between high- and low-effort options, thus controlling for opportunity cost. 
For the present experiment, we considered two alternative hypotheses. First, we 
reasoned that prolonging the action of dopamine in the synapse via methylphenidate 
might potentiate task disengagement by amplifying a putatively dopamine-mediated 
signal of the opportunity costs of cognitive task engagement (Cools, 2015). By contrast, 
we also considered the hypothesis that, in line with the OpAL model, methylphenidate 
might potentiate task engagement by shifting the balance more towards the benefits 
and away from the costs of cognitive work (Collins & Frank, 2014). Given prior evidence 
for large individual variability in dopaminergic drug effects, we anticipated that this 
effect would depend on striatal dopamine synthesis capacity. Although sulpiride can 
block postsynaptic D2 receptors at higher doses (Eisenegger et al., 2014), we predicted 
that the direction of sulpiride effects at the dose used in the current study (400mg) 
would parallel that of methylphenidate’s effects due to presynaptic autoreceptor 
binding, resulting in enhanced dopamine release (Frank & O’Reilly, 2006; Mehta et al., 
2008). These predictions were preregistered on https://osf.io/g2z6p/.
Materials and methods
Data and code are available via https://osf.io/4zwu7/.    
Participants
Fifty right-handed, neurologically and psychiatrically healthy volunteers were 
recruited as part of a larger study (detailed study overview in Supplementary 
information). Participants provided written informed consent and were paid €309 
upon completion of the study. The study was approved by the local ethics committee 
(CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands: protocol NL57538.091.16; trial 
register NTR6140, https://www.trialregister.nl/trial/5959). One participant dropped 
out during the second day due to nausea, another after four study days due to anxiety, 
and PET data of two other participants were incomplete (one due to scanner software 
problems and another due to discomfort during scanning). We analyzed data of the 
resulting 46 participants (age: mean(SD) = 23.8 (5.9) years; 23 women; body weight: 
mean(SD) = 71.0(10.1) kg). 
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General study overview and pharmacological manipulation
A within-subjects, cross-over and double-blind design was used, comprising 
five sessions. The first day served as an intake session. On the following three 
pharmacological sessions, participants first completed a working memory delayed 
response task (24 minutes). To ensure blinding with regard to drug condition, they then 
received one capsule at each of two different time points: either placebo or 400mg 
sulpiride at timepoint 1 and either placebo or 20mg methylphenidate at timepoint 
2. Participants completed a cognitive effort-discounting choice procedure (duration: 
22 minutes) 140 minutes after sulpiride (or the first placebo) administration and 50 
minutes after methylphenidate (or the second placebo) administration. Sulpiride 
plasma concentrations have been found to peak after approximately 3 hours (mean 
≈ 2.9h; SD ≈ 1.3h (Helmy, 2013; Wiesel et al., 1980)) and methylphenidate plasma 
concentrations have been found to peak after approximately 2 hours (mean ≈ 2.2h; 
SD ≈ 0.8h (Kimko et al., 1999; Spencer et al., 2006; Wargin et al., 1983)). Drug timings 
were optimized for peak effects during an fMRI paradigm not reported here; near-
peak effects were expected during the choice procedure. On the fifth day, participants 
underwent an [18F]DOPA PET scan to quantify their dopamine synthesis capacity. See 
Supplementary information for complete task battery and timings.
Behavioral paradigm
Color wheel working memory task 
The color wheel task (Figure 2.1A) is a delayed response working memory task assessing 
two distinct component processes of cognitive control: distractor resistance and 
flexible updating (Cools, 2016; Papadopetraki et al., 2019). A more detailed description 
of the paradigm and a discussion on flexibility versus stability are reported in the 
Supplementary information. The primary research question of this study concerned drug 
effects on motivation, irrespective of the type of cognitive control process. On each trial, 
participants had 0.5s to memorize the colors and locations of one to four squares (set-
size 1-4), followed by a 2s fixation cross. Then, a new set of colors appeared on screen 
for 0.5s, accompanied by either the letter ‘I’ (for ‘ignore’) or the letter ‘U’ (for ‘update’). In 
the ignore task-type, participants had to ignore the new colors and keep the previous set 
in memory. In the update task-type, they had to update their memory with the new set 
of colors. This was again followed by a fixation cross, which, depending on the task-type, 
lasted either 2s or 4.5s, ensuring equal delay times between the relevant stimuli (first set 
for the ignore type and second set for the update type) and the subsequent probe. During 
this probe phase, participants had 4s to indicate the color of the target square by clicking 
on the corresponding color on a color wheel. Participants completed 128 trials divided 












To quantify participants’ cognitive motivation, participants completed a choice task 
(Figure 2.1B) where they successively chose between repeating the color wheel task 
(redo option) for more money or a no-redo (rest) option for less money, in which 
participants would be free to do what they wanted for an equal length of time while 
staying in the testing room. Participants were informed that one of their redo versus no-
redo choices would be selected randomly for them to complete. Due to time constraints, 
and known to the participant, the entire task (i.e. both the monetary bonus and the redo 
of the color wheel task) was hypothetical. A strong effect of set-size on proportion of 
redo choices validated the task manipulation, evidencing strong monotonic cognitive 
load-based discounting (see Results). The hypothetical compensation for the redo 
option was fixed at €2.00. We assumed that participants would prefer the no-redo over 
the redo option. However, to also accommodate the possibility of effort seeking, that 
is, that some participants would unexpectedly prefer the redo option over the no-redo 
option, we varied the compensation for the no-redo option from €0.10 to €2.20. The 
redo option was further specified by task-type and set-size, so that participants were 
instructed that the majority of trials in the redo block would consist of trials of the 
chosen task-type and set-size. The remainder of the trials would be randomly divided 
among all task-type and set-size combinations. To account for the stochastic nature 
of decision-making (Rieskamp, 2008), we opted not to use a titration procedure for 
arriving at the subjective value (Westbrook et al., 2013), since titration adjusts the offer 
for the no-redo option based on previous, noisy choices. Instead, we randomly sampled 
choices across the full value-range in 3 blocks of 96 trials each, equally divided across 
set-size, task-type and monetary offer for the no-redo option.
PET acquisition and preprocessing
PET scans were acquired on a Siemens PET/CT-scanner at the Department of Nuclear 
Medicine of the Radboudumc, using an [18F]DOPA radiotracer, produced by the Radboud 
Translational Medicine department. Participants received 150mg carbidopa and 
400mg entacapone 50 minutes before scanning, to minimize peripheral metabolism of 
[18F]DOPA by decarboxylase and COMT, respectively, thereby increasing signal to noise 
ratio in the brain. After a bolus injection of [18F]DOPA (185MBq; approximately 5mCi) 
into the antecubital vein, the procedure started with a low dose CT-scan (approximately 
0.75mCi) for attenuation correction of the PET images after which a dynamic PET 
scan was collected over 89 minutes, divided into 24 frames (4x1, 3x2, 3x3, 14x5 
min). PET data (4x4x3mm voxel size; 5mm slice thickness; 200x200x75 matrix) were 
reconstructed with weighted attenuation correction and time-of-flight recovery, 
scatter-corrected, and smoothed with a 3mm full-width-at-half-maximum (FWHM) 
kernel. For registration purposes we acquired a T1-weighted  anatomical MRI scan 
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on the first testing day, using an MP-RAGE sequence (repetition time = 2300ms, echo 
time = 3.03ms, 192 sagittal slices, field of view = 256mm, voxel size 1mm isometric) 
on a Siemens 3T MR-scanner with a 64-channel coil. After reconstruction, PET data 
were preprocessed using SPM12 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). All frames were 
realigned for motion correction and coregistered to the anatomical MRI-scan, using 
the mean PET image of the first 11 frames (using the mean image of only the first 11 
frames improves coregistration, because these images have a greater range in image 
contrast in regions outside the striatum). Dopamine synthesis capacity was computed 
per voxel as [18F]DOPA influx constant per minute (Ki) relative to the cerebellar grey 
matter reference region using Gjedde-Patlak graphical analysis on the PET frames from 
the 24th to 89th minute (Patlak et al., 1983). We then extracted average Ki values from 
three regions of interest (ROIs) – nucleus accumbens, putamen and caudate nucleus – 
defined using masks based on an independent functional connectivity-analysis of 
the striatum (Piray et al., 2017) and exactly the same as reported in Westbrook et al. 
(Westbrook et al., 2020) (Figure 2.1C). 
Data analysis 
Performance measures on the color wheel task included median absolute degrees of 
deviance of the response from the correct color (deviance) and median response time 
(RT) for each participant. Participants’ preferences on the choice task were calculat-
ed as the proportion of trials on which participants chose the redo option over the 
no-redo option (proportion redo). Outliers were a priori defined as those who deviat-
ed more than three standard deviations from the global mean, which did not result in 
any exclusions. Repeated-measures ANOVAs were performed using the aov_car func-
tion from the afex package (Singmann et al., 2020) in R (version 3.6.0) including drug 
(placebo, methylphenidate, or sulpiride), task-type (ignore or update) and set-size 
(ranging from 1 to 4) as within-subjects variables and dopamine synthesis capacity 
(Ki; measured as the average [18F]DOPA uptake across all voxels within each ROI, 
mean-centered across participants) as covariate. Unless stated otherwise, we conduct-
ed an initial omnibus test including all three drug conditions (drug(3) x task-type(2) 
x set-size(4) x Ki), followed-up by three planned comparisons between each pair of 
drug conditions (drug(2) x task-type(2) x set-size(4) x Ki) and the simple three-way 
interaction under placebo (task-type(2) x set-size(4) x Ki). Separate analyses were run 
for each ROI – nucleus accumbens, putamen and caudate nucleus. Greenhouse–Geisser 
corrections were applied when the sphericity assumption was violated. A p-value 
smaller than 0.017 (Bonferroni-corrected for the 3 ROIs) was considered significant. 
Partial eta squared (hp2) and confidence intervals were calculated using the eta.partial.











FIGURE 2.1 | A – Schematic of the color wheel working memory task. I = ‘ignore’: participants 
have to ignore the new squares while still remembering the previous set of squares. U = ‘update’: 
participants have to remember the new set of squares and forget the previous set. B – Example 
trial sequence of the cognitive effort discounting choice task. C – Coronal view of our regions of 
interest including the nucleus accumbens (blue), putamen (green) and caudate nucleus (red).  
Results
Working memory performance
Before drug intake, participants performed the working memory task. Across sessions 
and in line with earlier work (Papadopetraki et al., 2019), participants performed 
poorer when working memory load increased, as indicated by higher deviance (hp2 = 
0.46, 90% CI [0.34, 0.55], p < 0.001) and longer RTs (hp2 = 0.77, 90% CI [0.69, 0.81], p 
< 0.001). While participants deviated from the target color less on update trials (hp2 = 
0.50, 90% CI [0.31, 0.66], p < 0.001), their RTs were longer compared with ignore trials 
(hp2 = 0.43, 90% CI [0.23, 0.59], p < 0.001). Both deviance and RT show a significant 
interaction (deviance: hp2 = 0.25, 90% CI [0.14, 0.35], p < 0.001; RT: hp2 = 0.09, 90% CI 
[0.02, 0.16], p = 0.006; Figure 2.2A-B).
There was no main effect of dopamine synthesis capacity on either deviance (caudate 
nucleus: hp2 = 0.01, 90% CI [0.00, 0.12], p = 0.471; putamen: hp2 = 0.00, 90% CI [0.00, 0.06], 
p = 0.795; nucleus accumbens: hp2 = 0.01, 90% CI [0.00, 0.09], p = 0.634) or RT (caudate 
nucleus: hp2 = 0.00, 90% CI [0.00, 0.05], p = 0.842; putamen: hp2 = 0.01, 90% CI [0.00, 
0.10], p = 0.577; nucleus accumbens: hp2 = 0.00, 90% CI [0.00, 0.09], p = 0.661), nor did 
dopamine synthesis capacity interact with any of the other variables.   
Methylphenidate increased cognitive motivation 
Under placebo, participants exhibited a preference for not repeating any task, as 
evidenced by the proportion redo being significantly smaller than 0.5 (proportion = 0.38, 
SD = 0.24; Cohen’s d = -0.51, 95% CI [-0.82, -0.20], p = 0.001). As hypothesized, we found 
a significant effect of drug on proportion redo (main effect of drug with 3 conditions: hp2 
= 0.10, 90% CI [0.02, 0.21], p = 0.008). This was driven by higher proportion redo under 
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methylphenidate versus placebo (hp2 = 0.15, 90% CI [0.03, 0.33], p = 0.007; Figure 2.2D). 
There was no difference between sulpiride and placebo (hp2 = 0.01, 90% CI [0.00, 0.12], p 
= 0.443; Figure 2.2D). Numerically, proportion redo was higher under methylphenidate 
than sulpiride, but this difference did not survive correction for multiple comparisons 
(hp2 = 0.12, 90% CI [0.01, 0.29], p = 0.021). Proportion redo decreased with set-size (hp2 = 
0.64, 90% CI [0.55, 0.71], p < 0.001; Figure 2.2C). There was no effect of task-type (hp2 = 
0.03, 90% CI [0.00, 0.15], p = 0.268) and no interaction between task-type and set-size 
(hp2 = 0.03, 90% CI [0.00, 0.08], p = 0.247), nor did drug interact with task-type (hp2 = 0.02, 
90% CI [0.00, 0.03], p = 0.478) or set-size (hp2 = 0.02, 90% CI [0.00, 0.07], p = 0.496). 
FIGURE 2.2 | A – Median absolute deviance, B – median response times and C – the proportion 
of trials on which participants chose the redo option across drug sessions plotted as a 
function of set-size, separately for each task-type. D – Drug effect on the proportion of trials 
on which participants chose the redo option (methylphenidate or sulpiride minus placebo). 
The methylphenidate-induced effect on proportion redo choices is still significant without the 
participant showing the greatest effect: F(2,86) = 4.0, p = 0.022. Error bars represent 95% confidence 















High-dopamine participants exhibited greater methylphenidate-re-
lated increases in cognitive motivation 
The effect of methylphenidate on proportion redo depended on dopamine 
synthesis capacity. This was supported by a significant interaction between drug 
(methylphenidate, sulpiride, placebo) and dopamine synthesis capacity in the nucleus 
accumbens (p = 0.009; Figure 2.3B-C; Table 2.1). Participants with higher dopamine 
synthesis capacity in the nucleus accumbens exhibited greater methylphenidate-
induced increases in proportion redo choices than participants with lower dopamine 
synthesis capacity (p = 0.006). The drug by dopamine synthesis capacity interaction 
for sulpiride versus placebo (p = 0.314) and for methylphenidate versus sulpiride (p = 
0.034) were not significant, after correction for multiple comparisons. Although sub-
threshold, interactions in the same direction were found between drug and dopamine 
synthesis capacity in the putamen and caudate nucleus (Figure 2.3B-C; Table 2.1). A 
negative association between dopamine synthesis capacity and proportion redo choices 
under placebo was not significant (Figure 2.3A; Table 2.1). Importantly, supplementary 
analyses demonstrated that the effect of methylphenidate on proportion redo does 
not reflect changes in choice randomness, effects on task performance (completed 
prior to drug administration), or effects on mood and medical symptoms. The effect is 
reproduced when analyzing ‘indifference points’ and when controlling for (a failure to 
counterbalance) session order (Supplementary information). 
Drug manipulation does not interact with the benefit of engaging in a 
cognitive task 
Primary analyses on proportion redo choices revealed no significant interactions 
between drug and the cognitive cost of the task – the set-size. We also explored 
whether drug effects interacted with the benefit of the task – the monetary payoff for 
the redo option relative to the no-redo option. Note that the payoff of the redo options 
was constant throughout the task. To that end, we added, in an additional analysis, the 
monetary payoff for the no-redo option to our rmANOVA. Because each monetary value 
was only repeated three times per drug session, task-type and set-size, we divided 
these values into tertiles so that proportion redo was calculated based on 12 trials. As 
expected, the monetary payoff had a strong negative main effect on proportion redo 
(hp2 = 0.72, 90% CI [0.62, 0.79], p < 0.001), such that the higher the payoff for the no-
redo option, the less often people chose the redo option. Although numerically there 
was a greater methylphenidate-related increase in proportion redo when the payoff 
for the no-redo option was lower (i.e. when the benefit for the task was higher), payoff 
did not significantly interact with drug (hp2 = 0.05, 90% CI [0.00, 0.10], p = 0.062) or 
with the interaction of drug with dopamine synthesis capacity (nucleus accumbens: hp2 
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= 0.02, 90% CI [0.00, 0.04], p = 0.562; putamen: hp2 = 0.02, 90% CI [0.00, 0.04], p = 0.513; 
caudate nucleus: hp2 = 0.02, 90% CI [0.00, 0.04], p = 0.456). Thus, while the possibility 
of unstructured free time comprised unmeasured opportunity costs of engaging in the 
task, drug manipulation did not reliably affect the sensitivity to the relative, explicit 
costs or benefits of the redo option.
High-dopamine participants exhibited greater methylphenidate-re-
lated slowing of choice latency
Exploratory analyses of choice latency revealed no main effect of drug (hp2 = 0.01, 
90% CI [0.00, 0.03], p = 0.794). There was a significant interaction between effect of 
drug on choice latency and dopamine synthesis capacity in the nucleus accumbens 
(p = 0.005) and putamen (p = 0.002; Table 2.1), which was driven by a difference 
between methylphenidate and placebo (nucleus accumbens: p = 0.002; putamen: p < 
0.001; Table 2.1; Figure 2.4B-C). Methylphenidate slowed people with higher dopamine 
synthesis capacity and invigorated people with lower dopamine synthesis capacity. 
No significant interactions between dopamine synthesis capacity and the effect of 
sulpiride (p > 0.096), or between dopamine synthesis capacity and the difference 
between methylphenidate and sulpiride (p > 0.021) were observed (Table 2.1). A 
significant negative association between dopamine synthesis capacity and choice 
latency under placebo was present in the nucleus accumbens (p < 0.001) and putamen 
(p = 0.010), but not in the caudate nucleus (p = 0.063), indicating that higher dopamine 
synthesis capacity was associated with faster responding (Figure 2.4A; Table 2.1). 
Positive correlation between drug-induced effects on cognitive moti-
vation and choice latency
Individuals who showed greater methylphenidate-related increases in proportion 
redo also showed greater methylphenidate-related slowing (Pearson’s r = 0.67, 95% CI 
[0.48, 0.81], p < 0.001). A similar positive correlation was present between the effect of 
sulpiride versus placebo on choice latency and the drug effect on proportion redo (r = 
0.50, 95% CI [0.24, 0.69], p < 0.001). 
All region-of-interest based results were corroborated by voxel-wise Ki analyses 
(Supplementary information), of which the unthresholded statistical maps are available 











FIGURE 2.3 | Proportion redo choices as a function of dopamine synthesis capacity in the nucleus 
accumbens (upper panels), putamen (middle panels) and caudate nucleus (bottom panels). p-values 
< 0.017 were considered significant. A. Correlation between dopamine synthesis capacity and 
proportion redo choices under placebo. B. Correlation between dopamine synthesis capacity and 
drug-induced changes in proportion redo choices. Correlation coefficients and p-values without 
the participant showing the greatest methylphenidate-induced effect on proportion redo choices: 
rnucleus accumbens = 0.36, p = 0.014; rputamen = 0.41, p = 0.005; rcaudate nucleus = 0.29, p = 0.056. C. Median 
split on dopamine synthesis capacity for visualization purposes. Shaded areas and error bars 
represent 95% confidence interval around the mean. PBO = placebo; MPH = methylphenidate; SUL 
= sulpiride; Ki = [
18F]DOPA uptake. 
BA C
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FIGURE 2.4 | Choice latency as a function of dopamine synthesis capacity in the nucleus accumbens 
(upper panels), putamen (middle panels) and caudate nucleus (bottom panels). p-values < 0.017 
were considered significant.  A. Correlation between dopamine synthesis capacity and choice 
latency under placebo. B. Correlation between dopamine synthesis capacity and drug-induced 
changes in choice latency. C. Median split on dopamine synthesis capacity for visualization 
purposes. Shaded areas and error bars represent 95% confidence interval around the mean. PBO = 
placebo; MPH = methylphenidate; SUL = sulpiride; Ki = [
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Discussion 
The present study demonstrates that methylphenidate boosts motivation for cognitive 
task performance over leisure. This effect was present across the group as a whole 
but was particularly strong in people with high ventral striatal dopamine synthesis 
capacity. This finding is consistent with the OpAL model (Collins & Frank, 2014), stating 
that methylphenidate reduces the weight on the cost of task engagement. Together 
with the findings reported in Westbrook et al. (Westbrook et al., 2020), these data 
strengthen the link between striatal dopamine and cognitive motivation (Aarts et al., 
2011; Mcguigan et al., 2019) and the hypothesis that the cognitive enhancing effect 
of methylphenidate reflects an increase in motivation. The present study design 
provides a particularly good test of drug-induced changes in participants’ cognitive 
motivation, rather than capacity, because methylphenidate was administered after the 
task-performance phase, but before the discounting phase. Moreover, the data firmly 
establish the pervasive baseline-dependency hypothesis of individual variability in 
the efficacy of the most commonly used catecholaminergic drug, methylphenidate. 
The present paradigm was more sensitive to the motivational boosting effect of 
methylphenidate, which was observed across the group as a whole, than the paradigm 
in Westbrook et al. (Westbrook et al., 2020), where the effect was detected only in 
low-dopamine participants. This likely reflects the greater sensitivity of the current 
paradigm, at baseline, to task avoidance, as evidenced by a strong preference for 
the rest option. We argue that this increased sensitivity to task avoidance of the 
present paradigm reflects the increased opportunity cost of task engagement: By 
choosing the task option, they also chose to forego an opportunity to rest and play 
with their smartphone and/or laptop. This sensitivity to the opportunity cost at 
baseline, which tended to be greater in high-dopamine participants, might have 
rendered greater dynamic range for methylphenidate-related decreases in the weight 
on the cost. Conversely, Westbrook et al. required choices between a high effort 
option for more money and a low effort option for less money. This set-up controlled 
for opportunity costs, and generated a default preference for the high-reward high-
effort task. This higher preference for the effortful option at baseline, particularly in 
high-dopamine participants, might have reduced the range for further increases in 
the weight on the benefits in those participants. In short, the two paradigms likely 
differ in their sensitivity to increases in the benefits versus decreases in the costs by 
methylphenidate. This is supported by the finding that the effect of methylphenidate 
in the previous experiment, but not the current experiment, interacted with monetary 
payoff. Critically, the differential sensitivity of the two paradigms to changes in 
the benefits versus (opportunity and/or effort) costs of cognitive effort might also 











participants in the present experiment but, conversely, in low-dopamine participants in 
Westbrook et al. Future studies might address the question whether the different types 
of effort costs and benefits implicate dopamine in distinct subregions of the striatum. 
This hypothesis is raised cautiously by the finding that the effect of methylphenidate 
on effort selection in the present study depends most strongly on dopamine synthesis 
capacity in the nucleus accumbens, whereas the effect in Westbrook et al. depends 
most strongly on dopamine in the caudate nucleus. 
According to the OpAL model (Collins & Frank, 2014), methylphenidate might have 
reduced the cost of cognitive effort in this study by decreasing activity in the NoGo 
pathway of the basal ganglia. An alternative  account of the observed effect is motivated 
by the “inverted-U” hypothesis of dopamine, which states that dopaminergic drugs 
shift dopamine levels from suboptimal to optimal levels in low-dopamine individuals, 
while shifting them from optimal to supra-optimal levels in high-dopamine individuals 
(Cools & D’Esposito, 2011). Specifically, methylphenidate might have decreased task 
motivation in low-dopamine subjects by increasing the (intrinsic) value of the rest 
option, while increasing task motivation in high-dopamine subjects by detrimentally 
“overdosing” the (intrinsic) value of the rest option. 
Exploratory analyses revealed a strong negative association between choice latency 
and dopamine synthesis capacity under placebo. While methylphenidate sped up 
choices of participants with low dopamine synthesis capacity, it slowed choices of 
participants with higher dopamine synthesis capacity. Intriguingly, these striatal 
dopamine-dependent effects of methylphenidate on choice latency correlated with the 
effects of methylphenidate on cognitive effort choice. One explanation of this effect is 
that the strength of the default preference for no-redo was strongest for people with 
high dopamine synthesis capacity. Because these participants showed the largest shift 
away from a default preference on methylphenidate, they might have experienced 
greater choice conflict, accounting for their slowing. 
The clinical implications of the current results for populations who commonly get 
prescribed methylphenidate have yet to be determined. Studies of the relationship 
between impulse control disorders and striatal dopamine synthesis capacity have 
produced contrasting results, with enhanced capacity in pathological gamblers (Holst et 
al., 2018), conflicting results in substance abusers (Bloomfield et al., 2014; Heinz et al., 
2005; Rademacher et al., 2016; Tiihonen et al., 1998) and if anything reduced capacity 
in ADHD patients (Ernst et al., 1998; Ludolph et al., 2008). 
A limitation of the current pharmacological PET study is that it does not allow us to 
directly address the neural locus of methylphenidate’s effect. The finding that the 
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effects of methylphenidate were associated with striatal dopamine synthesis capacity 
suggests that methylphenidate acted on the striatum to modulate cognitive motivation. 
However, given that [18F]DOPA uptake signal is too low in the prefrontal cortex, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that the variation in nigrostriatal dopamine synthesis 
capacity is paralleled by variation in prefrontal dopamine levels. An additional 
prefrontal locus of effect is also consistent with the absence of significant effects 
of sulpiride, which acts selectively on dopamine D2-receptors that are particularly 
abundant in the striatum. In future studies pharmacology and PET should be combined 
with functional magnetic resonance imaging to isolate the neural locus of the dopamine-
dependent effects of methylphenidate on cognitive motivation. 
The finding that the effects of methylphenidate, which blocks both dopamine and 
noradrenaline transporters (Kuczenski & Segal, 2001; Scheel-Krüger, 1971), were not 
accompanied by significant effects of the selective D2-receptor antagonist sulpiride is 
surprising. First, previous research has established that the present dose of sulpiride 
is effective at approximately 2 hours after intake, indexed in terms of both sulpiride 
plasma concentrations (Helmy, 2013; Wiesel et al., 1980) and behavioral effects on 
reversal learning (Van Der Schaaf et al., 2014). Second, the exact same dose of sulpiride 
did have a significant effect in Westbrook  et al. (Westbrook et al., 2020), where the 
exact same study protocol was applied. This might lead some to ask whether the 
current effects reflect a modulation of noradrenaline instead of dopamine (Aston-Jones 
& Cohen, 2005; Gilzenrat et al., 2010; Hopstaken et al., 2015; Rajkowski et al., 1993; 
Van den Brink et al., 2016). However, given the lack of sulpiride-related changes in 
physiological or subjective report measures (Supplemental information), we cannot 
exclude the possibility that the drug manipulation did not alter behavior on the current 
task due to for example, suboptimal timing or dosing. It is known that sulpiride can 
bind to both pre- and postsynaptic D2 receptors, with low doses (50-150mg) primarily 
binding pre-synaptically and high doses (>800mg) primarily binding post-synaptically 
(Chavanon et al., 2013; Frank & O’Reilly, 2006; Serra et al., 1990). The 400mg used in 
the current study might thus have had mixed pre- and postsynaptic effects, cancelling 
each other out. Nevertheless, the pattern of sulpiride effects resembled that of 
methylphenidate, with the difference between the two drugs not reaching significance. 
It is uncertain whether this represents a true difference between the effects of 
sulpiride and methylphenidate, a suboptimal dose that had a presynaptic effect in most 
participants but was sufficiently high to have a primarily postsynaptic effect in some 
participants, or rather a lack of statistical power to detect sulpiride-induced effects. 
Given that methylphenidate’s effects were predicted by [18F]DOPA uptake in the 
striatum (which does not contain any noradrenaline receptors), and the resemblance 
between the pattern of effects of methylphenidate and sulpiride, we argue that they 











also concurs with prior evidence that methylphenidate’s enhancing effects correspond 
with changes in midbrain dopamine release (Del Campo et al., 2013). 
In conclusion, this study suggests that methylphenidate reduces the cost of mental 
labor by increasing striatal dopamine, thus strengthening the motivational account of 
methylphenidate’s effects on cognition.
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The current experiment was part of a larger study (N = 100; https://www.toetsingonline.nl/to/
ccmo_search.nsf/fABRpop?readform&unids=3EF826A78F26D323C12585A50015752A). 
The first twenty-five women and twenty-five men completed the color wheel task. A 
description of the task battery, timings and randomization of the drug sessions can be 
found in Tables S2.1-3. 
The study consisted of five sessions, with an interval of at least one week between each 
session. The first study day served as an intake on which participants were screened 
for inclusion criteria (see below), underwent an anatomical MR scan, and completed 
several baseline measures (Table S2.4). On the following three pharmacological 
sessions participants first completed a working memory delayed response task, then 
they received an oral administration of either 20 mg of methylphenidate, or 400 mg of 
sulpiride, or a placebo. Methylphenidate is a catecholamine-transporter blocker, which 
reduces the reuptake of catecholamines, including dopamine and norepinephrine, 
thereby increasing their availability in the synapse. Sulpiride is a selective D2 
receptor antagonist that acts specifically on the dopamine system. Timings of drug 
administration were optimized for peak drug effects during the fMRI paradigm (not 
reported here; Table S2.2): methylphenidate plasma concentrations peak after 2 hours 
(Kimko et al., 1999) and sulpiride plasma concentrations peak after 3 hours (Wiesel 
et al., 1980). Near-peak effects were expected during the task of interest. After drug 
administration participants completed a cognitive effort-discounting choice procedure. 
Blood pressure, heart rate, and ear temperature were measured three times during the 
day for monitoring and safety reasons. At the same time-points, medical symptoms 
and mood measures were assessed three times on each session: at the start of each 
session, 20 minutes before the discounting task and at the end of the session (Table 
S2.5). On the fifth day, participants underwent an [18F]DOPA PET scan to quantify their 











TABLE S2.1 | Task battery
DAY 1: INTAKE DAY 2-4: PHARMACOLOGICAL-fMRI HOME: QUESTIONNAIRES DAY 5: PET SCAN
HEALTH SCREENING COGNITIVE ASSESSMENT PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT COGNITIVE ASSESSMENT
Psychiatric assessment Executive functions Impulsivity (BIS-11A) Executive functions
M.I.N.I Plus 5.0.0 Color wheel working memory task1 Behavioral inhibition/acti-
vation 
Digit span (Version B)
Physiological measures N-back working memory task1 Need for Cognition Intellectual functioning
Electrocardiogram (ECG) Cognitive motivation Depression inventory (BDI) Fluid intelligence (matrix 
reasoning)
Heart rate / blood 
pressure
Cognitive effort discounting task Creativity scale (K-DOCS) Motivation/learning
Body temperature Reward processing Pavlovian to instrumental 
transfer task 
Spontaneous eye blink 
rate
Reinforcement learning and 
working memory (RLWM)
MRI Creativity DOPAMINE SYNTHESIS 
CAPACITY
Anatomical T1 scan Alternative uses task Positron emission tomog-
raphy (PET)
Remote association task Carbidopa and entacapone 
intake
COGNITIVE ASSESSMENT Alternative names task [18F]DOPA bolus injection
Executive functions
Digit span (version A) fMRI
Listening span Reward processing and motivation
Intellectual functioning Reversal learning task (RL)
Crystalized IQ (NLV) Monetary Incentive Delay task (MID)
SOMATIC MEASURES 
Heart rate / blood pressure
Body temperature
MOOD ASSESSMENT
Positive and negative affect scales 
(PANAS)
Visual analogue scale (VAS)
1 First fifty participants completed the color wheel task (data reported here) while the second fifty completed the N-back 
task (Westbrook et al., 2020). M.I.N.I.: Dutch M.I.N.I. International Neuropsychiatric Interview 5.0; NLV: Dutch reading 
test; BIS-11A: Barratt Impulsiveness Scale; BDI: Beck Depression Inventory II; K-DOCS: Kaufman Domains of Creativity 
Scale.
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TABLE S2.2 | Pharmacological-fMRI session – timings  
TABLE S2.3 | Number of participants per drug order.
Description Sulpiride Methylphenidate
Screening -70 -160
Somatic and mood measures -65 -155
BEH: color wheel or N-back -40 -130
Capsule 1: SUL/PBO 0 -90
Rest 1 -89
Capsule 2: MPH/PBO 89 0
MRI: screening 105 15
Somatic and mood measures 120 30
BEH: cognitive effort discounting task 140 50
MRI: installment 170 80
MRI: RL 185 95
MRI: MID 215 125
Lunch 235 145
BEH: RLWM 250 160
BEH: Creativity 290 200
Somatic and mood measures 308 218
End study day 328 238
Timings are in minutes, where T = 0 is the time of drug intake. Participants 
either received sulpiride (SUL) followed by placebo (PBO), PBO followed 
by methylphenidate (MPH) or PBO twice in a within-subjects, cross-over 
double-blind design. BEH: behavioral testing; MRI: functional magnetic 
resonance imaging. RL: reversal learning task; MID: monetary incentive 
delay task; RLWM: reinforcement learning and working memory task.
Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 No. Participants
MPH SUL PBO 10
MPH PBO SUL 10
SUL MPH PBO 6
SUL PBO MPH 7
PBO MPH SUL 6
PBO SUL MPH 7














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Inclusion age range was 18–45 years old and participants had to be native-Dutch 
speakers, right-handed, had to have normal or corrected-to-normal vision and could 
not be color-blind. Assessment for inclusion on the first testing day comprised a 
medical screening, assessing blood pressure (systolic BP: 95-140 mm Hg; dystolic 
BP: 50-95 mm Hg), heart rate (45-120 bpm) and electrocardiography (QTC-interval 
M: <450 ms; F: <460 ms; PR-interval: <250 ms), as well as a systematic psychiatric 
screening interview (M.I.N.I. Plus 5.0.0) assessing psychiatric symptoms, such as major 
depression, dysthymia, suicidality, (hypo) mania, panic disorder, agoraphobia, social 
anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, alcohol 
abuse and dependence, psychoactive substance use disorders, psychotic disorder, 
anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, generalized anxiety disorder, and attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Participants could not have a diagnosis (or history) of 
relevant psychiatric, neurological, endocrine, or neuroendocrine treatment; frequent 
autonomic failure; clinically significant hepatic, cardiac, obstructive respiratory, renal, 
cerebrovascular, cardiovascular, metabolic, ocular or pulmonary diseases/disorders; 
alcohol or drug dependence; epilepsy; Raynaud’s syndrome; one first degree, or two 
or more second degree family members with history of sudden death of ventricular 
arrhythmia; history of over the counter medication within the last two months 
or prescribed medication within the last month prior to the study; regular use of 
corticosteroids; habitual smoking; diabetes; abnormal hearing or (uncorrected vision); 
glaucoma; irregular sleep/wake rhythm; possible pregnancy and no appropriate 
contraception. Participants had to abstain from cannabis throughout the course of the 
experiment, including 2 weeks before the start of the first pharmacological session, 
and were required to abstain from alcohol 24 hours and psychotropic medication and 
recreational drugs 72 hours before each session. 
Detailed description of the behavioral paradigm
Before drug administration, participants completed a short color sensitivity task (1 
minute) and a color wheel working memory task to familiarize participants with the 
type and level of cognitive control (24 minutes). After drug-intake they completed a 
cognitive effort-discounting choice task (22 minutes) to quantify the subjective value 
(and effort costs) of the color wheel working memory task. All tasks were performed 
on a computer running on Windows 7 and a screen resolution of 1920x1080p. 
The background color for all tasks was grey (R: 200 G: 200 B: 200). All tasks were 
programmed in MATLAB version 2016a, using Psychophysics Toolbox Version 3.0.12.
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Color sensitivity task
The color sensitivity task measured the ability to detect and distinguish the colors in 
the main task. A color wheel was presented in the middle of the screen and participants 
had to match the color of a square in the center of the wheel with the corresponding 
color on the wheel, by clicking on the color wheel. This task consisted of 12 trials and 
performance on the color sensitivity task was successful if the average deviation of the 
response from the correct color was below 15 degrees. If participants failed the first 
time, the color sensitivity task would be assessed again. Participants would be excluded 
if they failed the color sensitivity task twice (no participants failed the sensitivity test). 
The color wheel was created by placing a background-colored circle with a radius of 
362p on a circle with a radius of 486p that contained 512 successive colors. By placing 
the smaller circle over the bigger circle, a colored ring was created. Each color had 
an angle width of 0.7 degrees and was created with the HSV MATLAB color map. The 
color of the square was one of the 512 colors from the color wheel. After participants 
responded, a black line appeared that marked and confirmed the response. The black 
line consisted of a 0.4-degree arc, placed on the color wheel. Additionally, feedback 
conveying the deviance (the degrees the response deviated from the correct color) 
was given if the deviance was below 10 degrees: e.g. ‘Good job! You deviated only 4 
degrees!’ and by a second black arc that marked the correct location of the color. If the 
deviance was more than 10 degrees, the feedback only consisted of the second black 
arc. Participants were instructed to answer precisely, but not to take too much time to 
respond. There was no maximum response time. To test a wide variation of colors from 
the color wheel, the color wheel was divided into 12 parts, from now on referred to as 
color pies. From each color pie, one color was chosen at random to be presented in the 
center of the color wheel. Both the color of the square and the orientation of the color 
wheel were randomized across participants.
Color wheel working memory task 
The color wheel task (Figure 2.1A) is a delayed response task of working memory that 
distinguishes between distractor resistance and flexible updating, based on a paradigm 
introduced by Zhang and Luck (Zhang & Luck, 2008). Participants had to match a 
color that was held in working memory to a color wheel on the screen. Each trial was 
preceded by a centered black dot for 0.5s, which signaled the start of a new trial. On 
each trial, colored squares were presented in the middle of the screen, with the letter M 
in the middle, which stood for ‘memorize’. During this encoding phase, participants had 
0.5s to memorize the colors of the squares, after which there was a delay of 2s. During 











interference phase, a new set of colored squares appeared on screen, with one of two 
letters in the center. ‘I’ stood for ‘ignore’: participants had to ignore the new squares 
while still remembering the previous set of squares. ‘U’ stood for ‘update’: participants 
now had to update the colors of the squares, that is, remember the new set of squares 
and forget the previous squares. The new set of squares remained on screen for 0.5s, 
followed by a second delay phase. Depending on the task-type, distractor resistance 
(ignore) or flexible updating (update), this delay lasted either 2s or 4.5s, respectively, 
to have the same length of time between the relevant stimuli (encoding phase for the 
ignore type and interference phase for the update type) and the last phase, the probe 
phase. During this probe phase, a color wheel appeared in the center of the screen, 
containing frames of colorless squares, one of which was marked. Participants had 
4s to indicate the target color of the marked square by clicking on the corresponding 
color on the color wheel. For example, if the upper right frame was marked, and the 
condition was ignore, participants had to indicate the color of the upper right square 
during the encoding phase. When a response was made, a black line appeared on the 
color wheel at the location where the mouse click was made, remaining on screen until 
4s had passed since the appearance of the color wheel. No feedback was given on 
accuracy. If participants did not respond within 4s, a message was presented for 0.5s 
in the center of the screen: ‘Please respond faster!’ Participants were instructed to keep 
their eyes fixed on the center of the screen during the entire task. 
The number and locations of the squares were the same in each phase, but differed 
over trials, ranging from 1 to 4 squares, allowing us to assess effects of cognitive load 
(from now on referred to as set-size). All combinations of set-size (ranging from 1-4) 
and task-type (ignore or update) were repeated 16 times, which resulted in 128 trials 
divided over two blocks. The task was preceded by 16 practice trials. On these practice 
trials, feedback conveying the deviance (the degrees the response deviated from the 
correct color, with a maximum of 180 degrees) was given if the deviance was below 10 
degrees: e.g. ‘Good job! You deviated only 4 degrees!’ and by a second black line that 
marked the correct location of the color. If the deviance was more than 10 degrees, 
the feedback only consisted of the second black line. Feedback duration was 0.7s. To 
control for possible effects of different colors, the colors that were presented during 
the encoding phase of ignore trials were the same as the colors that were used during 
the interference phase of update trials. Additionally, the target colors were the same 
for both conditions. To control for possible location effects, the locations of the squares 
were allocated equally across trials and the location of the marked frame, and thus the 
target, was balanced across conditions. Additionally, the orientation of the color wheel 
was randomized across trials. Trial order was the same for each participant. 
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Choice task
To quantify participant’s preference for the task versus rest, participants completed 
a choice task where they repeatedly chose between a cognitively effortful (redo) 
option for more money and a leisure (no-redo) option for less money (Figure 2.1B). A 
redo choice implied that they preferred to complete another block of the color wheel 
task after completing the choice task. By choosing the no-redo option they indicated 
that they preferred to be free to do what they wanted, such as using their phone or 
the computer, for an equal length of time as another round of the color wheel task, 
while staying in the testing room. Participants were informed that their monetary 
bonus and the difficulty of the working memory task would depend on their choices 
during the choice task, because one of their choices would be randomly selected. Due 
to time constraints and to avoid transfer effects of experiencing the color wheel task 
under drug to future sessions, both the monetary bonus and the redo of the color 
wheel task were hypothetical, and participants were instructed accordingly. The 
rationale for this instruction was that it pre-empted gradual learning that the redo 
phase was hypothetical, invalidating comparison between the three sessions. Despite 
its hypothetical nature, the task manipulation and sensitivity to cognitive effort was 
validated by evidence for strong monotonic, set size-dependent discounting (see 
Results). The hypothetical compensation for the redo option was fixed at €2.00. The 
compensation for the no-redo option varied from a minimum of €0.10, and then 
from €0.20 to €2.20, with intervals of €0.20. The redo option was further specified 
by a task-type (ignore or update) and a set-size (1-4), which meant that most of the 
redo block would consist of trials of that task-type and set-size. The remainder of the 
trials would be divided among all task-type and set-size combinations. The task was 
divided into three blocks, with a break in between the blocks. Each block featured 
each unique combination of task-type, set-size and monetary compensation for the 
no redo option (€0.10-€2.20) in random order, which resulted in 96 trials per block 
and 288 trials in total. On each trial participants had 4s to respond. They were told 
that to receive the bonus, their performance during the redo block would have to be 
similar to their performance during the earlier blocks and that this meant that they 
had to put effort into doing the redo block, but not that they always had to be correct. 
This was conveyed to minimize differences in preference for a condition due to earlier 












Here we report the results from a number of supplementary control analyses to explore 
the primary effects of interest reported in the main manuscript. These exploratory 
analyses were conducted to confirm that the effects that were established to be 
significant in our primary analyses of interest are physiologically plausible (i.e. by the 
supplementary voxel-wise PET analyses) and that they do not reflect any factors of 
no interest. While we report confidence intervals, effect sizes and p-values for these 
supplementary analyses, we note that these should be interpreted with caution, given 
that these analyses were not designed to test our primary hypotheses or to test new 
additional hypotheses, and were thus not corrected for multiple comparisons, but 
rather served to double-check already established effects. 
Voxel-wise PET analyses 
We conducted voxel-wise analyses in addition to our primary region-of-interest 
analyses to assess the physiological plausibility of the link between drug effects on 
choice behavior (proportion redo choices and choice latency) and striatal dopamine 
synthesis capacity (Ki influx constant). To this end, the individual Ki maps were spatially 
normalized to MNI space and smoothed using an 8mm FWHM kernel. We restricted our 
search, following prior procedures (Sescousse et al., 2018), to one region of interest 
comprising all voxels that exhibited a Ki value of 3 standard deviations above the 
global mean. This region of interest included the striatum and midbrain (8993 voxels; 
Figure S2.1). Statistical significance was defined as family-wise error (FWE) corrected 
p<0.05 at peak coordinate, after small volume correction for all voxels within the 
region of interest. Note that the group-based [18F]DOPA mask was calculated based on 
the larger study group excluding drop-outs (N = 94).  
Figure S2.1 | A – Axial and B – sagittal view of the group-based small volume mask including all 
voxels with a Ki value of > 3 SD from the global mean. C – Histogram of mean Ki value within the 
group-based mask. Count represents number of participants. N = 46. The mean Ki values varied 
between 0.00768 and 0.01228. These values are comparable with previous reports (van Holst et 
al., 2018). 
A B C
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High-dopamine participants exhibited greater methylphenidate-related increases in 
cognitive motivation
In accordance with our region-of-interest based results, voxel-wise analyses revealed 
a positive correlation between dopamine synthesis capacity and the methylphenidate 
effect on overall proportion redo choices (Figure S2.2B; Table S2.6). Participants with 
higher dopamine synthesis capacity exhibited greater methylphenidate-induced 
increases in proportion redo choices than participants with lower dopamine. The 
correlation with midbrain dopamine synthesis capacity survived FWE-correction. 
Although not surviving FWE-correction, positive correlations with the methylphenidate 
effect were also found in the nucleus accumbens, putamen, and caudate nucleus. There 
was no association between the effect of sulpiride on proportion redo choices and 
dopamine synthesis capacity (Figure S2.2C) and no voxels correlated significantly 
with the difference in proportion redo choices between methylphenidate and sulpiride 
(Figure S2.2D; Table S2.6). The correlation between dopamine synthesis capacity and 
proportion redo choices under placebo was not significant (Figure S2.2A; Table S2.6).
High-dopamine participants exhibited greater methylphenidate-related slowing of 
choice latency
The effect of methylphenidate on choice latency correlated positively with dopamine 
synthesis capacity in the midbrain, left caudate nucleus and right putamen (Figure 
S2.2F; Table S2.6), indicating that methylphenidate slowed people with higher 
dopamine synthesis capacity and invigorated people with lower dopamine synthesis 
capacity. No significant correlation between dopamine synthesis capacity and the 
effect of sulpiride was observed (Figure S2.2G; Table S2.6) and no voxels correlated 
significantly with the difference in choice latency on the methylphenidate and the 
sulpiride session (Figure S2.2H; Table S2.6). Dopamine synthesis capacity correlated 
negatively with choice latency under placebo in the left caudate nucleus and midbrain 
(Figure S2.2A; Table S2.6), indicating that higher dopamine synthesis capacity was 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Methylphenidate increased indifference points
A priori we had planned to calculate indifference points (IPs): The offer for the no-redo 
option at which the participant was indifferent to either choosing no-redo or redoing 
the task for €2.00 (Figure S2.3A). However, because many participants demonstrated 
a very low willingness to redo the task, sometimes resulting in inestimable IPs, we 
instead decided to base our primary analyses on the proportion redo choices. A high 
IP means a strong preference for the cognitively more demanding redo option and 
high motivation for task engagement. The IP was calculated using binomial logistic 
regression analysis. Where IP was lower or higher than the minimum (€0.10) or 
maximum (€2.20) offer for the no-redo option, respectively, the IP was set to either 
0.10 (in case of an IP lower than the minimum) or 2.20 (in case of an IP higher than the 
maximum), to avoid loss of valuable data. Table S2.7 shows the repeated-measures 
ANOVA results with the within-participants factors drug (methylphenidate, sulpiride, 
placebo), task-type (ignore, update) and set-size and the covariate dopamine synthesis 
capacity (separate analyses for the three ROIs – nucleus accumbens, putamen and 
caudate nucleus). 
Under placebo, participants exhibited a strong preference for not repeating the task, as 
evidenced by the IP being significantly smaller than €2.00, the fixed offer for the redo 
option (0.79, SD = 0.55; Cohen’s d = -2.19, 95% CI [-2.72, -1.65], p < 0.001).
In accordance with proportion redo choices, IP decreased with set-size (ηhp2 = 0.64, 90% 
CI [0.55, 0.71], p < 0.001). There was no effect of task-type (hp2 = 0.03, 90% CI [0.00, 
0.17], p = 0.216) and no interaction between task-type and set-size (hp2 = 0.01, 90% CI 
[0.00, 0.04], p = 0.622). We found a significant effect of drug on IP (main effect over 
the 3 drug conditions: hp2 = 0.13, 90% CI [0.03, 0.24], p = 0.003), which was driven by 
a positive effect of methylphenidate versus placebo (hp2 = 0.17, 90% CI [0.04, 0.35], p 
= 0.004; Figure S2.3B) and a positive effect of methylphenidate versus sulpiride (hp2 
= 0.16, 90% CI [0.03, 0.34], p = 0.005). There was no difference between sulpiride and 
placebo (hp2 = 0.00, 90% CI [0.00, 0.07], p = 0.780; Figure S2.3B). 
The interaction between drug effect on IP and dopamine synthesis capacity qualitatively 
resembled the interaction effect on proportion redo choices (nucleus accumbens: hp2 = 
0.07, 90% CI [0.00, 0.17], p = 0.036; putamen: hp2 = 0.07, 90% CI [0.00, 0.16], p = 0.044; 
caudate nucleus: hp2 = 0.05, 90% CI [0.00, 0.13], p = 0.112; Table S2.7). Participants 
with higher dopamine synthesis capacity in the nucleus accumbens exhibited greater 
methylphenidate-induced increases in IP than participants with lower dopamine synthesis 
capacity (hp2 = 0.11, 90% CI [0.01, 0.28], p = 0.022). A negative association between 
dopamine synthesis capacity and IP under placebo was not significant (Table S2.7). 
Striatal dopamine-dependent effects of methylphenidate
70
FIGURE S2.3 | Indifference point. A – Probability of choosing the no-redo option as a function of 
the monetary offer for the no-redo option on Ignore trials during session 2 for a representative 
participant. Fitted probability functions for each set-size are plotted using logistic regression. 
The indifference point (IP) – where the probability line hits the dashed line – is the offer for 
the no-redo option at which there is a 50% chance that the participant chose no-redo for that 
amount or redo for €2. B – Drug effect on indifference point (methylphenidate or sulpiride minus 
placebo). Error bars represent 95% confidence interval around the mean. MPH: methylphenidate; 
SUL: sulpiride; PBO: placebo.
TABLE S2.7 | Repeated-measures ANOVAs on indifference points. Separate analysis for each 
ROI – nucleus accumbens, putamen and caudate nucleus, including drug, set-size and task-type 
as within-subjects variables and dopamine synthesis capacity (measured as the mean-centered 
average [18F]DOPA uptake, Ki) as covariate. Partial eta squared (hp2), 90% confidence intervals 
around hp2 and p-values for the interaction between dopamine synthesis and drug are shown, 
as well as the main effect of dopamine synthesis capacity on the placebo session. MPH = 
methylphenidate; SUL = sulpiride; PBO = placebo. 
BA
Nucleus accumbens Putamen Caudate nucleus
hp2 p hp2 p hp2 p
MPH, SUL, PBO 0.07 [0.00, 0.17] 0.036 0.07 [0.00, 0.16] 0.044 0.05 [0.00, 0.13] 0.112
post-hoc: 
MPH, PBO 0.11 [0.01, 0.28] 0.022 0.11 [0.01, 0.28] 0.025 0.08 [0.00, 0.24] 0.054
SUL, PBO 0.01 [0.00, 0.11] 0.502 0.01 [0.00, 0.12] 0.451 0.04 [0.00, 0.17] 0.198
MPH, SUL 0.07 [0.00, 0.23] 0.067 0.06 [0.00, 0.22] 0.088 0.02 [0.00, 0.13] 0.366











Methylphenidate-induced effect does not reflect choice randomness
Choice randomness would be evidenced by the proportion redo choices being close 
to 0.5. It is possible that methylphenidate increased choice randomness rather than 
cognitive motivation for high-dopamine individuals, resulting in a higher proportion 
redo choice. We therefore explored the choice slopes (see also Figure S2.3A). If 
participants were more random in their choices, their slope should be shallower. Two 
persons had an overall slope that was higher than three standard deviations above 
the global mean and were therefore excluded. Moreover, the slope could not be 
estimated if a participant’s IP was outside the sampled range (€0.10-€2.20). Because 
this was the case for most participants when calculating the slope separately for each 
combination of the three factors (drug, task-type and set-size), we assessed slope only 
as a function of drug (with conditions methylphenidate and placebo) to maximize the 
number of participants that could be included: N = 32. A rmANOVA revealed no effect 
of drug (hp2 = 0.07, 90% CI [0.00, 0.26], p = 0.150) nor an interaction between dopamine 
synthesis capacity and drug (nucleus accumbens: hp2 = 0.00, 90% CI [0.00, 0.11], p = 
0.710; putamen: hp2 = 0.00, 90% CI [0.00, 0.05], p = 0.880; caudate nucleus: hp2 = 0.00, 
90% CI [0.00, 1.00], p = 0.997). We thus conclude that the dopamine synthesis capacity-
dependent effect of methylphenidate on motivation did not reflect an effect on choice 
randomness.  
Dopamine synthesis capacity-dependent effects cannot be explained 
by working-memory performance
Although drugs were only administered after the working-memory task, we aimed 
to confirm that effects on performance could not explain the dopamine synthesis 
capacity-dependent effects of methylphenidate. We therefore ran the rmANOVAs again 
for deviance and RT, including the within-subjects variables task-type, set-size and 
drug and the covariate dopamine synthesis capacity. There were no main effects of 
drug on deviance (hp2 = 0.03, 90% CI [0.00, 0.09], p = 0.306) or RT (hp2 = 0.02, 90% CI [0.00, 
0.07], p = 0.451) and no interactions between dopamine synthesis capacity and drugs 
on deviance (nucleus accumbens: hp2 = 0.04, 90% CI [0.00, 0.12], p = 0.152; putamen: hp2 
= 0.06, 90% CI [0.00, 0.15], p = 0.071; caudate nucleus: hp2 = 0.03, 90% CI [0.00, 0.10], p 
= 0.258) or RT (nucleus accumbens: hp2 = 0.00, 90% CI [0.00, 1.00], p = 0.995; putamen: 
hp2 = 0.01, 90% CI [0.00, 0.06], p = 0.615; caudate nucleus: hp2 = 0.00, 90% CI [0.00, 1.00], 
p = 0.987). No other interactions including drug or dopamine synthesis capacity were 
significant. 
We also assessed a potential association between methylphenidate-related changes in 
performance and proportion redo choices or choice latency with a Pearson’s correlation. 
Striatal dopamine-dependent effects of methylphenidate
72
As expected, the effect of methylphenidate on performance did not correlate with the 
effect of methylphenidate on proportion redo choices (deviance: r = 0.10, 95% CI [-0.19, 
0.38], p = 0.493; RT: r = 0.16, 95% CI [-0.13, 0.43], p = 0.276) or choice latency (deviance: 
r = 0.16, 95% CI [-0.14, 0.43], p = 0.297; RT: r = 0.14, 95% CI [-0.16, 0.42], p = 0.347). It 
is therefore unlikely that methylphenidate-effects on choice behavior can be explained 
by changes in performance.  
Dopamine-dependent effects cannot be explained by mood and med-
ical symptoms 
On the pharmacological sessions (day 2-4), blood pressure, heart rate and ear 
temperature were monitored three times on each session: before the start of the task 
battery, 20 minutes before the start of the discounting task and after the task battery. 
At the same timepoints, mood measures (Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Watson 
et al., 1988); the Bond and Lader Visual Analogue Scales (calmness, contentedness, 
alertness; (Bond & Lader, 1974))) and medical symptoms (medical visual analogue scale) 
were assessed. Table S2.5 gives an overview of those measures for the participants 
included in the analyses. 
To assess whether methylphenidate-induced effects could be accounted for by 
nonspecific effects of methylphenidate on mood and medical symptoms, we performed 
a repeated measures MANOVA in SPSS (IBM SPSS statistics version 23.0) using Pillai’s 
trace with the within-subject factors Time (3: before the start of the task battery, 
20 minutes after intake of the second capsule and after the task battery) and Drug 
(3: placebo, methylphenidate and sulpiride) and the six measures as dependent 
variables (positive affect, negative affect, calmness, alertness, contentedness, medical 
symptoms). Significant initial MANOVA results (p < 0.05) were followed up with 
univariate tests of the interaction effect (drug x time) for each of the six dependent 
variables, with Bonferroni-corrected alpha = 0.05/6 ≈ 0.008. 
Drug did not significantly affect the mood and medical measures over time (drug x 
time: V = 0.68, hp2 = 0.64, p = 0.057). We conducted the MANOVA again, but now with 
only the first two timepoints, given the proximity of the second timepoint to the choice 
task (20 minutes before the start of the task). This revealed a significant drug effect 
over time (drug x time: V = 0.48, hp2 = 0.48, p = 0.015). However, none of the univariate 
interactions between drug and time for the six dependent variables was significant (all 
hp2 < 0.60, p > 0.061). A MANOVA on only timepoint 2 revealed no significant effect of 











Next, we correlated methylphenidate-induced changes on the six mood and medical 
measures at timepoint 2 with methylphenidate-induced changes in proportion redo 
choices. This revealed a positive correlation for positive affect (r = 0.34, 95% CI [0.05, 
0.57], p = 0.022) and alertness (r = 0.28, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.53], p = 0.060). The other 
correlations were all below r = 0.16 and above p = 0.283. We therefore ran additional 
repeated-measures ANOVAs on proportion redo choices with drug (methylphenidate 
and placebo), task-type (ignore and update) and set-size as within-subjects variables 
and dopamine synthesis capacity as a covariate, while also including the effect 
of methylphenidate on positive affect and alertness, respectively, as a covariate. 
Methylphenidate still significantly affected proportion redo choices when including 
positive affect, both as a main effect (hp2 = 0.17, 90% CI [0.03, 0.36], p = 0.004) and 
in interaction with dopamine synthesis capacity (nucleus accumbens: hp2 = 0.18, 90% 
CI [0.04, 0.36], p = 0.013; putamen: hp2 = 0.20, 90% CI [0.02, 0.33], p = 0.008; caudate 
nucleus: hp2 = 0.11, 90% CI [0.01, 0.28], p = 0.024). Similarly, methylphenidate still 
significantly affected proportion redo choices when including alertness, both as a 
main effect (hp2 = 0.18, 90% CI [0.04, 0.36], p = 0.004) and in interaction with dopamine 
synthesis capacity (nucleus accumbens: hp2 = 0.21, 90% CI [0.05, 0.39], p = 0.002; 
putamen: hp2 = 0.20, 90% CI [0.05, 0.39], p = 0.002; caudate nucleus: hp2 = 0.15, 90% CI 
[0.03, 0.34], p = 0.008). It is therefore unlikely that drug-induced changes on mood or 
medical measures account for effects on proportion redo choices.  
Controlling for session order
High-dopamine individuals received methylphenidate on earlier sessions than low-
dopamine individuals
A first ANOVA confirmed that session-day-number (1, 2 or 3) did not differ between the 
three drugs (hp2= 0.01, 90% CI [0.00, 0.05], p = 0.420). The order of the drug session could 
further potentially have confounded our dopamine synthesis capacity-dependency 
effects if people with lower dopamine synthesis capacity accidentally experienced 
a different order than people with higher synthesis capacity. Unexpectedly, a 
Spearman’s rank correlation indeed revealed that dopamine synthesis capacity was 
negatively correlated with the session on which participants received methylphenidate 
(Table S2.8). Participants with higher dopamine synthesis capacity more often received 
methylphenidate on the earlier sessions. There were no significant correlations 
between dopamine synthesis capacity and the session on which participants received 
sulpiride or placebo (Table S2.8). Given these findings, we reanalyzed our significant 
methylphenidate effects and methylphenidate by dopamine synthesis capacity 
interactions while controlling for the methylphenidate session number by adding 
methylphenidate’s session number as a between-subjects factor to the rmANOVA. 
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Table S2.8 | Spearman’s rank correlations between dopamine synthesis capacity and session 
number on which participants received methylphenidate, sulpiride and placebo.
 
Nucleus accumbens Putamen Caudate nucleus
rho p rho p rho p
Methylphenidate -0.29 0.047 -0.40 0.005 -0.24 0.116
Sulpiride 0.11 0.481 0.24 0.107 0.11 0.453
Placebo 0.22 0.145 0.21 0.167 0.15 0.310
 
After including methylphenidate’s session number as a between-subjects factor, 
methylphenidate, relative to placebo, still significantly increased proportion redo 
choices (hp2 = 0.14, 90% CI [0.02, 0.32], p = 0.012). The interaction effects between 
dopamine synthesis capacity and methylphenidate on proportion redo choices and 
choice latency were also the same as those reported in the main manuscript (proportion 
redo choices: nucleus accumbens: hp2 = 0.10, 90% CI [0.00, 0.27], p = 0.038; putamen: hp2 
= 0.05, 90% CI [0.00, 0.21], p = 0.127; caudate nucleus: hp2 = 0.09, 90% CI [0.00, 0.25], p 
= 0.051; choice latency: nucleus accumbens: hp2 = 0.11, 90% CI [0.01, 0.29], p = 0.026; 
putamen: hp2 = 0.08, 90% CI [0.00, 0.24], p = 0.071; caudate nucleus: hp2 = 0.03, 90% CI 
[0.00, 0.16], p = 0.252).
No correlation between dopamine synthesis capacity and time after methylphenidate 
administration
Previous research suggested that increased striatal dopamine synthesis capacity can be 
detected by an [18F]DOPA scan in conjunction with the inlet–outlet model even 2 weeks 
after a methylphenidate treatment (Schabram et al., 2014).  We therefore assessed 
whether the order effects could have arisen due to too short intervals between the 
drug sessions and the PET scan. The interval between the methylphenidate session 
and the PET scan ranged between 7 and 106 days (mean = 43.0, SD = 26.8). However, 
Pearson’s correlations between dopamine synthesis capacity and days between the 
methylphenidate session and the PET scan were not significant  (nucleus accumbens: r 
= 0.16, 95% CI [-0.14, 0.43], p = 0.303; putamen: r = 0.18, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.44], p = 0.245; 
caudate nucleus: r = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.26, 0.33], p = 0.786), thus minimizing the likelihood 
that our index of dopamine synthesis capacity was affected by drug administration. 
Drug effects on physiological measures
Primary analyses revealed no significant effects of sulpiride. To assess whether this 











measures MANOVA on the physiological measures heart rate, systolic blood pressure, 
diastolic blood pressure and ear temperature. The within-subject factors were Time 
(3: before the start of the task battery, 20 before the start of the discounting task and 
after the task battery) and Drug (3: placebo, methylphenidate and sulpiride). Significant 
effects were followed up with univariate tests of the interaction effect (drug x time) 
for each of the four dependent variables, with Bonferroni-corrected alpha = 0.05/4 ≈ 
0.013. 
Drug significantly affected heart rate and blood pressure over time (drug x time: V = 
0.73, hp2 = 0.73, p < 0.001; heart rate: hp2 = 0.25, p < 0.001; systolic blood pressure: hp2 = 
0.13, p < 0.001; diastolic blood pressure: hp2 = 0.13, p < 0.001), but not ear temperature 
(hp2 = 0.06, p = 0.035). The effect was driven by a difference between methylphenidate 
and placebo (V = 0.65, hp2 = 0.65, p < 0.001). Over time, methylphenidate increased 
heart rate (hp2 = 0.32, p < 0.001), systolic blood pressure (hp2 = 0.14, p = 0.001) and 
diastolic blood pressure (hp2 = 0.17, p < 0.001) compared with placebo. There were no 
significant effects of sulpiride over time (V = 0.14, hp2 = 0.14, p = 0.654). We conducted 
the MANOVA again, but now with only the first two timepoints, given the proximity 
of the second timepoint to the choice task (20 minutes before the start of the task). 
This revealed no significant drug effect over time (drug x time: V = 0.18, hp2 = 0.19, p = 
0.426). A MANOVA on only timepoint 2 revealed a significant effect of drug (V = 0.44, 
hp2 = 0.44, p = 0.003). However, only the univariate analysis on diastolic blood pressure 
revealed an effect of drug that did not reach significance after correction for multiple 
comparisons (hp2 = 0.08, p = 0.023). The drug effects on the other dependent variables 
were all below hp2 = 0.04 and above p = 0.145. This non-significant effect on diastolic 
blood pressure stemmed from a difference between methylphenidate and sulpiride (hp2 
= 0.14, p = 0.011), where diastolic blood pressure was higher on the methylphenidate 
session. Thus, although there were clear physiological effects of methylphenidate over 
time, these only emerged when including the third timepoint. There were no clear 
physiological effects of sulpiride.  
Supplemental discussion
Cognitive stability versus cognitive flexibility
In addition to investigating choices between cognitive control and rest, we assessed 
choices between different types of cognitive control. Specifically, we were interested 
to explore catecholaminergic drug effects on choices between a working memory 
“update” task requiring cognitive flexibility and a working memory “ignore” task 
requiring cognitive stability (Cools & D’Esposito, 2011; Fallon et al., 2017; Musslick 
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et al., 2018). Our data showed no strong evidence for methylphenidate or sulpiride 
shifting the balance between the motivation for stable versus flexible control. This 
might be not surprising, because, contrary to earlier studies, in which participants 
preferred a similar flexible update task over a stable ignore task (Froböse et al., 2018; 
Papadopetraki et al., 2019), there was no difference between the value of the two tasks 
under placebo. It is potentially relevant that here, in contrast to that previous work, 
participants did not choose between the “update” or “ignore” task, but rather between 
one of those tasks and a rest option. For future work, to investigate the question 
whether dopamine alters preference for one task versus another, we would require 
direct choices between the two types of task, while also considering the manipulation 
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Abstract
Working memory involves the dynamic balance between the stable maintenance and 
the flexible updating of goal representations. In an environment with high demands 
for flexible updating, it is adaptive to weaken task-representations in order to update 
goal representations more easily, whereas in an environment with high demands for 
goal maintenance, it is more adaptive to strengthen task representations. It has been 
argued that such strategic meta-control, which depends on preparatory processes, 
is particularly recruited when incentive motivation is high. Here, we tested whether 
incentive motivation potentiates strategic meta-control using a delayed working 
memory paradigm that distinguishes between two different trial-types, one demanding 
flexible update and the other demanding stability. We manipulated the extent to which 
participants could exert strategic meta-control by varying the frequency of one trial-
type over the other, allowing participants to prepare for the high-frequent trial type. 
We expected participants to be better prepared for demands for flexibility or stability 
when either is, respectively, more frequent, and that greater incentive motivation 
would strengthen this effect. While we did not find evidence for the predicted effects 
of incentive motivation on strategic meta-control in terms of accuracy, exploratory 
reaction time analyses showed greater slowing on update trials when this was the high-
frequent trial-type. Future studies with larger trial numbers might leverage reaction 
time distributions to investigate the hypothesis that this effect reflects a strategically 












Cognitive control is generally referred to as a set of mechanisms required for goal-
directed behavior, involving preparation and maintenance of rules to bias action and 
attention in working memory (Egner, 2017; Fuster, 1989; Monsell, 2003). A key aspect 
is to maintain stable goal representations, even in the face of distraction. However, 
such cognitive stability may incur a cost if the current goal becomes less beneficial 
relative to other potential goals. Thus, another essential feature of cognitive control is 
the ability to flexibly switch between goals when needed. This means that constantly 
a balance is sought between a stable focus on the current task and a flexible readiness 
to attend to new incoming stimuli, potentially associated with other rewards. Balancing 
this tradeoff requires a form of meta-level strategic control to incorporate task-relevant 
information, such as the required cognitive load or the potential costs and benefits of 
completing the task that in turn often depend on the contextual demands for stability 
versus flexibility (Boureau et al., 2015; Cools, 2019; Goschke & Bolte, 2014; Musslick et 
al., 2018). Here, we investigate the degree to which incentives and contextual demands 
for flexibility versus stability contribute to biasing people towards flexibility versus 
stability.
In a stable environment where goals do not change much, we can strongly focus 
on current goal representations without the need to regularly destabilize them. 
However, when the demands for flexible updating are high, we must regularly let 
go of previous goal representations, and destabilize them to replace them with 
new goal representations. In neural network simulations of the flexibility / stability 
tradeoff (Musslick et al., 2018), the cost of stable, focused control indexes demands for 
flexibility. In environments demanding flexibility, treating stability as more costly thus 
motivates weaker, more flexible goal representations, which increase flexibility while 
also diminishing controlled focus. Conversely, a context with high demands for stable 
maintenance will benefit from a strengthening of current goal representations. Support 
for this observation was obtained from neural network simulations of performance 
on a task-switching paradigm with Stroop targets. These demonstrated that stability 
costs, indexed by Stroop interference scores, were higher when the frequency of task-
switches was high. The implication of this observation is that people can proactively 
alter the strength of their current goal activation depending on the demands for 
flexibility of the environment. 
It has been argued that preparatory meta-control – of the sort needed to prepare 
for expected environmental demands – is particularly recruited when motivational 
incentives are high. By one proposal, motivational incentives would improve the 
neural signal-to-noise ratio in the frontal cortex via dopaminergic signaling, thereby 
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sharpening task representations (Braver, 2012; Braver et al., 2014; Yee & Braver, 
2018). Chiew and Braver have indeed shown that monetary incentives improved 
cognitive performance by increasing control (Chiew & Braver, 2016). Incentives 
reduced Flanker interference costs, with a greater effect when a cue indicated whether 
or not the Flanker stimuli would be congruent, allowing them to proactively prepare 
for the trial. In line with these behavioral findings and consistent with the hypothesis 
that motivation sharpens neural task representations, another study showed improved 
task set representation in frontoparietal brain regions when participants saw a cue 
indicating that they could win a reward on that trial (Etzel et al., 2016). Specifically, 
participants performed a cued task switching paradigm in which they had to respond 
to either the face or the word of an overlapping face/word stimulus. Decoding-accuracy 
of task-specific voxel-level BOLD activity patterns (for a face or word task) was better 
on high reward than on low reward incentive trials. Critically, this neural effect was 
associated with an incentive-related increase in behavioral performance accuracy.  
Grounded in these earlier studies on the effect of motivation on preparatory control, 
we here test whether incentive motivation affects meta-regulation of the flexibility/
stability tradeoff in an adapted version of the delayed working memory paradigm 
(Papadopetraki et al., 2019; Prinzmetal et al., 1997; Wilken & Ma, 2004). In addition, 
we bias participants to prepare for either stable or flexible working memory demands 
in the upcoming trial: in one context there is an equal frequency of both trial-types. In 
other contexts, the frequency of one task is higher than that of the other task, allowing 
for preparation for the high-frequent trial-type. Incentive motivation is manipulated 
in a trial-wise fashion by incentive magnitude. We predicted that participants would 
exhibit meta-level control and thus perform better on a task when it is highly frequent, 
with higher incentive motivation strengthening this effect. 
Methods
Participants
Thirty-five healthy and right-handed participants were recruited via SONA, the 
research participation system of the Radboud University. The procedure of this study 
was approved by the local ethics committee (CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands; protocol 2014/288 version 1.4). Before the start of the experiment, 
participants gave written consent. Participants were paid 8 euro per hour plus a bonus 
contingent on their performance, ranging between 3.58 and 7.10 euro. One participant 
was excluded from data analysis (see below), resulting in 34 participants (24 women; 












The experiment was performed on a computer running on Windows 7 with a screen 
resolution of 1920x1080p and a grey background color (R:200 G:200 B:200). The task 
was programmed in MATLAB version 2017a, using Psychophysics Toolbox Version 
3.0.12.
Color sensitivity task 
Participants first completed a color sensitivity task measuring the ability to detect and 
distinguish the colors in the main experiment. This task consisted of 12 trials where 
participants had to match the color of a square in the center of a color wheel to the 
corresponding color on the wheel, by moving the mouse toward the wheel. Once they 
reached a color on the wheel, that color was taken as their response. If the average 
deviation of the response from the true color was more than 15 degrees, the task was 
assessed again. Participants would be excluded after a second failure. 
The color wheel was created with the HSV MATLAB color map and was divided into 
12 parts, each from which one color was randomly chosen to be the target color. The 
orientation of the color wheel was randomized across trials. After each trial, a first 
black line confirmed the response and a second line indicated the true color. Additional 
feedback conveying the absolute number of degrees to which the response deviated 
from the true color (deviance) was given if the deviance was below 10 degrees: e.g. 
‘Good job! You deviated only 4 degrees!’. Participants were instructed to answer 
precisely, but not to take too much time to respond. There was no maximum response 
time, but participants were instructed to first determine their response and only then 
move their mouse as fast as possible toward the wheel. 
Color wheel working memory task
In the color wheel task, participants viewed an array of colors and, after a delay, 
reported the color of one probed item from the array. A visual representation is 
depicted in Figure 3.1. On each trial, an incentive cue ranging from 5 to 95 points was 
presented on screen. This incentive cue varied as a function of a Gaussian random 
walk with a standard deviation of 20. These parameters were chosen to optimize 
measurement of the effect of fluctuating average reward rates (averaged across a 
history of recent trials), motivated by a question about a possible effect of average 
reward (or opportunity cost) on meta-control (Otto & Daw, 2019). However, addressing 
this question is outside the scope of the current thesis. After 750ms participants were 
instructed to press the space bar to start the trial. After a blank screen lasting 500ms, 
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three colored items were presented in the middle of the screen, with the letter ‘M’ 
for ‘memorize’ in the middle. During this encoding phase, participants had 500ms to 
memorize the colors of the items, after which there was a delay of 500ms during which 
a fixation cross was shown. A new set of colored items then appeared on screen, with 
one of two letters in the center. ‘I’ for ‘ignore’: participants had to ignore the new items 
while still remembering the old set of items; ‘U’ or ‘update’: participants now had to 
memorize the new set of items and forget the old items. This interference phase lasted 
500ms and was followed by a second delay phase. Dependent on the trial-type, ignore 
or update, this delay lasted either 500ms or 1500ms, respectively, in order to match 
the time interval between the relevant items (the first set for ignore and the second set 
for update) and the probe phase. During this probe phase, the color wheel appeared 
on the screen together with one outlined frame that indicated the location of the item 
that should be reported. Participants had up to 4000ms to decide on their response 
before moving the mouse toward their desired color. Once they started moving the 
mouse, they had a short time window to reach the color wheel, which was individually 
determined by their median time to move the mouse toward the wheel during the color 
sensitivity task. Every tenth trial, this deadline was shortened with 100ms to promote 
fast responding (Beierholm et al., 2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 2011; Otto & Daw, 2019). 
The distinction between time to determine their response and time to move the mouse 
was made to minimize the contribution of motor processes to reaction times. However, 
the time to reach the color wheel was very short compared with the time to determine 
the response and our primary analyses revealed equivalent results for total response 
time and time to determine a response. We therefore only report total response time 
(RT), which was calculated as the sum over the time it took the participant to determine 
their response and the time it took to reach the color wheel. 
The task was preceded by two practice blocks of 8 trials each. The first block was 
without incentives to familiarize participants with the difference between the ignore 
and update trial-types. Feedback was provided as a second line indicating the true 
color. During the second practice block the trials were preceded by an incentive cue. No 
line indicating the true color was presented, but participants received feedback about 
their received reward, which was equal to the number of points indicated at the start of 
the trial when their deviance fell within 15 degrees or zero otherwise. 
During the actual task, participants received the reward if their response was 
considered correct, i.e., fell within an individually set response window, determined 
separately for ignore and update trials as the 85th percentile deviance score across all 
practice trials of that trial-type. Participants were instructed that they would earn a 











Participants completed three blocks of the color wheel task, each lasting 12 minutes. 
On average, participants completed 98 trials per block (SD = 6, range = 76 – 108). It is 
of note here that participants could win more reward the more trials they completed 
(while maintaining their accuracy) within those 12 minutes, which was also explicitly 
communicated to the participants. Thus, both accuracy and speed were important in 
this paradigm. In the first block, the trials were equally divided between ignore and 
update (neutral context), where the demand for proactive control was minimal. To 
bias meta-control processes we manipulated the frequency of the trial-types in two 
additional blocks, counterbalanced across participants, with one block consisting of 
67% ignore trial-type and 33% update trial-type (majority ignore context) and the other 
block consisting of 67% update trial-type and 33% ignore trial-type (majority update 
context). The participants were explicitly informed about these contexts during the 
instruction phase and again at the start of each block by “You will get mostly IGNORE/
UPDATE” being shown on the screen, after which they had to press the space bar. The 
colors that were presented during the encoding phase of ignore trials were matched 
to the colors that were presented during the interference phase of update trials and 
vice versa. The target colors were the same for both trial-types and the location of the 
target item was balanced across trial-types. Participants experienced the same set of 
stimuli in each context, but in randomized order. The orientation of the color wheel was 
randomized across trials. 
 
FIGURE 3.1 | Schematic of the color wheel working memory task where participants have to 
indicate the color of an outlined target item on the color wheel. M = memorize: participants had to 
memorize the colors of the items. I = ignore trial-type: participants have to ignore the new items 
while still remembering the previous items. U = update trial-type: participants have to remember 
the new items and forget the previous items. The number of points at the start of the trial in 
indicates the number of points to be earned if performance on that trial is below an individually 
set threshold.
Data analysis
Our primary dependent variables were deviance and response time, but we also 
explored whether the participant received a reward or not: the proportion of correct 
trials. Outliers were defined a priori as participants whose mean overall deviance 
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was either more than 3 standard deviations higher than that of the global mean, 
which resulted in one exclusion. We analyzed our data in R version 3.4.2 (R Core 
Team, 2018) using a combination of primary Bayesian trial-by-trial mixed effects 
modeling supplemented by repeated-measures ANOVAs (rmANOVAs) on summary 
data to confirm the results and to accommodate readers who are used to interpreting 
frequentist statistics.  
The Bayesian mixed effects models were performed using the brm function from 
the brms package (Bürkner, 2017). These models allowed for a trial-wise analysis 
and for incentive to be modeled as a continuous variable. We analyzed deviance, RT 
and whether participants received a reward on that trial (trials correct). The family 
functions used were lognormal for deviance and RT, and Bernoulli for trials correct. 
The omnibus model included the main effects of the predictors incentive (continuous), 
trial-type (ignore, update) and context (majority ignore, majority update, neutral) and 
their interactions as fixed effects, and random intercepts and slopes per participant 
for the same effects. To improve model performance and interpretability, incentive 
was z-scored and the categorical variables were coded as sum-to-zero contrasts. The 
contrasts for the context factor were represented as 1) ignore versus the grand mean of 
all contexts and 2) update versus the grand mean of all contexts. We used default brms-
priors. The model was fit using four chains with 10,000 iterations each (5,000 warm-
up) and were inspected for convergence. Coefficients were considered statistically 
significant if the 95% posterior credible intervals did not overlap with zero.
The omnibus model represents three levels of the context factor and interpretation 
of effects including this factor is complicated. Therefore, we additionally ran pairwise 
comparisons contrasting each pair of contexts. Upon significant interactions that 
included the factor context, we ran separate models for each context. These follow-up 
models were otherwise computed as described above. 
The rmANOVAs were performed on mean deviance, mean RT and the proportion of 
trials on which participants received a reward (proportion correct) and included the 
within-subjects factors incentive (median split per individual: low, high), trial-type 
(ignore, update) and context (majority ignore, majority update, neutral). The analyses 
were performed using the ezANOVA function from the ez package (Lawrence, 2016). 
When the assumption of sphericity was violated, we report Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected p-values. If an interaction was significant, we followed-up with post-hoc tests 
contrasting each pair of contexts (majority ignore versus majority update; majority 
ignore versus neutral; majority update versus neutral) and assessing the effects of 











Additionally, we ran a repeated measures correlation to assess a potential speed-
accuracy trade-off between deviance and response time using the rmcorr package in R 
(Bakdash & Marusich, 2018).   
To assess potential effects of meta-control or incentive on distributional skew (De Jong, 
2000; Nieuwenhuis & Monsel, 2002), we performed ex-Gaussian analyses. The analyses 
were performed using the mexgauss function from the retimes package in R (Massidda, 
2013) to calculate central tendency (μ and σ parameters) and skew (τ parameter) for 
each context, trial-type and incentive (low, high) for each participant, followed by a 
rmANOVA with the within-subjects factors context, trial-type and incentive. We briefly 
report the results below for the purpose of full reporting. However, given the low 
number of trials per condition we deemed our statistical power low  (range = 5-51) 
(Heathcote et al., 2004) and warrant caution in interpreting these results.  
Results
Better performance on update than ignore trials
In line with previous studies using this paradigm (Hofmans et al., 2020; Papadopetraki 
et al., 2019), participants were less accurate on ignore trials than on update trials, both 
in terms of deviance (BRMS: 95% CI = [0.21, 0.31]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 124.0, p = 1.02e
-12; 
Figure 3.2A) and trials correct (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.62, -0.06]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 5.2, p 
= 0.029; Figure 3.2B). Additionally, as in previous studies, they were faster on ignore 
trials than on update trials (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.05, -0.02]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 23.3, p = 
3.11e-5; Figure 3.2C).
Does context elicit meta-level strategy prioritization?
We then assessed whether we succeeded in isolating a meta-control effect using this 
paradigm. Such an effect of meta-control would be evident in terms of an interaction 
between trial-type and context, with better performance on ignore trials in a block 
where the majority of trials were ignore trials and better performance on update trials 
in a block where the majority of trials were update trials. This interaction was not 
significant for either deviance (BRMS: 95% CI majority ignore versus neutral = [-0.03, 
0.05], majority update versus neutral = [-0.03, 0.04], majority ignore versus majority 
update = [-0.03, 0.05]; rmANOVA: F(2,66) = 1.6, p = 0.219; Figure 3.2A) or trials correct 
(trials on which reward was received; BRMS: 95% CI majority ignore versus neutral 
= [-0.12, 0.11], majority update versus neutral = [-0.13, 0.07], majority ignore versus 
majority update = [-0.10, 0.15]; rmANOVA: F(2,66) = 1.2, p = 0.322; Figure 3.2B). Thus, there 
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was no evidence from accuracy data that participants used the context information to 
prioritize strategy and thus enhance performance. However, we did see a significant 
interaction between trial-type and context on RT (rmANOVA: omnibus: F(2,66) = 4.0, 
p = 0.024; Figure 3.2C), which was driven by a difference in the effect of trial-type 
between the majority ignore and majority update context (Trial-type x context: BRMS: 
95% CI = [0.01, 0.02]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 8.0, p = 0.008). This was due to participants 
being slower on update trials than on ignore trials to a larger degree in the majority 
update context (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.07, -0.03]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 20.2, p = 8.14e
-5) than 
in the majority ignore context (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.05, -0.00]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 3.7, 
p = 0.065). The interaction between trial-type and context was not significant when 
comparing the neutral context with either the majority ignore (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.00, 
0.02]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 3.7, p = 0.064) or the majority update context (BRMS: 95% CI = 
[-0.01, 0.00]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.7, p = 0.420).
Context biases performance nonselectively
Analyses of deviance revealed a significant main effect of context (rmANOVA: F(2,66) = 
5.7, p = 0.005; Figure 3.2A), indicating lower deviance in the majority ignore versus both 
the neutral context (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.12, -0.03]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 10.6, p = 0.003) and 
the majority update context (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.09, -0.01]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 6.8, p = 
0.013). There was no difference between the majority update and the neutral context 
(BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.06, 0.02]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.2, p = 0.667). The effect of context was 
similar for trials correct (rmANOVA: F(2,66) = 7.1, p = 0.002; Figure 3.2B), with participants 
being more often correct in the majority ignore versus both the neutral context (BRMS: 
95% CI = [0.08, 0.33]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 11.7, p = 0.002) and the majority update context 
(BRMS: 95% CI = [0.04, 0.28]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 9.5, p = 0.004). Again, there was no 
difference between the majority update and the neutral context (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.06, 
0.14]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.3, p = 0.612). The observation that participants performed 
better in the majority ignore context might represent a different, unpredicted form 
of meta-control, where the more demanding and stability-requiring majority ignore 
context improves performance nonselectively, independent of trial-type.
We additionally observed a significant main effect of context on RT (rmANOVA: F(2,66) 
= 28.7, p = 7.10e-8; Figure 3.2C), with participants being faster in the majority update 
versus the neutral context (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.08, -0.04]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 33.0, p = 
2.04e-6) and in the majority ignore versus the neutral context (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.10, 
-0.04]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 34.2, p = 1.52e
-6), potentially owing to practice effects due to 
the order of the contexts, as the neural context was always the first block. There was no 
difference between the majority ignore and majority update context (BRMS: 95% CI = 











Does incentive motivation facilitate meta-control? 
We considered the possibility that an effect of meta-control might depend on the 
degree to which participants were motivated. Thus, next we assessed whether an 
effect of meta-control, that is the interaction between context and trial-type or the 
main effect of context, varied as a function of incentive motivation. 
Contrary to our hypothesis, analyses of deviance revealed no interaction between 
incentive, trial-type and context (BRMS: 95% CI majority ignore versus neutral = [-0.02, 
0.05], majority update versus neutral = [-0.04, 0.03], majority ignore versus majority 
update = [-0.02, 0.06]; rmANOVA: F(2,66) = 1.4, p = 0.257; Figure 3.3A). Similarly, we did 
not observe a significant interaction between incentive, trial-type and context for trials 
correct (BRMS: 95% CI majority ignore versus neutral = [-0.14, 0.09], majority update 
versus neutral = [-0.13, 0.08], majority ignore versus majority update = [-0.12, 0.12]; 
rmANOVA: F(2,66) = 2.0, p = 0.156; Figure 3.3B). 
However, analyses of RT did reveal an interaction between incentive, trial-type and 
context for the comparison between the majority update versus the neutral context 
(BRMS: 95% CI majority update versus neutral = [-0.02, -0.00], majority ignore versus 
neutral = [-0.01, 0.00], majority ignore versus majority update = [-0.00, 0.01]; rmANOVA: 
omnibus: F(2,66) = 2.7, p = 0.073, majority update versus neutral: F(1,33) = 5.4, p = 0.027, 
majority ignore versus neutral: F(1,33) = 1.2, p = 0.281, majority ignore versus majority 
update: F(1,33) = 1.6, p = 0.210; Figure 3.3C). This three-way interaction between 
incentive, trial-type and context was driven by incentive inducing greater slowing on 
update relative to ignore trials in the majority update context, but not in the other 
contexts (BRMS: 95% CI majority update = [-0.02, -0.00], majority ignore = [-0.01, 0.00], 
neutral = [-0.01, 0.02]; rmANOVA: majority update: F(1,33) = 4.6, p = 0.040, majority ignore: 
F(1,33) = 1.1, p = 0.305, neutral: F(1,33) = 0.5, p = 0.478). In the majority update context, 
incentive slowed responding on update trials, but had no effect on ignore trials (BRMS: 
95% CI update trials = [0.00, 0.03], ignore trials = [-0.03, 0.01]; rmANOVA: update trials: 
F(1,33) = 3.9, p = 0.058, ignore trials: F(1,33) = 1.2, p = 0.282). 
Incentive did not interact with the main effect of context in terms of either deviance 
(BRMS: 95% CI majority ignore versus neutral = [-0.12, 0.12], majority update versus 
neutral = [-0.14, 0.07], majority ignore versus majority update = [-0.08, 0.15]; rmANOVA: 
F(2,66) = 1.4, p = 0.252), trials correct (BRMS: 95% CI majority ignore versus neutral = [-0.04, 
0.04], majority update versus neutral = [-0.03, 0.05], majority ignore versus majority 
update = [-0.05, 0.03]; rmANOVA: F(2,66) = 0.8, p = 0.466) or RT (BRMS: 95% CI majority 
ignore versus neutral = [-0.01, 0.01], majority update versus neutral = [-0.01, 0.01], 
majority ignore versus majority update = [-0.00, 0.01]; rmANOVA: F(2,66) = 0.3, p = 0.738). 
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Moreover, there was no main effect of incentive on either deviance (BRMS: 95% CI = 
[-0.05, 0.02]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.1e-7, p = 0.992), trials correct (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.08, 
0.11]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.1, p = 0.738) or RT (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.00, 0.01]; rmANOVA: 
F(1,33) = 1.3, p = 0.255). 
FIGURE 3.2 | A – Mean deviance, B – proportion of trials on which participants were correct and 
received a reward and C – mean response time as a function of context, separately for both trial-
types. Dots represent mean scores per individual. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. 
 
 
FIGURE 3.3 | Incentive effect (median split: high minus low incentive) on A – mean deviance, 
B – proportion of trials on which participants were correct and received a reward and C – mean 
response time as a function of context and trial-type. Dots represent mean scores per individual. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. 
Does the lack of meta-control effects reflect a failure-to-engage?
Although we did not find support for control strategy prioritization, we next considered 
a previous account arguing that people sometimes fail to engage in control, even 













participants’ switch costs, were diminished when they had time to proactively prepare 
for a task-switch (De Jong, 2000; Nieuwenhuis & Monsel, 2002). However, switch costs 
were not eliminated, which was attributed to failures to engage in advance cognitive 
preparation on a portion of the trials. This failure-to-engage manifested itself most 
notably in the longer RTs, with individuals exhibiting disproportionately long RTs when 
they did not prepare for an upcoming trial. 
It might be possible that here too, meta-level strategy prioritization is most prominently 
present for trials with the longer RTs and/or the larger deviances. To examine changes in 
longer RTs, associated with distributional skew, we used ex-Gaussian analyses for both 
deviance and RT. Ex-Gaussian models have three parameters: μ and η, reflecting the 
mean and standard deviation of the Gaussian part of the distribution and η, reflecting 
the mean and standard deviation of the exponential part, or the tail of the distribution 
consisting of the longest RTs or the largest deviance scores. We were interested in 
whether patterns of meta-level strategy prioritization would emerge when assessing η 
and whether this would be affected by the prospect of reward.  
There was a non-significant trend for the interaction between context and trial-type 
on the τ parameter for deviance (F(2,66) = 2.7, p = 0.073). However, in contrast with 
our hypothesis that the τ parameter should be smaller for the high-frequent trial-
type, participants’ τ was smaller for update trials in the majority ignore context. Thus, 
the proportion of large deviance scores was relatively lower for update trials in the 
majority ignore context. Consistent with the analyses of mean deviance, the main effect 
of context on the τ parameter for deviance was significant (F(2,66) = 3.4, p = 0.039), with 
τ being smaller in the majority ignore context compared with both the majority update 
context (F(1,33) = 4.3, p = 0.046) and the neutral context (F(1,33) = 6.4, p = 0.017). There was 
no difference between the majority update and the neutral context (F(1,33) = 0.07, p = 
0.792). There were no main or interaction effects of incentive on τ (all p > 0.109). 
For RT we observed a numerical trend for an interaction between context and trial-
type on τ (F(2,66) = 2.7, p = 0.078), which was similar as for the analyses of mean RT: 
participants’ τ was larger for update trials in the majority update context, indicating a 
larger proportion of long RTs for update trials in the majority update context. Consistent 
with the analysis of mean RT above, distributional analyses of RTs revealed a main 
effect of context on τ (F(2,66) = 14.0, p = 4.0e
-5). Compared with the neutral context, τ was 
lower for the majority ignore (F(1,33) = 28.0, p = 7.7e
-6) and the majority update context 
(F(1,33) = 10.7, p = 0.003), potentially owing to practice effects. There were no differences 
between the majority ignore and the majority update context (F(1,33) = 1.9, p = 0.177). 
There were no main or interaction effects of incentive on τ (all p > 0.200). 
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Thus, ex-Gaussian analyses revealed no evidence for the predicted effects of meta-
level strategy prioritization in terms of accuracy. However, consistent with our primary 
analyses of mean deviance, we observed a main effect of context on the distributional 
skew of deviance scores, such that the proportion of large deviance scores was lower in 
the majority ignore context. 
Better performance on ignore trials following ignore trials than fol-
lowing update trials
The observation that participants performed better in the majority ignore context 
might represent a different, unpredicted form of meta-control. This performance 
improvement might have reflected the greater proportion of ignore trials, which 
prompted increases in meta-control on trials immediately following those more stable 
and demanding ignore trials. Therefore, we explored whether participants performed 
better on trials following ignore trials and whether this effect depended on the current 
trial-type and incentive motivation. Additionally, we explored whether participants 
were slower on update trials immediately preceded by update versus ignore trials, 
given our observation that participants were relatively slower on update trials in the 
majority update context than in the majority ignore context. To this end, we analyzed 
deviance, trials correct and RT as a function of trial-type, previous trial-type and 
incentive.   
This revealed a main effect of previous-trial type on both deviance and trials correct, 
such that participants performed better following an ignore than an update trial 
(Deviance: BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.07, -0.01]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 14.8, p = 5.2e
-4; Trials correct: 
BRMS: 95% CI = [0.00, 0.18]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 4.2, p = 0.049). However, there was 
a significant interaction between trial-type and previous trial-type (Deviance: BRMS: 
95% CI = [-0.08, -0.02]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 21.6, p = 5.2e
-5; Trials correct: BRMS: 95% CI = 
[0.03, 0.20]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 17.9, p = 1.7e
-4; Figure 3.4A-B). Performance on ignore 
trials was better following an ignore trial than following an update trial (Deviance: 
BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.14, -0.05]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 22.8, p = 3.6e
-5; Trials correct: BRMS: 
95% CI = [0.09, 0.31]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 16.6, p = 2.7e
-4). However, previous trial-type 
did not affect update trials (Deviance: BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.04, 0.04]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) 
= 1.0, p = 0.328; Trials correct: BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.16, 0.12]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.5, p 
= 0.488). Thus, the greater proportion of trials following ignore trials in the majority 
ignore context might explain the performance improvement for ignore trials, but 
not for update trials. This trial-wise meta-control effect, i.e. the interaction between 
current trial-type and previous trial-type, was not affected by incentive (Deviance: 
BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.02, -0.04]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 9.2e
-3, p = 0.924; Trials correct: BRMS: 











interaction between incentive and previous-trial type (Deviance: BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.03, 
-0.03]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 1.4, p = 0.250; Trials correct: BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.10, 0.06]; 
rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.5, p = 0.503).
There was no effect of previous trial-type on RT (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.01, 0.00]; 
rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 2.7, p = 0.108), nor was there an interaction between previous trial-
type and current trial-type (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.00, 0.01]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.5, p = 
0.495; Figure 3.4C). Incentive did not interact with previous trial-type (BRMS: 95% CI = 
[-0.00, 0.01]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.8, p = 0.378) or with the interaction between previous 
trial-type and current trial-type (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.01, 0.00]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.05, 
p = 0.827; Figure 3.5C).
Following the observation of these sequential effects on accuracy, we examined 
whether the improvement on ignore trials following ignore trials differed across 
contexts. To that end, we analyzed deviance and trials correct as a function of trial-
type, previous trial-type and context, leaving out incentive as a predictor due to 
the low number of trials. However, there was no effect of context on the interaction 
between trial-type and previous trial-type on deviance (BRMS: 95% CI majority ignore 
versus neutral = [-0.04, 0.04], majority update versus neutral = [-0.03, 0.06], majority 
ignore versus majority update = [-0.06, 0.03]; rmANOVA: F(2,66) = 0.5, p = 0.595) or trials 
correct (BRMS: 95% CI majority ignore versus neutral = [-0.15, 0.11], majority update 
versus neutral = [-0.14, 0.08], majority ignore versus majority update = [-0.11, 0.14]; 
rmANOVA: F(2,66) = 0.8, p = 0.470).  
 
Figure 3.4. A – Mean deviance, B – proportion of trials on which participants were correct and 
received a reward and C – mean response time as a function of trial-type and the trial-type 
immediately preceding the current trial (previous trial-type). Dots represent mean scores per 
individual. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval.  
A B C
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Figure 3.5. Incentive effect (median split: high minus low incentive) on A – Mean deviance, B 
– proportion of trials on which participants were correct and received a reward and C – mean 
response time as a function of trial-type and the trial-type immediately preceding the current 
trial (previous trial-type). Dots represent mean scores per individual. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence interval.   
Discussion
Here we assessed whether incentive motivation promotes cognitive meta-control. We 
predicted that incentive motivation would favor the high-frequent task over the low-
frequent task by increasing meta-level strategy prioritization (Braver, 2012; Braver 
et al., 2014). In contrast to our prediction, there was no interaction between trial-type 
and context on deviance or proportion correct. We expected participants to perform 
better on update trials in a context where the majority of the trials consisted of update 
trials and to perform better on ignore trials in a context where the majority of the trials 
consisted of ignore trials, and thus show a form of meta-control for the high-frequent 
task. However, we found no indication of this form of meta-level strategy prioritization 
in terms of accuracy. A subsequent exploratory ex-Gaussian analysis to specifically 
recover effects on trials with the largest deviance scores also revealed no effects of 
meta-level strategy prioritization on deviance. The absence of the predicted effect of 
meta-level strategy prioritization on accuracy prevents us from assessing our hypothesis 
that incentive increases strategy prioritization. Indeed, we did not find support for the 
hypothesized interaction between trial-type, context and incentive motivation.
A significant trial-type by context effect on response times indicated that participants 
were particularly slower on update trials in the majority update context relative to the 












being rewarded with more points. The interpretation of response times is unclear in 
this paradigm. Participants were instructed that they would receive the reward if their 
deviance were below a certain threshold, as long as they responded within the very 
liberal response window of 4 seconds. Therefore, they might well have responded 
more slowly to increase their accuracy, such that longer RTs would reflect enhanced 
caution. However, these slower RTs were not accompanied by improved accuracy and 
participants were instructed that they could potentially receive more reward if they 
completed more trials, implying that slower RTs would reflect poorer performance. 
Future analyses using drift diffusion (Ratcliff, 1978; Smith, 2016) or LATER (Pearson 
et al., 2014) models could offer a solution to this open question. According to these 
models, participants accumulate evidence until a certain decision threshold is reached. 
Although the number of trials in the current paradigm is too low, future studies with 
higher number of trials could assess whether the slower RTs reflect an increased 
threshold (i.e. enhanced caution) or a reduced rate of evidence accumulation (i.e. poorer 
memory representation).  
The lack of predicted effects raises the question why participants did not engage in 
meta-level strategy prioritization, at least to enhance accuracy, particularly because 
they were explicitly instructed about the context manipulation at multiple timepoints? 
The lack of meta-level strategy prioritization is unlikely to reflect ceiling effects or a 
failure to process the task cues, because accuracy was increased in the majority ignore 
context compared with the other contexts. 
One possibility is that the benefit associated with meta-level strategy prioritization 
did not weigh up against the effort cost (De Jong, 2000; Shenhav et al., 2013, 2017). 
According to the expected value of control (EVC) model, people decide whether to 
exert cognitive control based on the expected net value of control, which combines 
the expected payoff of exerting cognitive control and the expected subjective cost 
associated with exerting the amount of cognitive control necessary to achieve that 
payoff (Shenhav et al., 2013, 2017). The high percentage of trials rewarded (around 
90%, see Figure 3.2B) might imply that it was not worth spending the selective effort 
cost to prepare for the high-frequent task at the expense of the low-frequent task. 
Participants could decide to only memorize the items from the phase they expected 
to be the relevant phase, that is the first phase in the majority ignore context and the 
second phase in the majority update context. However, they would then arguably only 
receive a reward on 67% of the trials, which is considerably lower than their default 
performance. The lenient threshold to obtain a reward was intentionally implemented 
to optimize the design for average reward manipulations (out of the scope of the 
current chapter), in order to preserve the random Gaussian distribution of received 
reward (see Methods). However, future studies could either implement a more stringent 
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threshold or adapt the incentive structure such that the amount of received reward is 
inversely and linearly related to deviance (see e.g. (Honig et al., 2020)). 
Another possibility is that despite the lack of evidence for meta-level strategy 
prioritization, we did observe an interesting performance improvement, independent 
of trial-type, in the majority ignore context. This might reflect a different form of meta-
control, where the majority ignore context triggered a nonselective improvement in 
effort, motivation or attention to the experiment. For ignore trials, but not for update 
trials, the context effect might have resulted from increased meta-control on a trial-
wise level. The observation that participants performed better on ignore trials following 
ignore trials compared to update trials is akin to the Gratton effect: an incongruency 
effect, i.e. poorer performance on incongruent relative to congruent trials, is decreased 
following incongruent compared to congruent trials (Gratton et al., 1992). However, the 
previous trial-type did not affect performance on update trials. Thus, in addition to the 
trial-wise effect, the high proportion of the more demanding and stability-requiring 
ignore trials in the majority ignore context might have had a general positive effect on 
working memory by increasing task engagement, cognitive maintenance, or attention 
to the experiment. Incentive motivation also did not affect this form of meta-control. 
Although this is in contrast with studies that reported positive effects of incentive 
motivation on meta-control (Chiew & Braver, 2016; Etzel et al., 2016), two previous 
studies could also not demonstrate an interaction between meta-control and incentive 
motivation (Soutschek et al., 2014, 2015). The first study examined behavioral effects 
on a Stroop task, in which trials were either preceded by a reward cue or not. The 
possibility for meta-control was manipulated by varying the frequency of incongruent 
versus congruent trials in a block, with a high frequency of incongruent trials 
generating conflict expectation and thereby allowing for preparation for the harder, 
incongruent trials. Both the possibility for meta-control and reward incentives reduced 
the congruency effect (i.e. slower responding on incongruent trials), but a combination 
of the two did not yield additional improvements (Soutschek et al., 2014). A follow-up 
fMRI study used a Stroop-like paradigm in which participants had to decide whether 
a face was that of a woman or a man, while ignoring the overlaid word “woman” or 
“man” (Soutschek et al., 2015). Again, the frequency of incongruent trials varied to 
manipulate conflict expectancy. Although conflict expectancy reduced conflict-related 
activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex only when incentive motivation was 
high but not when incentive motivation was low, implying that motivation enhances 
meta-control, this was not accompanied by parallel effects on performance. Moreover, 
it has been shown using a working-memory paradigm that incentive motivation 
amplified patterns of enhanced representation of relevant stimuli and suppressed 











behavioral effects (Krawczyk et al., 2007). Thus, it is possible that interactions between 
incentive motivation and meta-control did not surface at the behavioral level did have 
neural effects.
Another possibility is that meta-control would be affected by the average reward 
rate, rather than by the incentive associated with the current trial. Indeed, previous 
research has shown that the average reward rate, but not the reward on offer, affected 
effort exertion in terms of response times and accuracy on tasks involving perceptual 
detection, task-switching and stimulus-response compatibility (Beierholm et al., 2013; 
Guitart-Masip et al., 2011; Otto & Daw, 2019). Further analyses of the current dataset 
could determine whether average reward rate also affects meta-control. 
Altogether, we find no evidence for effects of incentive motivation on meta-control in 
terms of accuracy. The pattern of effects on reaction times might raise the hypothesis 
that incentive motivation has elicited a proactively controlled increase in decision 
threshold, but sequential sampling modeling of both accuracy and RT data is required 
to confirm that hypothesis. Nevertheless, we remain puzzled by the insensitivity of the 
current paradigm to selective changes in accuracy by context and incentive motivation.
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Abstract
Cognitive control requires a dynamic balance between the extent to which we focus 
and maintain current task representations (cognitive stability) and the extent to which 
we flexibly switch between representations (cognitive flexibility). It has been argued 
that rewards, through their action on dopaminergic processes in the striatum, promote 
cognitive flexibility by facilitating the gating of new information into working memory. 
Here, we assessed whether a highly rewarding task-environment, in which participants 
earn a high amount of reward, was associated with improved cognitive flexibility at the 
expense of cognitive stability using a working memory task. We expected that highly 
rewarding environments would not only improve cognitive flexibility in terms of 
performance, but also reduce the subjective cost of cognitive effort for tasks requiring 
flexibility, such that participants are more willing to engage in cognitive flexibility 
versus stability, measured with a subsequent cognitive effort discounting procedure. 
However, we did not find evidence that the reward environment affects the balance 
between cognitive stability and flexibility. Moreover, the general lack of any effects 













Cognitive control refers to a set of mechanisms required for adaptively pursuing a (long 
term) goal, involving preparation and maintenance of rules to bias action and attention 
in working memory (Egner, 2017; Fuster, 1989; Monsell, 2003). Cognitive control, 
comprising functions such as working memory, attention and inhibition, is often 
associated with distractor resistance and persistent focus. However, in our dynamic 
environment, where goals change over the course of time and context, we also need 
to be able to flexibly adjust to the circumstances and allow new input and demands to 
enter our working memory. It is therefore important to dynamically balance the extent 
to which we focus and maintain current task representations (cognitive stability) versus 
the extent to which we flexibly switch between representations (cognitive flexibility). 
Rewards have often been found to enhance cognitive control (Jimura et al., 2010; 
Krawczyk et al., 2007; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010), but conflicting results have also 
been found, with rewards decreasing cognitive performance (Aarts et al., 2010, 
2011; Chib et al., 2012; Mobbs et al., 2009; Zedelius et al., 2011). These contrasting 
effects of rewards have previously been hypothesized to stem from increases in 
striatal dopamine release induced by anticipated reward (Robbins & Everitt, 2007; 
Salamone et al., 2016; Schultz, 1997) and the observation that dopamine can have 
opposing effects depending on the type of the task at hand (Cools et al., 2010; Mehta 
et al., 2001, 2004). For example, administration of the dopamine receptor antagonist 
sulpiride impaired set-shifting but improved distractor resistance (Mehta et al., 2004). 
This is in agreement with observations in patients with Parkinson’s disease, a disorder 
associated with striatal dopamine depletion, who show deficits in flexible task-
switching (Cools et al., 2001), but enhanced cognitive stability on working memory 
paradigms when off but not on their dopaminergic medication (Cools et al., 2010; 
Moustafa et al., 2008). It has been argued that these task-dependent effects reflect 
dopamine’s differential action in the prefrontal cortex and striatum (Cools & D’Esposito, 
2011). Prefrontal dopamine would promote cognitive stability by increasing signal-
to-noise (Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008; Vijayraghavan et al., 2007), whereas striatal 
dopamine would promote cognitive flexibility by facilitating the gating of new 
information into working memory (Frank et al., 2001; Hazy et al., 2007). In agreement 
with this hypothesis is the observation that dopamine depletion following 6-OHDA 
injection in marmosets had remarkably different effects depending on the site of 
injection: dopamine depletion in the frontal cortex impaired distractor resistance but 
improved attentional shifting, whereas dopamine depletion in the caudate nucleus 
improved distractor resistance and did not improve attentional shifting (Crofts et 
al., 2001). Similar results were found in a later study in humans, with the dopamine 
receptor agonist bromocriptine increasing neural activity in the prefrontal cortex 
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during distractor-resistance, while increasing neural activity in the striatum during 
task-switching (Cools et al., 2007).   
Leveraging these insights to the effects of reward on cognitive stability versus 
flexibility, previous reasoning puts forward the hypothesis that anticipated reward 
would increase flexible control at the expense of stable control (Aarts et al., 2011). 
Indeed, it has been demonstrated, and replicated, using an incentivized Stroop task 
that human participants carrying the 9-repeat allele of the DAT1 transporter gene, 
which is predominantly expressed in the striatum and associated with higher striatal 
dopamine levels, showed greater reward-related improvements in task-switching than 
10-repeat homozygotes (Aarts et al., 2010; van Holstein et al., 2011). Moreover, high 
reward increased switch-related neural activity in the striatum to a larger extent in 
the 9-repeat group (Aarts et al., 2010). These results strengthen the hypothesis that 
motivation increases cognitive flexibility through striatal processes. 
In line with these effects of incentive motivation, inducing performance independent-
affect, for example by having participants listen to happy or pleasant music or watch 
affective pictures, has been demonstrated to decrease perseverance but to increase 
distractibility (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004) and to decrease maintenance capacity 
on the AX Continuous Performance Task, but benefit performance on the same task 
when goals suddenly changed (Dreisbach, 2006). Other researchers have found that 
positive affect increased susceptibility to distracting information (Rowe et al., 2007) 
and reduced focus after a trial with conflicting information (van Steenbergen et al., 
2010). Thus, both incentive motivation and positive affect have been shown to enhance 
cognitive flexibility at the expense of cognitive stability
Here, we build on these insights by assessing whether a highly rewarding task-
environment is associated with improved cognitive flexibility but reduced cognitive 
stability. Because in chapter 3 we did not find any effects of incentive motivation on 
cognitive control, we here manipulate the value of performance-independent rewards, 
such that participants perform a task in a rich and a poor environment. 
In addition to expecting that rich environments would be associated with improved 
performance on tasks requiring cognitive flexibility, we also anticipated that these rich 
environments would be associated with reduced subjective cost of cognitive flexibility, 
such that participants are more willing to engage in cognitive flexibility versus stability, 
measured with a subsequent cognitive effort discounting procedure. This hypothesis 
is based on the proposal that the cost of cognitive control is equal to the average 
rewards received over time (Boureau et al., 2015; Niv et al., 2007; Otto & Daw, 2019): 











cognitive flexibility requires less focus than cognitive stability, we here asked whether 
manipulating the reward value of the environment would also bias people towards 
greater cognitive flexibility in terms of costs in the context of a working memory task.  
Methods
Participants
Thirty-five healthy and right-handed participants were recruited via SONA, the 
research participation system of the Radboud University. Participants had no history 
of neurological or psychiatric illness. The procedure of this study was approved by 
the local ethics committee (CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands; protocol 
2014/288 version 1.4). Before the start of the experiment, subjects gave written 
consent. On top of an hourly rate of €8 per hour, participants were paid a monetary 
amount based on the number of points they received during the experiment (mean (SD) 
= €3.01 (€0.61), range €1.47 – €4.53). One participant was excluded from data analysis 
due to an incomplete dataset, resulting in 34 participants (28 women; age: mean (SD) = 
22.9 (3.3), range 18 – 34).  
Behavioral paradigm
The experiment consisted of four parts: participants completed a color sensitivity task, 
a color wheel working memory task to assess performance on cognitive stability and 
cognitive flexibility, a cognitive effort discounting paradigm to assess subjective costs 
of cognitive stability and flexibility, and a repetition of the working memory task. All 
tasks were performed on a computer running on Windows 7 and a screen resolution 
of 1920x1080p. The background color for all tasks was grey (R:200 G: 200 B: 200). 
All tasks were programmed in MATLAB version 2018a, using Psychophysics Toolbox 
Version 3.0.12.
Color sensitivity task 
Participants first completed a color sensitivity task measuring the ability to detect 
and distinguish the colors in the main experiment. This task consisted of 12 trials 
where they had to match the color of a square in the center of a color wheel to the 
corresponding color on the wheel, by moving the mouse toward the wheel. Once they 
reached a color on the wheel, that color was taken as their response. If the average 
deviation of the response from the true color was more than 15 degrees, the task was 
assessed again. Participants would be excluded after a second failure. 
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The color wheel was created with the HSV MATLAB color map and was divided into 
12 parts, each from which one color was randomly chosen to be the target color. The 
orientation of the color wheel was randomized across trials. After each trial, a first 
black line confirmed the response and a second line indicated the true color. Additional 
feedback conveying the absolute number of degrees to which the response deviated 
from the true color (deviance) was given if the deviance was below 10 degrees: e.g. 
‘Good job! You deviated only 4 degrees!’. Participants were instructed to answer 
precisely, but not to take too much time to respond. There was no maximum response 
time, but participants were instructed to first determine their response and only then 
move their mouse as fast as possible toward the wheel.
Color wheel working memory task
The color wheel task is a delayed response working memory task where participants 
view an array of colors and, after a delay, report the color of one probed item from the 
array (Prinzmetal et al., 1997; Wilken & Ma, 2004). We employed a version of the task 
that distinguishes between distracter resistance and flexible updating (Papadopetraki et 
al., 2019). A visual representation is depicted in Figure 1A. On each trial, colored items 
were presented in the middle of the screen, with the letter ‘M’ for ‘memorize’ in the 
middle. During this encoding phase, participants had 500ms to remember the colors of 
the items, after which there was a delay of 500ms during which a fixation cross was 
shown. During a subsequent interference phase, a new set of colored items appeared on 
screen, with one of two letters in the center. ‘I’ for ‘ignore’: participants had to ignore the 
new items while still remembering the old set of items; ‘U’ or ‘update’: participants now 
had to memorize the new set of items and forget the old items. This new set of squares 
remained on screen for 500ms, followed by a second delay phase. Depending on the task 
type, distractor resistance (ignore) or flexible updating (update), this delay lasted either 
500ms or 1500ms, respectively, so that the time interval between the relevant stimuli 
(encoding phase for ignore and interference phase for update) and the probe phase was 
matched between task types. During this probe phase, a color wheel appeared on screen 
together with one highlighted frame that indicated the location of the color that should be 
reported. Participants had 4000ms to indicate the color of this target location by moving 
the mouse towards the corresponding color on the color wheel. No feedback was given 
on accuracy. If participants did not respond within 4000ms, a message was presented for 
500ms in the center of the screen: ‘Please respond faster!’ Participants were instructed to 
always keep their eyes fixed on the center of the screen during the entire task. 
To manipulate the richness of the environment, participants were instructed that they 
would complete several blocks of the task: half of the blocks in a rich environment and 











a checkered or a dotted background pattern, counterbalanced across participants, 
and one of two sounds at the start of the trial, as shown in Figure 1A. They received 
50 points for each trial in the rich environment and 10 points for each trial in the 
poor environment. Importantly, in Chapter 3 we did not find any reliable effects of 
performance-contingent rewards and it has been observed earlier that contingent and 
non-contingent rewards have different effects on performance (Braem et al., 2013; 
Grogan et al., 2020; Manohar et al., 2017). Moreover, it has been observed that the 
average reward rate, but not by the instrumental immediate reward offered on a trial 
affected performance (Beierholm et al., 2013; Guitart-Masip et al., 2011; Otto & Daw, 
2019). We therefore adjusted the reward scheme such that obtaining the points was not 
contingent on performance to more closely mimic a “Pavlovian” reward environment 
rather than a direct action-outcome association. The obtained points were accumulated 
and proportionally converted into a monetary bonus. 
Before the start of the task, participants read the instructions and completed two 
practice rounds. The first practice round consisted of 32 trials served to familiarize the 
participants with the distinction between update and ignore, without the environment 
manipulation. The second practice round introduced the two environments and 
consisted of 4 blocks of 8 trials each. The two environments were counterbalanced 
over blocks in an ABBA order. The actual task consisted of 8 blocks of 8 trials each, 
with the two environments counterbalanced across blocks in an ABBABAAB order. The 
number of items (set size) was either 1 or 3. All combinations of set size (1 or 3) and 
task type (ignore or update) were repeated twice within each block. All color sets were 
equal across task types and environments but randomized between blocks to minimize 
the chance that participants remembered them. The colors that were presented during 
the encoding phase of ignore trials were the same as the colors that were presented 
during the interference phase of update trials and vice versa. The target colors were 
the same for both task types. 
The total duration of the task, including instruction and practice trials, was 
approximately 50 minutes.
Cognitive effort discounting task 
The subjective cost of cognitive control exertion in the color wheel working memory 
task was assessed using a choice task based on the cognitive effort discounting 
paradigm (COG-ED; (Westbrook et al., 2013)), administered after participants completed 
the color wheel task. Participants repeatedly had to choose between two different 
versions of repeating the color wheel working memory task for different amounts of 
money (Figure 1B). The amount of money offered was titrated over 6 iterations and 
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the difference in final amount between the versions was taken as the cost of cognitive 
effort (see below). To test the key effect of environmental richness on subjective costs, 
choices were completed in both a rich and a poor environment.
The version pairs were divided into two types: 1) choosing between redoing the 
color wheel task or not having to redo the task (task versus no redo) and 2) direct 
comparisons between redoing different ignore versus update or high versus low set 
size color wheel versions (direct comparison). The “task versus no-redo” choices always 
asked whether the participant would rather do a particular of the color wheel task 
again or whether they would rather not redo the task, which meant that they would 
be free to do what they wanted for an equal length of time while staying in the testing 
room (They could use the computer, their phone, etc.). The redo version was further 
specified by task type and set size (update 1; update 3; ignore 1; ignore 3), so that 
participants were instructed that 75% of trials during the redo would consist of trials of 
the chosen task type and set size. The remainder of the redo trials would be randomly 
divided among all task type and set size combinations. The “direct comparison” choices 
compared whether participants would rather redo set size 1 for less money versus 
set size 3 for more money (comparing set size: update 1 versus update 3; ignore 1 
versus ignore 3) or whether participants would rather redo update versus ignore trials 
(comparing task type: update 1 versus ignore 1; update 3 versus ignore 3). This resulted 
in 8 unique version pairs.
Participants were initially offered €2 for both versions. The offer for the version that 
was a priori assumed to be the easier one of the versions was then stepwise titrated 
over 6 iterations until the participant did not prefer one version over the other anymore 
(Figure 1B). In the “task versus no redo” version, the offer for the no redo option was 
always adjusted and the offer for the task option was fixed at €2.00, whereas in the 
“direct comparison” version, the offer for the lower set size or the update option was 
adjusted and the offer for the higher set size or the ignore option was fixed at €2.00. For 
example, if on a given trial a “no redo” version of the task was chosen over an “update 
1” version, the offer for “no redo” was decreased. If instead the “update 1” version was 
chosen, the offer for “no redo” was increased. Each adjustment was half as much as 
the prior adjustment, with a final adjustment of €0.03125 following their sixth choice. 
This titration procedure was conducted for each unique version pair. The final amount 
after the last adjustment was taken as the participant’s indifference point. That is, the 
participant does not prefer one version for a lower amount of money over another 
version for a higher amount of money. For example, if the final amount is €0.84 for “no 
redo” versus €2.00 for “update 1”, the participant is willing to forego €1.16 in exchange 
for not having to redo the task instead of having to redo a “mostly update 1” version of 











The location of the versions was randomized (top/bottom; left/right). Participants 
selected their preferred version by pressing the ‘1’ key for the version on the left and 
the ‘2’ key for the version on the right, using their right hand. To prevent participants 
from feeling rushed in their decision-making, but to discourage them from taking a 
long break, the maximum response time was set to 22 seconds, after which a warning 
message appeared (‘Too slow!’), and the same trial was repeated. To encourage 
participants to make a deliberate choice, a warning message appeared on the screen 
if participants responded within 500ms (‘Please consider both options carefully!’) and 
the same trial was repeated. 
After a short practice block in which each version pair was presented once (resulting 
in 8 trials), participants completed four blocks of 48 choices each (6 iterations for each 
of the 8 version pairs). To test the key effect of environmental richness on subjective 
costs, each block was completed in either a rich or a poor environment, indicated by 
the same background pattern and tone associated with the respective environment 
in the color wheel task. The environments were counterbalanced in an ABBA order. 
Each version pair was thus run through the titration procedure twice under each 
environment. The average cost of effort across the two runs was taken as the final 
subjective cost. 
Participants were informed that one of their choices would be randomly selected for 
them to complete. Moreover, they were instructed that the richness of the environment 
in which they made the selected choice determined the richness of the environment 
in which they repeated the color wheel working memory task, and thus the number of 
points they would obtain per trial. For example, if their selected choice was to redo the 
update 1 version for €1.50 (versus “No redo” for €2.00) and the environment in which 
that choice was made was rich, this meant they would receive €1.50 associated with 
their choice, that most of the trials would be update trials with set size 1, and that they 
would additionally receive 50 points for each trial, which would later be converted 
into a monetary amount. Alternatively, if their selected choice was to not redo the task 
for €0.50 and the environment in which that choice was made was rich, they received 
€0.50 associated with their choice and they would still receive the 50 points per trial 
they would have received by repeating the task. This was to purely test the effect 
of the environment on participants’ choices and to not bias them to choose the redo 
version based on the extra money they would receive for completing trials in a rich 
environment.  
The total duration of the task, including instruction and practice trials, was 
approximately 25 minutes.
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Subjective cost questions on the color wheel working memory task
In addition to quantifying the subjective cost using the subsequent discounting 
procedure, we also explored the subjective cost during the performance of the 
color wheel task. After each block of trials, participants had to indicate on a visual 
analogue scale how much money they would give up to not have to repeat a certain 
task condition again (4 questions, one for each combination of set size and task type), 
ranging from €1 to €2.  
FIGURE 4.1 | Behavioral tasks. A – Schematic of the color wheel working memory task. Participants 
receive 10 points for each trial completed in a poor environment (top) and 50 points for each trial 
completed in a rich environment (bottom). A low tone is played at the start of a poor environment 
and a high tone is played at the start of a rich environment. The two background patterns 
associated with the richness of the environment are counterbalanced across participants. M = 
‘memorize’: participants have to remember the colors; I = ‘ignore’: participants have to ignore 
the new colors while still remembering the previous colors. U = ‘update’: participants have to 





































Offer for “No redo” versus €2.00 for “Ignore 1” in a rich environment
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discounting task. Participants repeatedly choose between two versions of the color wheel task 
for various amounts of money. The offer for one of the versions is titrated until arriving at a final 
amount, which is taken as the offer for that version at which the participant does not prefer one 
version over the other. 
 
Data analysis
Performance measures on the color wheel task included the absolute number of 
degrees with which the response deviated from the correct color (deviance) and 
the response time (RT) for each participant. Subjective cost of the color wheel task 
was calculated as the mean difference between the final amount and the initial €2 
(discounting task; primary measure of subjective cost) or as the amount of money a 
participant was willing to give up to avoid having to repeat a certain task condition 
again (questions during the color wheel task; exploratory measure). All trials on the 
color wheel task with a response time below 200 ms were excluded. Outliers were a 
priori defined as those participants whose median deviance, median RT, or average 
subjective cost deviated more than three standard deviations from the average across 
participants. This did not result in any exclusions. 
We analyzed our data in R version 3.6.0 (R Core Team, 2018) using a combination 
of primary Bayesian mixed effects modeling supplemented by repeated-measures 
ANOVAs (rmANOVAs) on summary data to confirm the results and to accommodate 
readers who are used to interpreting frequentist statistics.
The Bayesian mixed effects models were performed using the brm function from the 
brms package (Bürkner, 2017). Deviance, RT and subjective cost on the color wheel 
task were analyzed on a trial-by-trial level, whereas subjective cost as measured by 
the discounting task was taken as the average cost across runs. The family functions 
used were lognormal for deviance and RT and gaussian for subjective cost. The model 
included the main effects of the predictors set size (1 or 3), task type (ignore, update) 
and environment (poor, rich) and their interactions as fixed effects, and random 
intercepts and slopes per participant for the same effects. The categorical variables 
were coded as sum-to-zero contrasts. We used default brms-priors. The model was fit 
using four chains with 10,000 iterations each (5,000 warm-up) and were inspected for 
convergence. Coefficients were considered statistically significant if the 95% posterior 
credible intervals did not overlap with zero. The rmANOVAs were performed on median 
deviance, median RT and mean subjective cost and included the within-subjects factors 
set size, task type and environment. The analyses were performed using the ezANOVA 
function from the ez package (Lawrence, 2016). Data are visualized using raincloud 
plots (Allen et al., 2018).
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Results
No effect of reward environment on performance on the color wheel 
working memory task
Consistent with earlier studies using a similar paradigm (Hofmans et al., 2020; 
Papadopetraki et al., 2019), deviance was higher (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.66, -0.48]; 
rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 66.0, p < 0.001) and responses were slower (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.14, 
-0.10]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 113.0, p < 0.001) on trials with a higher set size. The effect of 
task-type on deviance depended on set size (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.23, -0.11]; rmANOVA: 
F(1,33) = 39.5, p < 0.001; Figure 2A), such that deviance was lower on update compared 
with ignore trials for set size 3 (BRMS: 95% CI = [0.28, 0.47]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 41.5, p 
< 0.001), but there was no significant difference for set size 1 (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.05, 
0.11]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.9, 7 = 0.352). Participants were slower on update than on 
ignore trials (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.04, -0.01]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 8.6, p = 0.006). The 
interaction effect between task type and set size on RT was not significant (BRMS: 95% 
CI = [-0.01, 0.01]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.3, p = 0.605; Figure 2B).
Contrary to our predictions, there was no effect of reward environment on 
performance on update versus ignore trials either in terms of deviance (environment 
x task type: BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.04, 0.08]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 1.2, p = 0.283; Figure 2C) 
or RT (environment x task type: BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.02, 0.01]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 1.3, p = 
0.267; Figure 2D). There was also no interaction between environment, task type and 
set size (Deviance: BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.06, 0.06]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 2.4, p = 0.129; RT: 
BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.01, 0.01]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.3, p = 0.610), no interaction between 
environment and set size (Deviance: BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.07, 0.05]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 2.1, 
p = 0.155; RT: BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.01, 0.01]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.4, p = 0.544) and no 
main effect of environment (Deviance: BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.08, 0.04]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 
1.7, p = 0.205; RT: BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.01, 0.02]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) < 0.1, p = 0.943). 
No effect of reward environment on the subjective cost of working 
memory effort
Cognitive effort versus rest
Next, we assessed whether reward environment affected the subjective cost of 
cognitive effort differentially for ignore and update trials. To that end, we first 
computed the subjective cost of effort relative to rest, or the No redo option. This 
revealed a significant effect of set size, such that the subjective cost was higher for set 











p < 0.001). The effect of task type was not significant (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.02, 0.09]; 
rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 1.6, p = 0.208), nor was the interaction between task type and set 
size (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.06, 0.04]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.1, p = 0.730; Figure 3A). 
Contrary to our hypothesis, we did not find a significant interaction between reward 
environment and task type (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.03, 0.03]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) < 0.1, p = 
0.993; Figure 3B). There was also no interaction between reward environment, task 
type and set size (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.00, 0.05]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 3.2, p = 0.085), no 
interaction between reward environment and set size (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.04, 0.02]; 
rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.6, p = 0.431) and no main effect of reward environment (BRMS: 
95% CI = [-0.01, 0.07]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 2.4, p = 0.131). 
FIGURE 4.2 | Performance on the color wheel working memory task. Median deviance (A) and 
median reaction time (B) as a function of set size and task type. Difference between ignore and 
update trials in terms of median deviance (C) and median reaction time (D) as a function of set 
size and reward environment. Individual jittered datapoints and data distribution are shown. 
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Update versus ignore
We then assessed the choice trials with a direct comparison between ignore and update 
trials. The offer for the ignore option was fixed at €2.00, with a calibrated offer for 
the update option. Therefore, a subjective cost above 0 indicated that participants 
preferred update over ignore, whereas a subjective cost below 0 indicated that 
participants preferred ignore over update. An initial t-test across both set sizes and 
both reward environments revealed no difference in cost between ignore and update 
trials (mean = -0.004, t = -0.07, p = 0.944). This subjective cost did not depend on 
reward environment (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.05, 0.04]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.1, p = 0.743), set 
size (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.09, 0.16]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.3, p = 0.609), or the interaction 
between set size and reward environment (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.03, 0.06]; rmANOVA: 
F(1,33) = 0.4, p = 0.554; Figure 3C).   
Low versus high set size
Lastly, we assessed the choice trials with a direct comparison between set size 1 and 3. 
The offer for the set size 3 option was fixed at €2.00, with a calibrated offer for the set 
size 1 option. Therefore, a subjective cost above 0 indicated that participants preferred 
set size 1 over set size 3, whereas a subjective cost below 0 indicated that participants 
preferred set size 3 over set size 1. An initial t-test across both task types and both 
reward environments revealed a significant higher cost of set size 3 compared with 
set size 1 (mean = 0.72, t = 13.2, p < 0.001). However, this subjective cost did not 
depend on reward environment (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.02, 0.04]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) = 0.5, p = 
0.476), task type (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.11, 0.13]; rmANOVA: F(1,33) < 0.1, p = 0.843), or the 
interaction between task type and reward environment (BRMS: 95% CI = [-0.04, 0.04]; 











FIGURE 4.3 | Subjective cost of performing the color wheel working memory task. A – 
Subjective cost of performing the color wheel working memory task versus rest as a function 
of set size and task type, as measured by the task versus no redo trials of the discounting task. 
B – Difference in subjective cost between ignore and update trials as a function of set size and 
reward environment, as measured by the task versus no redo trials of the discounting task. 
C – Subjective cost of performing ignore versus update trials as a function of set size and reward 
environment, as measured by the direct comparison trials of the discounting task. D – Subjective 
cost of performing set size 3 versus set size 1 as a function of task type and reward environment, 
as measured by the direct comparison trials of the discounting task. Individual jittered datapoints 
and data distribution are shown. Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. N = 34.
 
Subjective cost questions
We explored the subjective cost measured during the color wheel working memory 
task. This revealed no effect of either reward environment, task type or set size (main 
effects and interactions; all 95% CI overlapping with 0; all F(1,33) < 1.9; all p > 0.175). 







task versus “no redo” trials 
direct comparison trials
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during the color wheel task correlated with subjective cost of the same trial type as 
measured using the discounting task. This was not the case, as revealed by Pearson’s 
correlations for each trial type (all r < 0.24, all p > 0.166).   
Participants were aware of the difference between the reward environments
The lack of effects of reward environment poses the question whether the participants 
were aware of the manipulation of reward environment. After the task instructions but 
before the start of the task, participants were asked by the experimenter to explain 
the task in their own words to verify that they had understood the task. Furthermore, 
after finishing the experiment, participants were asked whether they had noticed the 
different manipulations cueing the reward environment (“Did you notice the difference 
in tone between the rich and poor environments while playing the game?” and “Did you 
notice the difference in background patterns between the rich and poor environments 
while playing the game?”; answer options: yes, no). The majority of participants indeed 
reported that they were aware of these manipulations: 87% of the participants was 
aware of the difference in tone; 71% of the participants was aware of the difference in 
background pattern. 
Discussion
According to the hypothesis that rewards enhance cognitive flexibility at the expense 
of cognitive stability (Aarts et al., 2011; Cools & D’Esposito, 2011; Dreisbach, 2006; 
Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Rowe et al., 2007; van Steenbergen et al., 2010), the 
present study assessed whether performing a task in a rich environment improved 
cognitive flexibility at the expense of cognitive stability, in terms of both working 
memory performance and subjective cost of cognitive effort. This hypothesis was 
further inspired by the average reward rate literature, which argues that it is more 
costly to focus on a current task when the average reward received over previous tasks 
is high (Boureau et al., 2015; Niv et al., 2007; Otto & Daw, 2019). We asked whether 
this high cost of focus would also manifest itself in the context of a working memory 
task, such that a high reward value of the environment would generate relatively lower 
costs for flexibility versus stability. However, in contrast to our hypothesis, we did 
not observe any effects of reward environment on the balance between stability and 
flexibility in cognitive performance or subjective cost of effort. 
The average reward rate proposal was inspired by literature on patch-leaving and 
foraging, it has been shown that when the reward value of alternative options is high, 











rather than to continue to exploit the current patch (Charnov, 1976; Constantino & Daw, 
2015; Kolling et al., 2012; Le Heron et al., 2020). As described by the Marginal Value 
Theorem, engaging with or exploitation of an option is only beneficial as long as the 
received rewards are higher than the rewards you would expect to receive by exploring 
other options. As the reward that can be received from a current option decreases 
over time, a foraging animal should leave the current patch as soon as the reward falls 
below the expected value of other options, in other words, below the opportunity cost 
of time (Charnov, 1976). Thus, high rewards for alternative options would bias a person 
towards flexibility at the expense of stability. An important caveat in our present 
design was that although a rich environment was meant to increase the subjective cost 
of effort by increasing the average reward rate over time (Boureau et al., 2015; Niv et 
al., 2007; Otto & Daw, 2019), this manipulation could have in fact gone the opposite 
way. Participants were instructed about the points they would receive in a low and 
high reward environment and about the blocked design. Because the environments 
were blocked, currently being in a high reward environment could be interpreted as 
the rewards per trial currently being higher than the rewards per trials on average, 
across all blocks. Thus, a high reward environment could have been experienced as a 
high reward for the current task amidst a relatively lower reward for alternative tasks 
or blocks, resulting in effects opposite of our hypothesis: a bias toward stability rather 
than flexibility. Still, we did not find any effects of reward environment, in neither 
direction.
It is worth noting that although our hypothesis involved the effect of reward 
environment on the balance in performance between trials requiring stability versus 
flexibility, one might also have expected a general invigorating effect of a high reward 
environment. Based on earlier research, a high average reward rate as experienced in 
a rich environment, would increase the speed of responding (Beierholm et al., 2013; 
Guitart-Masip et al., 2011; Niv et al., 2007; Otto & Daw, 2019): If the reward per trial is 
high, it is costly to focus on the current trial for too long and it is beneficial to rapidly 
finish the current trial to move on to the next one. However, we did not find any main 
effects of reward environment.
This lack of reward effects raises the question whether participants were aware of 
the reward environment. Initial verification by the experimenter before the start of 
each task and the later debriefing questions indicated that participants were indeed 
aware of the different environments during the task. However, it might have been the 
case that participants did not cognitively process this information during the trial, 
even though they were aware of the different environments. We deliberately opted 
for rewards that were performance-independent, because we had previously found no 
effects of performance-contingent rewards and it had been observed that contingent 
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and non-contingent rewards have different effects on performance (Braem et al., 2013; 
Manohar et al., 2017). However, in combination with the relative complexity and the 
fast pace of the color wheel task, this might have discouraged participants from using 
this information to adapt their cognitive control strategy, so they could use their 
cognitive resources to process information that was relevant for their performance. 
Future work might assess the effect of performance-contingent reward environments 
or paradigms similar to patch-leaving tasks on the balance between cognitive flexibility 
and stability. 
In the “versus No redo” version of the discounting choice task, participants would 
always receive the number of points per trial associated with the environment in which 
the choice was made, even if the selected choice was the No redo option. It would have 
been more likely to find a main effect of reward environment if participants were to 
receive those points only if they selected the Redo option: Participants would probably 
be more inclined to choose the Redo (update or ignore) option in a rich environment 
than in a poor environment, so they could maximize their points. However, a strong 
inclination to choose the Redo option regardless of the trial-type would have 
diminished the chance to find any differential effects on stability versus flexibility, our 
main effect of interest. 
We did not replicate the earlier finding by Papadopetraki and colleagues that, using 
the same color wheel paradigm, participants preferred update trials over ignore trials 
(Papadopetraki et al., 2019). This distinction in preference between the two task types 
was also not observed in another study, even though participants performed better 
on update than on ignore trials (Hofmans et al., 2020). A difference between these 
studies was that in the Papadopetraki study, participants had to make choices both 
between update and ignore trials and between task (update or ignore) and rest, while 
in the Hofmans study participants only chose between task (update or ignore) and 
rest, which might have restricted the distinction participants made between the two 
task types. However, in the current paradigm, we reintroduced the direct comparison 
between update and ignore, without observing any differences in subjective cost. A 
possible explanation for the difference in effects is that the pacing of the trials was 
faster in both the study by Hofmans and colleagues and the current study than in the 
study by Papadopetraki and colleagues. In the current paradigm, both the duration of 
the stimuli and the delays was 500ms instead of the 2000ms in the earlier study. It has 
recently been proposed that a decision is made between two strategy representations 
(here, update or ignore) based on a control signal that accumulates over time for both 
types of strategy until one of the two response thresholds is reached (Musslick et al., 
2018). The intensity of this control signal reflects the experienced cognitive cost, as 











on the better performance on update relative to ignore trials, we might assume that 
an update representation is more automatic than an ignore representation. It could 
then be speculated that when there is not enough time to accumulate control, which 
might be the case in the fast-paced current paradigm, one would still perform well 
on update trials, but not on the more control-demanding ignore trials. Therefore, the 
intensity of the control signal, or the exerted effort is too low to result in a distinctive 
subjective cost of ignore relative to update. This is supported by the observation that 
the median deviance on ignore trials, but not update trials, with a set size of 3 is higher 
in the current study than in the study by Papadopetraki et al. (ignore: ~30 versus ~15; 
update: ~10 versus ~10), suggesting that participants exerted less control for ignore 
trials in the current study, possibly resulting in lower subjective costs for ignore trials. 
In conclusion, our results do not provide evidence that the reward environment, where 
rewards are not performance-contingent, affects the balance between stability and 
flexibility in a working memory paradigm. Moreover, the general lack of any effects of 
reward environment, together with earlier results that show no effect of performance-
contingent immediate reward (Chapter 3), might suggest that the current paradigm is 
not sensitive to reward manipulations. 
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Abstract
Cognitive control is known to be sensitive to changes in incentive motivation. However, 
contrasting effects of incentive motivation have been observed. Here we test a 
hypothesis derived from our understanding of striatal dopamine’s role in cognitive 
control. Specifically, striatal dopamine is known to promote cognitive flexibility, but 
impair cognitive stability. Accordingly, we asked whether reward motivation enhances 
performance on tasks requiring cognitive flexibility at the expense of performance on 
tasks requiring cognitive stability. We applied a delayed match-to-sample task that 
distinguishes between trials requiring cognitive stability and cognitive flexibility, while 
also measuring trait impulsivity to capture potential individual variability in the effects 
of reward motivation. We found no effects of reward motivation on working memory 
accuracy. Instead, participants responded more slowly on high versus low reward 
trials. Exploratory analyses revealed that this slowing was selectively reduced on trials 
requiring flexibility, but not on trials requiring stability, and only in high-impulsive 
individuals, suggesting increased cognitive flexibility versus stability. Although 
preliminary and in need of replication, these initial results provide an interesting 
starting point for future behavioral studies using more sensitive paradigms, as well as 












Appetitive motivation or anticipated rewards are generally thought to enhance 
cognitive control (Jimura et al., 2010; Krawczyk et al., 2007; Pessoa & Engelmann, 
2010). However, reward incentives have also been demonstrated to decrease task 
performance depending on task demands (Aarts et al., 2010, 2011; Chib et al., 2012; 
Mobbs et al., 2009; Zedelius et al., 2011). These contrasting effects of rewards have 
previously been argued to reflect opposing effects of striatal dopamine depending on 
the type of the task at hand (Aarts et al., 2011; Cools et al., 2010; Salamone et al., 
2016). For example, dopaminergic manipulations have been demonstrated to have, 
in the same individuals, opposing effects on tasks requiring cognitive stability, such 
as distractor-resistance, and  tasks requiring cognitive flexibility, such as reversal 
learning and task-switching (Crofts, 2001; Mehta et al., 2001, 2004). Pharmacological 
manipulations as well as neurocomputational modeling suggest that striatal dopamine 
promotes flexible behavior and the updating of working memory representations by 
shifting the balance toward the direct ‘go’ pathway, away from the indirect ‘no-go’ 
pathway and thereby  allowing new items to enter working memory (Collins & Frank, 
2014; Cools, 2015; Cools & D’Esposito, 2011; Frank et al., 2001; Frank & O’Reilly, 2006; 
Hazy et al., 2007; Ueltzhöffer et al., 2015). This concurs with observations in patients 
with Parkinson’s disease, characterized by striatal dopamine depletion, who exhibit 
cognitive inflexibility on task-switching paradigms (Cools et al., 2001), but enhanced 
cognitive stability on working memory paradigms when off but not on dopaminergic 
medication (Cools et al., 2010; Moustafa et al., 2008).
Here we leverage these insights about dopamine’s contrasting effects on cognitive 
control to advance our understanding of reward effects on cognitive control. Specifically, 
in line with prior theorizing, we hypothesize that incentive motivation, by increasing 
striatal dopamine, enhances cognitive flexibility at the expense of cognitive stability 
(Aarts et al., 2011). This hypothesis generally concurs with the prior observations that 
positive affect decreases perseverance but increases distractibility on the AX Continuous 
Performance Task (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004), while also benefiting performance on 
the same task when goals suddenly change (Dreisbach, 2006). We also consider the 
alternative hypothesis that incentive motivation, by increasing prefrontal dopamine, 
might increase the signal-to-noise of a memory representation, thereby improving 
cognitive stability versus flexibility (Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008), which is consistent 
with pharmacological studies showing that prefrontal dopamine activity is important for 
cognitive stability but impairs cognitive flexibility (Crofts et al., 2001; Fallon et al., 2017).
The effect of reward motivation was investigated using a delayed match-to-sample 
task that distinguishes between trials requiring cognitive stability and cognitive 
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flexibility (Papadopetraki et al., 2019). We predict that the promise of reward improves 
accuracy on trials requiring flexibility but impairs accuracy on trials requiring stability. 
Moreover, based on prior work demonstrating large individual variability in the effects 
of dopamine on cognitive control and working memory, we stratified our reward effects 
by trait impulsivity (Clatworthy et al., 2009; Cools et al., 2007), which itself implicates 
striatal dopamine (Buckholtz et al., 2010; Cools et al., 2008; Dalley et al., 2007; Kim 
et al., 2013; Landau et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2009). Given the presumed positive link 
between trait impulsivity and dopamine release (Buckholtz et al., 2010), we expected 
enhanced dopamine release in response to rewards and therefore stronger effects in 
more impulsive individuals. 
METHODS
Participants
Forty healthy and right-handed participants (22 women; age range = 18-34) were 
recruited via SONA, the research participation system of the Radboud University. 
Participants had no history of neurological or psychiatric illness. The procedure of this 
study was approved by the local ethics committee (CMO region Arnhem-Nijmegen, 
The Netherlands; protocol 2014/288 version 1.4). Before the start of the experiment, 
subjects gave written consent. Participants were paid 8 euro per hour plus a bonus 
contingent on their performance, ranging from 2.68-5.37 euro. All participants were 
included for data analysis.
General procedure
The study consisted of two sessions, with at least a week in between (range 7-14 days). 
On the first day, participants completed a color sensitivity task (1 minute), a short color 
wheel working memory task to familiarize participants with the task (12 minutes), 
and a cognitive effort discounting paradigm not described in the current paper (22 
minutes). On the second day, participants completed a rewarded version of the color 
wheel working memory task. All tasks were performed on a computer running on 
Windows 7 and a screen resolution of 1920x1080p. The background color for all tasks 
was grey (R:200 G: 200 B: 200). All tasks were programmed in MATLAB version 2016b, 











Color wheel working memory task
Color sensitivity task (day 1)
The color sensitivity task measured the ability to detect and distinguish the colors in 
the main experiment. Participants completed 12 trials where they had to match the 
color of a square in the center of a color wheel to the corresponding color on the wheel, 
by clicking on the color wheel. Performance on the color sensitivity task was successful 
if the average deviation of the response to the correct color was below 15 degrees. 
In case a participant failed, the color sensitivity task was assessed again. In case a 
participant failed twice, they would be excluded. 
The color wheel was created by generating a circle with a radius of 486p that contained 
512 successive colors and placing a smaller, background-colored circle with a radius of 
362p on top of it. Each color had an angle width of 0.7 degrees (360 degrees divided 
by 512 colors) and was created with the HSV MATLAB color map. The color wheel was 
divided into 12 parts, each from which one color was chosen at random to be presented 
in the center of the color wheel. The orientation of the color wheel was randomized 
across trials. 
After participants responded, a black line appeared that marked and confirmed the 
response. Additionally, feedback conveying the absolute number of degrees to which 
the response deviated from the true color (deviance) was given if the deviance was 
below 10 degrees: e.g. ‘Good job! You deviated only 4 degrees!’ and by a second black 
arc that marked the correct location of the color. If the deviance was more than 10 
degrees, the feedback only consisted of the second black arc. Participants were 
instructed to answer precisely, but not to take too much time to respond. There was no 
maximum response time. 
Familiarizing phase (day 1)
Each trial was preceded by a centered black dot for 500ms, signaling the start of a new 
trial. On each trial, colored squares were presented in the middle of the screen, with 
the letter ‘M’ for ‘memorize’ in the middle (Figure 5.1). During this encoding phase, 
participants had 500ms to remember the colors of the squares, after which there was 
a delay of 2000ms during which a fixation cross was shown. During a subsequent 
interference phase, a new set of colored squares appeared on screen, with one of 
two letters in the center. ‘I’ for ‘ignore’: participants had to ignore the new squares 
while still remembering the old set of squares; ‘U’ or ‘update’: participants now had to 
remember the new set of squares and forget the old squares. This new set of squares 
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remained on screen for 500ms, followed by a second delay phase. Dependent on the 
task-type, distractor resistance (ignore) or flexible updating (update), this delay lasted 
either 2000ms or 4500ms, respectively, in order to match the time interval between 
the relevant stimuli (encoding phase for the ignore condition and interference phase 
for the update condition) and the probe phase. During this probe phase, a color 
wheel appeared in the center of the screen together with one highlighted frame that 
indicated the location of the color that should be reported. Participants had 4000ms 
to indicate the color of this target location by clicking on the corresponding color on 
the color wheel. When a response was made, a black line appeared on the color wheel 
at the location where the mouse click was made, remaining on screen until 4000ms 
had passed since the appearance of the color wheel. Importantly, this means that 
no advantage can be gained from quick responding in terms of number of trials or 
potential rewards.  No feedback was given on accuracy. If participants did not respond 
within 4000ms, a message was presented for 500ms in the center of the screen: ‘Please 
respond faster!’ Participants were instructed to always keep their eyes fixed on the 
center of the screen during the entire task. 
The number of squares (set size) ranged from 1 to 4 squares. All combinations of 
set size (ranging from 1-4) and task type (ignore or update) were repeated 8 times, 
which resulted in 64 trials. Sixteen practice trials preceded those 64 trials. On these 
practice trials, feedback conveying the deviance was given if the deviance was below 
10 degrees: e.g. ‘Good job! You deviated only 4 degrees!’ and by a second black line that 
marked the correct location of the color. If the deviance was more than 10 degrees, the 
feedback only consisted of the second black line. Feedback duration was 700ms. The 
total duration of the task was 12 minutes. 
The colors that were presented during the encoding phase of ignore trials were the 
same as the colors that were presented during the interference phase of update trials 
and vice versa. The target colors were the same for both task types. The locations of 
the squares were allocated equally across trials and the location of the target square 
was balanced across conditions. The orientation of the color wheel was randomized 
across trials. Trial order was the same for each participant. 
Main phase (day 2)
During the main phase of the color wheel working memory task, performed on the 
second day, a reward cue was introduced at the beginning of each trial. On half of the 
trials, participants could win 1 cent, on the other half they could win 10 cents. These 
rewards on offer were counterbalanced across conditions and remained on screen for 











practice trials preceded those 128 trials. The total duration of the task was 28 minutes. 
To increase the likelihood that participants would receive a bonus on an equal number 
of trials, they would win the reward, as instructed, if their accuracy on that trial would 
be equal to or better than their median accuracy on the first day, calculated for each 
of the 8 task type and set size combinations separately (Table 5.1). Feedback about 
the achieved reward up to that point was given after every 8 trials and remained on 
screen for 1500ms: ‘Your reward now totals €2.61.’ Trial order was randomized across 
participants, while being counterbalanced over task type, set size and reward. 
FIGURE 5.1 | Schematic of the color wheel working memory task where participants have to 
indicate the color of a highlighted target location on the color wheel. I = ignore: participants 
have to ignore the new squares while still remembering the previous set of squares. U = update: 
participants have to remember the new set of squares and forget the previous set.
 
Trait impulsivity
Trait impulsivity was indexed using two widely used self-report questionnaires: 1) 
the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11), assessing motor, non-planning and cognitive 
impulsiveness (Patton et al., 1995) and 2) the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale (UPPS), 
which is based on a factor analysis of commonly used impulsivity scales (including 
the BIS-11) and assesses urgency, (lack of) premeditation, (lack of) perseverance, and 
sensation seeking (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). Participants filled in one questionnaire 
on the first day and the other questionnaire on the second day in a counterbalanced 
fashion. A Pearson’s correlation revealed that total scores on these scales are strongly 
correlated (r = 0.74, p = 5.0e-8). 
Data analysis
Our main dependent variable was mean deviance, but we also explored mean response 
time and the percentage of trials on which participants received a reward. Outliers were 
defined a priori as participants whose mean overall deviance was either more than 3 
standard deviations higher than that of the global mean or higher than 90 degrees. 
However, no participant met these exclusion criteria. We ran repeated measures 
analyses of variance (rmANOVAs) for the two measures of trait impulsivity separately, 
with the within-subjects factors reward (low, high), task type (ignore, update) and 
1000ms 2000ms500ms I: 2000ms
U: 4500ms
max 4000ms500ms 500ms
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set size (1-4) and mean-centered trait impulsivity (UPPS-P or BIS-11) as a between-
subjects variable. The analyses were performed using the ezANOVA function from the 
ez package (Lawrence, 2016) in R (version 3.4.2). When the assumption of sphericity 
was violated, we report Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p-values. We adjusted our 
alpha-value to 0.025 (Bonferroni-corrected) to account for the two measures of trait 
impulsivity. 
Additionally, we ran a repeated measures correlation to assess a potential speed-
accuracy trade-off between deviance and response time using the rmcorr package in R 
(Bakdash & Marusich, 2018).   
Table 5.1 | Mean, standard deviation (SD) and minimum (min) and maximum (max) mean absolute 
deviance (degrees) on session 1 and percentage of trials on which participants’ deviance was 
below their median deviance on session 1 and therefore received a reward. 
IGNORE UPDATE
SET SIZE mean SD min max % correct mean SD min max % correct
1 13.4 16.6 2.7 112.2 49.9 10.2 3.8 3.9 18.6 52.8
2 15.8 15.7 2,8 75.2 66.2 7.2 3.2 2.1 13.8 51.1
3 23.1 24.0 5.6 140.3 62.7 12.1 3.9 5.8 22.3 57.1
4 41.7 34.6 5.2 132.1 67.3 20.6 14.9 4.6 58.2 62.9
RESULTS
In line with previous studies using this paradigm (Hofmans et al., 2019; Papadopetraki 
et al., 2019), participants performed more poorly, as measured with deviance scores 
for ignore than update (F(1, 38) = 23.4, p = 2.2e
-5) and for higher set sizes (F(3, 114) = 46.7, 
p = 1.6e-13). The difference between ignore and update was larger for higher set sizes 
(F(3, 114) = 6.0, p = 0.002; Figure 5.2A). There was no main effect of reward (F(1, 38) = 1.7, p 
= 0.194). Crucially, there was no interaction between reward and task type (F(1, 38) = 0.6, 
p = 0.446) or between reward, task type and impulsivity (reward x task type x BIS-11: 
F(1, 38) = 0.1, p = 0.803; reward x task type x UPPS: F(1, 38) = 1.9, p = 0.181). A marginal 
interaction between reward and BIS-11 (but not UPPS) scores was below our statistical 
threshold (BIS-11: F(1, 38) = 3.7, p = 0.063; UPPS: F(1, 38) = 2.4, p = 0.131), and was due to 
reward tending to reduce deviance (i.e. improve accuracy) particularly for participants 
with higher BIS-11 scores (r = 0.30, p = 0.064). The main effect of impulsivity (BIS-11: 











Exploratory analyses of response times revealed main effects of task type (F(1, 38) = 14.5, 
p = 4.9e-4) and set size (F(3, 114) = 45.8, p = 1.7e
-19). Participants were slower on update 
versus ignore trials and slower with increasing set sizes (Figure 5.2B). The interaction 
between task type and set size was not significant (F(3, 114) = 0.4, p = 0.766). Across 
participants, reward slowed responding on the task (F(1, 38) = 13.6, p = 7.1e-4). The 
interaction between reward and task type was not significant (F(1, 38) = 0.4, p = 0.540). 
However, the interaction between reward, task type and impulsivity was significant 
using the UPPS score (F(1, 38) = 6.8, p = 0.013). Post-hoc tests revealed that the interaction 
between reward and UPPS was only present for update (F(1, 38) = 7.5, p = 0.009) and not 
for ignore (F(1, 38) = 0.1, p = 0.771), such that for update trials, higher trait impulsivity 
as indexed by UPPS score predicted less reward-related slowing (Figure 5.3). A median 
split on UPPS scores demonstrated that for ignore trials, both low and high UPPS scores 
predicted slower responding after the promise of a high reward (low UPPS: t(19) = 2.75, 
p = 0.013; high UPPS: t(19) = 1.83, p = 0.083). However, for update trials, low UPPS scores 
predicted slower responding after the promise of a high reward (t(19) = 3.86, p = 0.001), 
whereas high UPPS scores did not (t(19) = 0.96, p = 0.348). This interaction between 
reward and task type – the reward effect for update trials minus the reward effect for 
ignore trials – on response time did not correlate with the interaction between reward 
and task type on deviance (r = -0.02, p = 0.902). However, across all trials, irrespective 
of reward or task type, there was a positive within-subjects correlation between 
response time and deviance (r = 0.15, p = 3.2e-28), indicating that subjects exhibited 
poorer accuracy when they responded more slowly. 
The parallel interaction between reward, task type and impulsivity (in the same 
direction) did not reach significance for BIS-11 (F(1, 38) = 2.9, p = 0.095). There was no 
main effect of impulsivity on reaction times (BIS-11: F(1, 38) = 0.1, p = 0.721; UPPS: F(1, 
38) = 1.5, p = 0.228).  
Exploratory analyses of the percentage of trials on which participants received a 
reward also did not reveal an interaction between reward and task type (F(1, 38) = 0.6, p 
= 0.430) or between reward, task type and impulsivity (BIS-11: F(1, 38) = 0.2, p = 0.688; 
UPPS: F(1, 38) = 0.02, p = 0.880).  
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FIGURE 5.2 | A – mean absolute deviance and B – mean response time as a function of set size, 
separately for each task type. Dots represent mean scores per individual. Error bars represent 
95% confidence interval.  
FIGURE 5.3 | Reward effect (high minus low reward) on response time as a function of task type 
and trait impulsivity (median split on UPPS score). Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. 
Inset: correlation between trait impulsivity (UPPS score) and the effect of reward on response 














The present study tested the hypothesis that reward motivation has contrasting effects 
as a function of task demands for flexibility versus stability (Aarts et al., 2011). This was 
based on our understanding of dopamine’s contrasting effects on cognitive flexibility 
versus stability. Specifically, striatal dopamine has previously been demonstrated to 
improve performance on tasks requiring cognitive flexibility, but to impair performance 
on tasks requiring cognitive stability (Cools et al., 2010; Mehta et al., 2001, 2004). 
Reward cues are well established to elicit dopamine release in the striatum (Howe et 
al., 2013; Schultz, 1997). Accordingly, we anticipated that the promise of high versus 
low reward would improve performance on the update task but impair performance 
on the well matched ignore task condition. Contrary to this hypothesis, we did not find 
differential effects of reward on task accuracy for distractor resistance versus flexible 
updating. 
However, exploratory analyses did reveal that reward effects on response times 
depended on both task demands and trait impulsivity. Low impulsive individuals 
became slower in response to a high reward cue, independent of task demands, but 
high impulsive individuals only became slower on ignore trials, not on update trials. 
The interpretation of response times is uncertain in this context. Participants were 
instructed that they would receive the reward if their deviance was small enough, 
as long as they responded within the very tolerant response window of 4 seconds. 
Therefore, they might well have responded more slowly to increase their accuracy. 
However, in contrast to this speed-accuracy account, slower response times were 
actually associated with lower accuracy. Therefore, we cautiously interpret the 
observation that reward-related slowing was reduced on update versus ignore trials in 
high impulsive individuals to be consistent with our hypothesis that reward motivation 
increases cognitive flexibility versus stability. Clearly this requires replication in future 
work and further analyses using for example drift diffusion models to assess whether 
slower response times reflect an increased decision threshold (i.e. enhanced caution) or 
a slower rate of evidence accumulation (i.e. poorer memory representation). 
One limitation of the current study is that we cannot determine the locus of neural 
action of our reward manipulation. Our exploratory finding generally concurs with 
evidence from previous neurocomputational modeling work, according to which 
increases in striatal dopamine reduces the threshold for (cognitive) action gating by 
changing the balance between the activating ‘go’ pathway and the inhibiting ‘no-go’ 
pathway (Collins & Frank, 2014; Frank et al., 2001; Frank & O’Reilly, 2006; Hazy et al., 
2007). This raises the hypothesis that reward-related changes in the balance between 
updating and ignoring in the current task are accompanied by changes in striatal BOLD 
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signaling. Such future work might disentangle this hypothesis from the alternative 
hypothesis that prospective rewards elicit changes in cognitive control by increasing 
dopamine in the prefrontal cortex, thus altering the signal-to-noise of current memory 
representations, with higher signal-to-noise lowering susceptibility to distraction 
and thus improving performance on ignore relative to update (Braver & Cohen, 2000; 
Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008; Pessoa, 2017). 
At first sight, the present finding might appear at odds with findings from a previous 
study employing a similar paradigm that distinguished reward effects on ignore and 
update trials (Fallon & Cools, 2014). This study showed that an unexpected gain relative 
to an unexpected loss strengthened connectivity between the ventral striatum and 
prefrontal regions during ignore, suggesting increased recruitment of the distractor 
resistance network. Although there were no behavioral effects of rewards in this 
study, reward-related BOLD signaling in the ventral striatum and prefrontal regions 
was associated with greater accuracy on ignore versus update trials. A key difference 
between the current paradigm and the one employed in Fallon and Cools (2014) is that 
rewards were presented as incentive cues in the current study, signaling the promise 
of reward contingent on good performance, but as unexpected outcomes of a gamble 
game, signaling the receipt of non-contingent reward in the previous study. Future 
work is needed to asses potentially different consequences of reward anticipation 
and receipt for cognitive control (Aarts et al., 2010), particularly given that the control 
of preparatory and consummatory responses to reward implicate dissociable neural 
mechanisms (Baldo & Kelley, 2007; Robbins & Everitt, 1992). 
It is important to be cautious of false positives and to not overinterpret the current 
results. The interaction of interest between reward and task type was only present in 
our exploratory outcome measure response time, of which the interpretation might 
be ambiguous. Moreover, the interactions with trait impulsivity depended on the 
questionnaire that was used, questioning the robustness of the results. Nevertheless, 
these initial results provide an interesting starting point for replication and further 
testing using neuroimaging methods. 
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Abstract
Reward motivation is known to enhance cognitive control. However, detrimental effects 
have also been observed, which have been attributed to overdosing of already high 
baseline dopamine levels by further dopamine increases elicited by reward cues. Aarts 
et al. (2014) indeed demonstrated, in 14 individuals, that reward effects depended on 
striatal dopamine synthesis capacity, measured with [18F]FMT-PET: promised reward 
improved Stroop control in low-dopamine individuals, while impairing it in high-
dopamine individuals. Here, we aimed to assess this same effect in 44 new participants, 
who had previously undergone an [18F]DOPA-PET scan to quantify dopamine synthesis 
capacity. This sample performed the exact same rewarded Stroop paradigm as in 
the prior study. However, we did not find any correlation between reward effects on 
cognitive control and striatal dopamine synthesis capacity. Critical differences between 
the radiotracers [18F]DOPA and [18F]FMT are discussed, as the discrepancy between the 
current and our previous findings might reflect the use of the potentially less sensitive 












Incentive motivation, or motivation activated by external reward cues, is generally 
thought to enhance cognitive control (Krawczyk et al., 2007; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010) 
and performance-contingent rewards are common across various domains of our society, 
including sports, education and the workplace. However, negative effects of rewards on 
cognitive control have also been observed (Aarts et al., 2010, 2011; Ariely et al., 2009; 
Chib et al., 2012, 2014; Mobbs et al., 2009; Zedelius et al., 2011). For example, it has 
been demonstrated that when participants received performance-contingent payment 
for completing various tasks – including tasks that drew primarily on motor skills, 
memory and creativity – high reward levels had detrimental effects on performance, 
compared with low and medium reward levels (Ariely et al., 2009). The authors argued 
that high reward levels can shift arousal or motivation levels beyond the optimal level 
for executing a task, leading to performance decrements, an effect known as choking. 
However, not everyone chokes under high reward conditions and to gain more insight 
into this individual variation we must unravel the neural mechanisms underlying these 
choking effects. Motivational effects have long been associated with striatal dopamine 
signaling (Mohebi et al., 2019; Robbins & Everitt, 2007; Salamone et al., 2016) and 
prior work indeed suggested that individual variation in the effects of motivation on 
cognitive control depends on dopamine-related functioning, such as dopamine cell loss 
in Parkinson’s disease, midbrain and striatal BOLD activity, loss aversion and dopamine 
transporter genotype (Aarts et al., 2010, 2012; Chib et al., 2012, 2014; Mobbs et al., 
2009; van Holstein et al., 2011). Detrimental effects of rewards resonate with the notion 
of a potential overdosing of the dopamine system: Rewards, eliciting dopamine release 
(Schultz, 1997), could have beneficial effects in individuals with low dopamine levels by 
inducing a shift from sub-optimal to optimal dopamine levels, but detrimental effects 
in individuals with already high dopamine levels by inducing a shift from optimal to 
supra-optimal dopamine levels (Cools & D’Esposito, 2011). Building on this work, 
our previous study (Aarts et al., 2014) directly addressed this issue by assessing the 
effect of reward on cognitive control as a function of dopamine synthesis capacity, 
measured with 6-[18F]-fluoro-L-m-tyrosine ([18F]FMT) positron emission tomography 
(PET). Specifically, participants performed a Stroop task after being promised either a 
high or a low monetary reward upon successful completion of the task. These monetary 
incentives were demonstrated to enhance Stroop interference control in participants 
with low baseline dopamine synthesis capacity in the left caudate nucleus, but impair 
Stroop interference control in participants with high baseline dopamine synthesis 
capacity in the left caudate nucleus. This study thus advanced our understanding of 
differential effects of incentives on cognitive control, by demonstrating that incentive 
motivation can shift dopamine levels to supra-optimal in participants with already high 
dopamine levels. It is of note that this effect was present only when participants were 
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uninformed (i.e., un-cued) about the congruency of the upcoming Stroop target and not 
when Stroop targets were preceded by cues informing subjects about their congruency. 
The finding that a negative correlation between reward effects and dopamine 
synthesis capacity was present specifically in the left caudate nucleus strengthened 
evidence from two other prior studies, implicating specifically the left caudate nucleus 
in the effects of the dopamine transporter gene DAT1 during rewarded cognitive 
control (Aarts et al., 2010, 2015). Moreover, this finding generally concurred with 
evidence from an fMRI study demonstrating enhanced connectivity between the 
ventral striatum and left caudate nucleus when cognitive demand for reward was high 
(Schmidt et al., 2012). The focus of the effect on the caudate nucleus also converged 
with functional MRI work from a third research group demonstrating a modulation 
by reward incentives of specifically the caudate nucleus during (oculomotor) control 
(Harsay et al., 2011). Finally, confidence in a negative correlation between individual 
differences in baseline dopamine levels and reward effects on cognitive control 
was further increased following a subsequent study in Parkinson’s disease patients, 
revealing greater beneficial effects of reward on cognitive control in patients with 
greater dopamine cell loss, measured with CIT-SPECT (Aarts et al., 2012).
However, the sample size (n = 14) of the key PET study providing the direct evidence 
for baseline-dependency of reward effects on cognitive control in healthy volunteers 
was very small for a between-subject correlational design. Such a small sample size 
is associated not only with low positive predictive value (Heston & King, 2017), but 
also with high likelihood that effect sizes are biased and overestimated (Button et al., 
2013). Therefore, we here aimed to test the effect found by Aarts et al. using a new, 
larger participant sample, who had already, as part of a previous study, undergone 
a PET scan with the radiotracer [18F]fluoro-3,4-dihydroxyphenyl-L-alanine ([18F]
FDOPA). Specifically, we hypothesized that the effect of anticipated reward on Stroop 
interference control depends on individual differences in baseline dopamine synthesis 
capacity in the left caudate nucleus. We supplemented the analyses with voxel-wise 
correlations of the behavioral measures with dopamine synthesis capacity. Critically, 
striatal dopamine synthesis capacity in this new sample had already been indexed in 
the context of a previous study not reported here (www.trialregister.nl/trial/5959; data 
of which were previously included in Westbrook et al. (Westbrook et al., 2020) and 
Hofmans et al. (Hofmans et al., 2020)), using [18F]DOPA PET. This is unlike the original 
study, in which [18F]FMT PET was used to index striatal dopamine synthesis capacity. 
While [18F]DOPA PET is considered less sensitive than [18F]FMT PET, due to increased 
background noise and cell clearance of radiolabeled metabolites, we anticipated that 
a strong association between striatal dopamine synthesis capacity and  motivational 











The present attempt at conceptual replication was driven by our goal to increase our 
confidence in the role of dopamine synthesis capacity in motivated cognitive control 
and is of particular interest because a robust mechanistic account of  the link between 
incentive motivation and cognitive control will advance our understanding of who 
chokes under high reward conditions and why (Silston & Mobbs, 2014), a topic of great 




Forty-five (out of a total of 94) right-handed and native Dutch-speaking volunteers 
who had participated in a previous [18F]DOPA PET study (protocol NL57538.091.16; 
trial register NTR6140, www.trialregister.nl/trial/5959) accepted the invitation 
to participate in the current study. All participants gave written informed consent 
according to the declaration of Helsinki and the experiment was conducted in 
compliance with and was approved by the local ethics committee (CMO Arnhem-
Nijmegen, The Netherlands; Imaging Human Cognition, CMO 2014/288, version 2.2). 
One dataset was excluded due to an error rate above 33% (36%; mean (SD) = 18 (7) %). 
With the resulting 44 participants (aged: 19-45 years, mean (SD) = 24 (5.8); 22 women) 
we adhered to Simonsohn’s (2015) recommendation to obtain a sample size at least 
2.5 times larger than the original sample size (N = 14). The new sample had 90% power 
(Faul et al., 2009) to detect a correlation of r = 0.55, which is considerably lower than 
the correlation of r = 0.75 reported in the original study (two-sided α = 0.0042, see Data 
analysis). The time between the PET scan and this behavioral study ranged between 0.3 
and 1.8 years (mean (SD) = 1.0 (0.4)), which is substantially shorter than in the original 
study (range: 1.0-4.2 years, mean (SD) = 2.3 (1.1)). Background neuropsychological 
tests (listening span and behavioral inhibition / activation) had been assessed in the 
prior [18F]DOPA PET study. 
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TABLE 6.1 | Demographic, background and task characteristics of participants included in the 
behavioral analyses. 
Behavioral paradigm
Participants completed the exact same paradigm as in Aarts et al.: a rewarded word-
arrow Stroop paradigm, where they responded with a left or right button press to the 
words “left” or “right” in a left or right pointing arrow, using their right index finger 
or right middle finger, respectively (Figure 6.1a). The direction indicated by the word 
could either be congruent (same direction as the arrow) or incongruent (opposite 
direction). Each trial was preceded by a reward cue for a duration of 1-2 seconds, which 
indicated either a high (15 cents) or low (1 cent) reward that would be earned on that 
trial if the participant responded correctly and within the response window. After the 
reward cue, an information cue was shown on the screen for 1-2 seconds which was 
either informative, in which case it announced to the participant whether the trial 
would be congruent (green circle) or incongruent (red cross), or uninformative, in which 
case it showed a question mark. The information cues were added in the original study 
to assess potential anticipatory reward effects on proactive control, i.e. the ability to 
prepare for the upcoming congruent and incongruent Stroop targets (without being 
able to prepare a left or right motor response). Reward cues, information cues and 
congruency were equally divided across 240 trials, which lasted about 30 minutes. 
Characteristic Aarts et al. (2014) Current study Welch’s T p
Demographics Included participants 14 44
Sex (women) 57% 50%
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Age (years) 28 (2.7) 24 (5.9) -3.4 0.001
Time between PET and 
behavioral testing (years)
2.3 (1.1) 1.0 (0.4) -4.4 0.0006




Total span 3.8 (0.9)1 4.3 (1.5) 1.6 0.109
Total words correct 54.3 (7.7)1 59.1 (16.0) 1.5 0.143
BIS/BAS 
BIS 19.5 (3.3) 17.6 (4.3) -1.8 0.087
BAS (total score) 37.4 (9.9) 39.4 (4.2) 0.76 0.457
Stroop task 
performance
Overall error rate (%) 15 (6) 17 (7) 1.0 0.319
Overall response time 
(ms)
398 (33) 347 (57) -4.1 0.0002
Reward effect on Stroop 
interference on unin-
formed trials2
0.1 (36.0) -3.2 (32.3) -0.3 0.767
Neuropsychological assessment included the listening span task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) and the 
Behavioral Inhibition Scale/Behavioral Activation Scale (BIS/BAS; (Carver & White, 1994)). 11 missing 











As in the original study, before the actual task, participants completed 3 practice blocks. 
The first one to familiarize them with the information cues (12 trials), the second one 
to familiarize them with the reward cues (32 trials), and a third one - similar to the 
actual experiment - to set the initial response windows  for the different trial types (48 
trials). The initial response windows were set as the average response time per trial 
type (high or low reward; informed or uninformed; congruent or incongruent). During 
the actual experiment, the response windows were adapted after correct responses 
within the time window (-25 ms) or too late responses (+25 ms). After every block of 
30 trials participants received feedback on their performance, showing their obtained 
reward on that block, the maximum reward that could have been obtained, their misses 
(too late), their errors (in time but wrong) and their reward for the total experiment so 
far, which remained on screen for 15 seconds. Due to the dynamic response windows, 
obtained reward was similar across participants and trial types (mean (SD) = €9.31 
(0.95) for the entire experiment). The task was performed on a computer running on 
Windows 7 and a screen resolution of 1920x1080p, and the stimuli were shown using 
Presentation (version 20.2, 2018). 
FIGURE 6.1 | Schematic of data acquisition. (a) Schematic of an example word-arrow Stroop 
trial. Participants could either earn a high (15 cents) or low (1 cent) reward for a correct answer 
within the response window, which was cued at the start of the trial (1-2 seconds). After that, 
an information cue was presented for 1-2 seconds, indicating a congruent (green circle) or 
incongruent (red cross) trial, or giving no information about the upcoming congruency (grey 
question mark). Upon seeing the word-arrow Stroop target, participants had to respond to the 
word with a left or right button-press within the dynamically set response window. (b) Coronal 
view of our regions of interest including the bilateral caudate nucleus (red), putamen (green) and 
ventral striatum (blue). 
PET acquisition
PET scans were carried out at the Department of Nuclear Medicine of the Radboud 
university medical center, using a Siemens PET/CT scanner and the radiotracer [18F]
DOPA. Participants received 150 mg of carbidopa and 400 mg of entacapone 50 
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increase central [18F]DOPA availability. The procedure started with a low dose CT scan 
(approximately 0.75 mCi) followed by a bolus injection of [18F]DOPA into an antecubital 
vein and an 89 minute dynamic PET scan (approximately 5 mCi). The data were divided 
into 24 frames (4x1, 3x2, 3x3, 14x5 min) and reconstructed with weighted attenuation 
correction and time-of-flight recovery, scatter corrected, and smoothed with a 3 mm 
full-width-at-half-maximum (FWHM) kernel. 
Structural MRI
A high-resolution anatomical scan, T1-weighted MP-RAGE sequence (repetition time = 
2300 ms, echo time = 3.03 ms, 192 sagittal slices, field of view = 256 mm, voxel size 
1 mm isometric) was acquired using a Siemens 3T MR scanner with a 64-channel coil. 
These were used for coregistration and spatial normalization of the PET scans. 
PET analysis
PET data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM12 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.
ac.uk/spm/). All frames were realigned for motion correction and coregistered to the 
anatomical MRI-scan, using the mean PET image of the first 11 frames. Dopamine 
synthesis capacity was computed as the [18F]DOPA influx constant per minute (Ki) per 
voxel relative to the grey matter of the cerebellum, using Gjedde-Patlak graphical 
analysis (Patlak et al., 1983). The individual cerebellum grey matter masks were 
obtained by segmenting the individuals’ anatomical MRI scan, using Freesurfer (https://
surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/). The Ki values were calculated based on the PET frames 
from the 24th to 89th minute. We then extracted average Ki values from six regions 
of interest (ROIs) – left and right caudate nucleus, putamen and ventral striatum – 
defined using masks based on an independent functional connectivity-analysis of 
the striatum (Piray et al., 2017) (Figure 6.1b). These ROIs are different from the ROIs 
used by Aarts et al. (Aarts et al., 2014), which were specified according to guidelines 
described by Mawlawi et al. (Mawlawi et al., 2001). An overlay of the two sets of 
ROIs are displayed in Supplementary Figure S6.1. Supplementary analyses reveal a 
high Pearson correlation coefficient between the mean Ki values extracted from the 
two sets of ROIs (all r > 0.96). Analyses assessing the relationship between dopamine 
synthesis capacity in the left caudate nucleus as specified according to Mawlawi et al. 
and the effect of reward on Stroop interference can be found in the Supplementary 
information, including Supplementary Figure S6.2). For voxel-wise group analyses, the 












We expected a linear relationship between dopamine synthesis capacity and the 
effect of reward on Stroop interference. This prediction derives from the hypothesis 
that there is a negative quadratic relationship between dopamine signaling and 
cognitive performance (Cools & D’Esposito, 2011), such that both too little and too 
much dopamine is detrimental for performance: in low-dopamine participants, a 
putative increase in dopamine release in response to the promise of reward will 
positively affect performance by shifting dopamine levels from suboptimal to optimal. 
Conversely, in high-dopamine participants, the same reward promise will negatively 
affect performance by shifting dopamine levels from optimal to supra-optimal. See 
Supplementary Figure S6.3 and S6.4 for an exploration of nonlinear relationships 
between dopamine signaling and cognitive performance. 
The main effect of interest was the correlation between the effect of reward on 
Stroop interference (in terms of response times) on uninformed trials and dopamine 
synthesis capacity in the left caudate nucleus, as was observed in the original study. 
For completeness, we also explored the other five ROIs. We analyzed response times 
(RTs) of all correct trials, including trials on which participants were “too late”, and 
error rates. Participants with error rates above 33% were excluded. We ran separate 
repeated measures analyses of variance (rmANOVA) for each region of interest and two 
dependent variables: Stroop interference on RT and on error rate (mean RT or error 
rate on incongruent trials minus mean RT or error rate on congruent trials). The within-
subjects factors were REWARD (low, high) and INFORMATION (uninformed, informed), 
and [18F]DOPA Ki in the left or right caudate nucleus, putamen, or ventral striatum was 
a covariate of interest.  The analyses were performed using the ezANOVA function 
from the ez package (Lawrence, 2016) in R (version 3.4.2). We corrected for multiple 
comparisons (6 ROIs, 2 dependent variables), resulting in a Bonferroni-corrected alpha 
value of 0.0042. Pearson’s correlations were calculated between the Ki values of the 
six ROIs and the effect of reward on Stroop interference in terms of RT on uninformed 
trials for comparison with the original study (Aarts et al., 2014). We supplemented the 
analyses with voxel-wise correlations between the reward effect on Stroop interference 
and dopamine synthesis capacity within the voxels comprising the entire striatum (the 
sum of the 6 regions of interest, specified above). Statistical significance was defined as 
family-wise error corrected p < 0.05 at peak coordinate, after small volume correction 
for all voxels within the striatal region of interest.
Although striatal [18F]DOPA uptake shows high test-retest reliability within a time 
frame of 2 years (Egerton et al., 2010), we performed additional regression analyses, 
separately for each of the six ROIs, to assess whether any effects of the interaction 
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between REWARD and dopamine synthesis capacity on Stroop interference depended 
on time between the PET scan and the behavioral testing day, while also including age 
and gender in the model, using the lm function from the stats package in R. 
We could not directly compare baseline dopamine synthesis capacity between the 
original and the current study, because the PET tracer differed between the two 
studies. However, to appreciate possible differences between the main findings of the 
current study and that of the original study, it is important to analyze comparability 
of the sample (Table 6.1). We therefore compared the two samples in terms of age, 
neuropsychological assessment (listening span and behavioral inhibition / activation) 
and overall performance in terms of error rates and RT, using Welch’s t-tests. We 
then compared reward effects on Stroop interference in terms of RT between the two 
studies, with the hypothesis that reward would decrease interference in individuals 
with lower baseline dopamine synthesis capacity and increase interference in 
individuals with higher baseline dopamine synthesis capacity (Aarts et al., 2014; 
Cools & D’Esposito, 2011). We assessed differences in mean using a Welch’s t-test and 
differences in variances using a Levene’s test. Moreover, given the well-established 
link between dopamine and response vigor (Niv et al., 2007; Robbins & Everitt, 2007; 
Salamone et al., 2016), we assessed the effect of baseline dopamine synthesis capacity 
on response times, both the main effect and in interaction with reward, in the current 
and the original study using an rmANOVA (Supplementary Table S6.1, S6.2). 
To allow for quantification of evidence for or against our hypotheses, we additionally 
report Bayesian individual effects analyses performed in JASP (version 0.10.2.0), 
with default JASP Cauchy priors. The BFinclusion reflects how strongly the data support 
inclusion of a factor. We performed a sequential Bayesian correlation to illustrate 
evidence accumulation against the previously found correlation between the effect of 
reward on Stroop interference and dopamine synthesis capacity in the left caudate 
nucleus after observing the new data. Data from both studies were included; dopamine 
synthesis capacity values were separately standardized (z-scored) for both [18F]DOPA 
and [18F]FMT Ki values.
All continuous independent variables ([18F]DOPA Ki values, time between the PET and 












Participants performed more poorly on incongruent than congruent trials (RT: F(1,43) = 
185.3, p = 3.438e-17, BFINC = 3.217e
+14; error rate: F(1,43) = 137.7, p = 5.394e
-15, BFINC = 
6.434e+13), on uninformed than informed trials (RT: F(1,43) = 35.0, p = 4.829e-7, BFINC = 
3.217e+14; error rate: F(1,43) = 34.1, p = 6.224e
-7, BFINC = 4.949e
+13) and low reward than 
high reward trials (RT: F(1,43) = 14.2, p = 4.974e
-4, BFINC = 3.217e
+14; error rate: F(1,43) = 0.2, 
p = 0.662, BFINC = 4.949e
+13). These results validate the task manipulation, and they are 
similar to findings in the original study. 
Crucially, and in contrast with the original study, there was no interaction effect 
between REWARD, INFORMATION and dopamine synthesis capacity in any of the six 
ROIs on Stroop interference in terms of response times or error rates (Table 6.2). For 
completeness, we also report the effect of reward on Stroop interference independent 
of the factor INFORMATION (Table 6.2). Pearson’s correlations between baseline 
dopamine synthesis capacity and the effect of reward on Stroop interference on 
uninformed trials only revealed no significant associations (all r < |0.22|, p > 0.158, 
BF < 0.575; Figure 6.2). Importantly, the 95% confidence interval for the correlation 
between dopamine synthesis capacity in the left caudate nucleus and the effect of 
reward on Stroop interference in the present study (r = -0.06, p = 0.700, 95% CI [-0.35, 
0.24]) did not overlap with that of the originally reported effect of r = 0.75. Upon visual 
inspection of Figure 6.2, we additionally explored a quadratic relationship between 
dopamine synthesis capacity in the left and right caudate nucleus and the effect of 
motivation on Stroop interference in terms of RT on uninformed trials, but did this 
not yield significant results (Supplementary information). Moreover, a supplementary 
rmANOVA and Pearson’s correlation analysis revealed no relationship between 
dopamine synthesis capacity in the left caudate nucleus as specified according to 
Mawlawi et al. (Mawlawi et al., 2001) and used in Aarts et al. (Aarts et al., 2014) and the 
effect of reward on Stroop interference (Supplementary Figure S6.2).
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TABLE 6.2 | Interaction effects in terms of response times (RT) and error rates obtained from the 
rmANOVAs with dopamine synthesis capacity in each ROI as a single covariate. The dependent variable 
is Stroop performance (mean RT or error rate on incongruent trials minus mean RT or error rate on 
congruent trials). Effect in dark purple was the interaction observed in Aarts et al. to be significant.
Reward x information x DAsynth Reward x DAsynth
F(1,42) p BFINC F(1,42) p BFINC
RT
Left caudate nucleus 1.9 0.177 0.003 0.5 0.473 0.044
Right caudate nucleus 0.6 0.456 0.003 1.4 0.244 0.041
Left putamen 2.4 0.126 0.003 0.2 0.628 0.029
Right putamen 3.4 0.072 0.004 0.3 0.612 0.029
Left ventral striatum 1.5 0.234 0.003 0.4 0.546 0.030
Right ventral striatum 0.8 0.365 0.002 0.0 0.964 0.034
Error rate
Left caudate nucleus 0.5 0.492 0.003 0.4 0.526 0.041
Right caudate nucleus 0.3 0.600 0.017 0.2 0.623 0.065
Left putamen 0.2 0.658 0.018 0.0 0.946 0.068
Right putamen 0.7 0.417 0.019 0.2 0.666 0.076
Left ventral striatum 0.0 0.951 0.014 0.3 0.618 0.059
Right ventral striatum 0.3 0.618 0.015 0.0 0.961 0.065
p-values below a Bonferroni-corrected alpha-value of 0.0042 were considered significant. 
Note that Aarts et al. analyzed the interaction between congruency, reward, information and 
dopamine synthesis capacity on response times and error rates. Here, we show the equivalent 
interaction between reward, information and dopamine synthesis capacity on Stroop interference 
(i.e. the difference between incongruent and congruent trials).
Voxel-wise analyses of the effect of reward on Stroop interference on uninformed trials 
confirmed the lack of significant correlations with any of the voxels within the striatum 
(Figure 6.3). Separate multiple regression analyses for each ROI further confirmed 
the lack of a significant interaction between REWARD, INFORMATION and dopamine 
synthesis capacity or between REWARD and dopamine synthesis capacity on Stroop 
interference in terms of RT or error rate (Table 6.3). Additionally, time between PET 
and behavioral testing, age and gender did not affect the interaction between REWARD, 
INFORMATION and dopamine synthesis capacity or the interaction between REWARD 
and dopamine synthesis capacity on Stroop interference in terms of RT or error rate 
(Table 6.3). To further illustrate evidence against a correlation between the effect of 
REWARD on Stroop interference and dopamine synthesis capacity in the left caudate 
nucleus on uninformed trials, we ran a sequential Bayesian correlation including the 
data from both the original study and the current study. This revealed a strong increase 
in evidence in favor of a correlation when including participants from the original 
study, followed by a strong decline in evidence when including participants from the 











FIGURE 6.2 | The effect of reward on Stroop interference (RT: incongruent – congruent) on 
uninformed trials plotted as a function of dopamine synthesis capacity in the six ROIs. Shaded 
area around the regression line represents 95% confidence interval. N = 44.; RT (ms) = response 
time in milliseconds; Ki = [
18F]DOPA uptake, reflecting dopamine synthesis capacity. Effect in grey 
was the correlation observed in Aarts et al. to be significant.
detrimental
uninformed trials
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FIGURE 6.3 | Association of baseline dopamine synthesis capacity with the effect of reward on Stroop 
interference on uninformed trials. Voxels showing a positive (red) or negative (blue) regression 
coefficient on the effect of a promised reward on Stroop interference in terms of response times 
on uninformed trials. Dual-coded and simultaneously displaying the contrast estimate (x axis) and 
t values (y axis). The hue indicates the size of the contrast estimate, and the opacity indicates the 
height of the t value. The z coordinates correspond to the standard MNI brain. No voxels survive p < 
0.05 peak-level corrected (FWE) or p < 0.001 uncorrected. Plotted using a procedure introduced by 
Allen et al. (E. A. Allen et al., 2012) and implemented by Zandbelt (Zandbelt, 2017).
FIGURE 6.4 | Sequential analysis showing progression of the Bayes Factor (BF) as new participants 
(n) enter the analysis. Values above 1 represent evidence for a correlation between dopamine 
synthesis capacity in the left caudate nucleus and a motivation effect on Stroop interference 
on uninformed trials, whereas values below 1 represent evidence against a correlation. Each 
dot represents the BF after inclusion of the next participant. Dark grey dots represent the 14 
participants from Aarts et al. entered first; light grey dots represent the 44 participants from the 
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Average age differed significantly between the original and the current study (original 
study: mean = 28.1 years old; current study: mean = 24.3 years old; t(47) = -3.4, p = 
0.001; Table 6.1). To assess whether this could have caused the lack of effect of 
interest in the current study, we repeatedly discarded the youngest participant from 
our current dataset until age no longer differed between the studies, before rerunning 
the rmANOVAs. This resulted in a dataset including 26 participants (mean age = 26.9 
years old; t(37) = -0.9, p = 0.379). However, we did not observe a significant REWARD 
(by INFORMATION) by dopamine synthesis capacity interaction effect on Stroop 
interference (Supplementary Table S6.3). 
Similarly, individual average RTs across trials differed significantly between the 
original and the current study (original study: mean = 397.5 ms; current study: mean 
= 346.9 ms; t(40) = -4.1, p = 2.0e-4; Table 6.1). We therefore repeatedly discarded the 
fastest participant from our current dataset until the average RTs no longer differed, 
resulting in a dataset including 29 participants (mean RT = 371.8; t(39) = -1.9, p = 0.064). 
However, we did not observe a significant REWARD (by INFORMATION) by dopamine 
synthesis capacity effect on Stroop interference (Supplementary Table S6.4). We 
additionally ran a multiple linear regression for each ROI including the terms REWARD, 
INFORMATION, dopamine synthesis capacity and individual average RT across all trials, 
including all interactions, which confirmed the lack of a significant effect of average 
RTs (Supplementary Table S6.5).
To establish that the discrepancy between the studies does not reflect differences in 
the dynamic range of the key variable of interest, we also compared the means and 
variances of the reward effects on Stroop interference on uninformed trials in terms 
of RT between the two studies. The two participant samples did not differ significantly 
from each other in terms of their means and variances (Figure 6.5), as revealed by a 
Welch’s t-test (original study: mean = 0.07 ms; current study: mean = -3.2 ms; t(20) = -0.3, 











FIGURE 6.5 | The effect of promised reward on Stroop interference (RT incongruent trials minus RT 
congruent trials) on uninformed trials in the original study (Aarts et al.) and the current replication 
attempt. Individual data points and probability distribution. Error bars represent 95% confidence 
interval around the mean. Plotted using R_rainclouds.R (M. Allen et al., 2018). 
Discussion
The current study reveals no evidence for an interaction between monetary incentives 
and dopamine synthesis capacity, indexed with [18F]DOPA PET, on Stroop interference. 
Bayesian analyses in fact provide evidence in favor of a lack of a relationship between 
dopamine synthesis capacity and reward effect on Stroop interference. Our conclusion 
is therefore not consistent with the earlier findings by Aarts et al. (Aarts et al., 2014). 
It is possible that the discrepancy between the findings of the two studies reflects the 
use of [18F]DOPA in the present study, as opposed to [18F]FMT used in the original study. 
[18F]DOPA is a substrate for catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) in the periphery. 
Metabolites can cross the blood-brain-barrier and will distribute evenly throughout 
the brain, enhancing background noise relative to the use of [18F]FMT, which is not a 
substrate for COMT (Becker et al., 2017). However, this is mainly a concern when one 
is interested in brain areas with low dopamine levels, as opposed to the dopamine-
rich striatum. Moreover, entacapone was administered before PET scanning to inhibit 
peripheral COMT metabolism, further reducing the risk of a too low signal-to-noise 
ratio. [18F]DOPA and [18F]FMT also differ in their metabolic actions after decarboxylation 
by aromatic amino acid decarboxylase (AAAD), including higher affinity of [18F]
DOPA metabolites compared with [18F]FMT metabolites for the vesicular monoamine 
transporter, leading to increased cell clearance of radiolabeled [18F]DOPA metabolites 
(Doudet et al., 1999). Indeed, differences in aging effects on dopamine synthesis 
capacity measured with [18F]DOPA and [18F]FMT have been observed, possibly owing 
to age-related changes in post-AADC metabolism (DeJesus et al., 2001). However, this 
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would mostly be a concern for extended scanning times, as [18F]DOPA behaves as an 
irreversibly bound tracer in the first 90 minutes after tracer injection, during which 
their uptake rates are tightly correlated (Becker et al., 2017; Doudet et al., 1999). 
Another possibility is that the discrepancy between the original and the current study 
was introduced by group differences in sample characteristics. However, differences 
in overall response times and age did not explain the lack of significant effects in the 
current study. According to the dopamine overdose hypothesis (Cools & D’Esposito, 
2011), monetary incentives might enhance Stroop interference control in participants 
with very low average levels of baseline dopamine, whereas those incentives would 
impair control in participants with very high average levels. Sampling only participants 
with intermediate dopamine levels should lead to very small reward effects. However, 
a comparison of reward effects between the two studies demonstrated similar means 
and variances within the two samples. We therefore argue that the current result 
decreases our belief in the previously observed correlation between motivational 
effects on cognitive control and baseline dopamine synthesis capacity. 
Notably, this conclusion would not imply that dopamine transmission is not important 
for the motivation of cognitive control, because brain dopamine levels are a function 
not only of dopamine synthesis capacity, but also of other factors, including transporter 
density, dopamine receptor availability, dopamine release and genetic make-up. Thus, 
the current study cannot refute hypothesized correlations between motivational 
effects on cognitive control and other measures of dopamine function. For example, 
the current design does not disconfirm previously demonstrated and replicated links 
between motivation, cognitive control and polymorphisms in the dopamine transporter 
gene (Aarts et al., 2010, 2015; van Holstein et al., 2011), dopamine release (Jonasson et 
al., 2014) or dopamine-related disease status (Aarts et al., 2012; Manohar et al., 2015; 
Timmer et al., 2018). Similarly, the current failure to replicate does not undermine 
other studies demonstrating a link between dopamine synthesis capacity and cognitive 
motivation indexed with other tasks, such as delay discounting (Smith et al., 2016), 
cognitive effort discounting (Hofmans et al., 2020; Westbrook et al., 2020) or reward-
based reversal learning (Cools et al., 2009). Nevertheless, the presently observed lack 
of effect reduces our confidence in the link between dopamine synthesis capacity 
and the effect of a promised reward on Stroop interference and stresses the need for 
further studies. 
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Comparison between the regions of interest used in the current study 
and the study by Aarts et al
Here we report results from a comparison between the regions of interest (ROIs) used 
in the current study and those used in the study by Aarts and colleagues (Aarts et 
al., 2014). In the current study we based our ROIs on functional connectivity analyses 
(Piray et al., 2017) (see PET analysis in main text), while the ROIs in the study by Aarts 
and colleagues were drawn according to guidelines described previously by Mawlawi 
and colleagues (Mawlawi et al., 2001).
The ROIs as used by Aarts et al. were specified in MNI space and transformed to subject 
native space for analyses. Figure S6.1 displays the two sets of ROIs in MNI space. Both 
sets of ROIs included the bilateral caudate nucleus (medial caudate region and dorsal 
caudate nucleus region), putamen (dorsal-anterior and dorsal-posterior putamen 
region) and ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens, ventral caudate nucleus, and ventral 
parts of the putamen). A Pearson’s correlations revealed that there was a strong 
positive correlation between the [18F]DOPA Ki values in the two sets of ROIs (native 
space; left caudate nucleus: r = 0.97, p < 2e-16; right caudate nucleus: r = 0.96, p < 2e-16; 
left putamen: r = 0.99, p < 2e-16; right putamen: r = 0.99, p < 2e-16; left ventral striatum: 
r = 0.98, p < 2e-16; right ventral striatum: r = 0.97, p < 2e-16). 
Next we reran the rmANOVAs on the dependent variable Stroop interference – mean 
RT incongruent trials minus mean RT congruent trials – including the within-subjects 
factors REWARD (low, high) and INFORMATION (uninformed, informed), and [18F]DOPA 
Ki in the left dorsal caudate nucleus (as specified according to Mawlawi et al. and used 
by Aarts et al.) as a covariate of interest. There were no significant interactions between 
REWARD, INFORMATION and dopamine synthesis capacity (F(1,42) = 2.2, p = 0.150, BFINC 
= 0.003) or between REWARD and dopamine synthesis capacity (independent of 
INFORMATION; F(1,42) = 0.1, p = 0.715, BFINC = 0.044). Figure S6.2 shows the correlation 
between dopamine synthesis capacity in the left dorsal caudate nucleus (as specified 
according to Mawlawi et al.) and the effect of motivation on Stroop interference on 
uninformed trials. 
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Figure S6.1 | Overlay of the regions of interest (ROIs) used in the current study and in Aarts et al. 
(Aarts et al., 2014). ROIs used in the current study are displayed in red; ROIs used in Aarts et al. 
are displayed in blue; overlap is purple. a – caudate nucleus with crosshairs at MNI coordinates 
[-14, 10, 10]. b – putamen with crosshairs at MNI coordinates [-28, 0, 6]. c – ventral striatum with 














FIGURE S6.2 | The effect of reward on Stroop interference (RT: incongruent – congruent) on 
uninformed trials plotted as a function of dopamine synthesis capacity in the left dorsal caudate 
nucleus (ROI specified according to Mawlawi et al. and used by Aarts et al.). Shaded area around 
the regression line represents 95% confidence interval. RT (ms) = response time in milliseconds; Ki 
= [18F]DOPA uptake, reflecting dopamine synthesis capacity; N = 44. 
No evidence for a quadratic relationship between dopamine synthe-
sis capacity and Stroop interference on low reward trials
Our primary hypothesis was that dopamine synthesis capacity would be associated 
linearly with the effect of reward on Stroop performance. This hypothesis was based on 
a putative inverted-U shaped relationship between dopamine and Stroop performance, 
whereby further increases in dopamine elicited by the promise of reward would shift 
dopamine levels from suboptimal to optimal in low-dopamine participants, but from 
optimal to supra-optimal in high-dopamine participants. In addition to testing the 
linear effects of reward, we also explored quadratic effects under low-reward (putative 
baseline) conditions. To this end, we ran linear regressions (separately for each ROI) in R 
using the lm function, including the quadratic z-scored Ki term as independent variable 
and Stroop interference on the uninformed low reward trials as dependent variable. 
A p-value below a Bonferroni-corrected alpha-level of 0.0083 (0.05÷6 ROIs) was 
considered significant. We additionally ran the same Bayesian linear regressions in JASP 
to obtain a Bayes Factor for the effect. Results are displayed in Figure S6.3. Although this 
revealed that Stroop interference was indeed strongest for individuals with the lowest 
and highest dopamine synthesis capacity in the right caudate nucleus (R2 = 0.159, p = 
0.007, BF = 2.99), this relationship was driven by the participant with the highest Stroop 
interference score, who was an outlier according to a Grubbs’ test (G = 4.0, p = 1.6e-
4). Without this participant the quadratic relationship was not present anymore (R2 = 
0.03, p = 0.292, BF = 0.481). There were no significant quadratic relationships between 
dopamine synthesis capacity in the other ROIs and Stroop interference. Crucially, the 
detrimental
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quadratic effect between dopamine synthesis capacity (in the left dorsal caudate nucleus, 
as specified according to Mawlawi et al. (Mawlawi et al., 2001) and Stroop interference 
was also not present in the study by Aarts and colleagues (Figure S6.4). 
 
FIGURE S6.3 | Quadratic Ki-related effect on Stroop interference (mean RT incongruent trials minus 
mean RT congruent trials) in the six ROIs for uninformed low reward trials. Shaded area around 
the regression line represents 95% confidence interval. RT (ms) = response time in milliseconds; 
Ki = [
18F]DOPA uptake, reflecting dopamine synthesis capacity; N = 44. NB: Quadratic relationship 
between dopamine synthesis capacity in the right caudate nucleus and Stroop interference 











FIGURE S6.4 | Quadratic Ki-related effect on Stroop interference (mean RT incongruent trials 
minus mean RT congruent trials) in the left dorsal caudate nucleus for uninformed low reward 
trials in Aarts et al. Shaded area around the regression line represents 95% confidence interval. 
RT (ms) = response time in milliseconds; Ki = [
18F]DOPA uptake, reflecting dopamine synthesis 
capacity; N = 14.
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Both in the current sample (Table S6.1) and the original sample (Table S6.2), baseline 
dopamine synthesis capacity was not associated with response times, neither in 
interaction with reward nor as main effect:
TABLE S6.1 | Effect of dopamine synthesis capacity and dopamine synthesis capacity x reward on 
response times in the current sample. Separate rmANOVA for each of the six regions of interest, 
including reward, congruency and information as within-subjects factors and dopamine synthesis 
capacity as covariate. N = 44. 
 
DAsynth Reward x DAsynth
F(1,42) p F(1,42) p
Left caudate nucleus 2.4 0.128 3.1 0.084
Right caudate nucleus1 7.5 0.009 3.8 0.058
Left putamen 0.0 0.833 1.1 0.299
Right putamen 0.1 0.804 1.3 0.268
Left ventral striatum 0.1 0.771 1.3 0.261
Right ventral striatum 0.3 0.596 2.9 0.095
1Corresponds to a negative correlation between dopamine synthesis capacity and response times. 
Effects when 1 participant with low dopamine synthesis capacity in the right caudate nucleus and 
an average RT of 4 standard deviations above the group mean was excluded: DAsynth: F(1,41) = 3.0, 
p = 0.092; reward x DAsynth: F(1,41) = 0.4, p = 0.535.
TABLE S6.2 | Effect of dopamine synthesis capacity and dopamine synthesis capacity x reward on 
response times in Aarts et al. Separate rmANOVA for each of the six regions of interest, including 
reward, congruency and information as within-subjects factors and dopamine synthesis capacity 
as covariate. N = 14. 
DAsynth Reward x DAsynth
F(1,12) p F(1,12) p
Left caudate nucleus 0.1 0.738 0.0 0.930
Right caudate nucleus 0.0 0.855 0.0 0.871
Left putamen 0.0 0.966 0.0 0.965
Right putamen 0.0 0.907 0.1 0.817
Left ventral striatum 0.2 0.702 0.0 0.893
Right ventral striatum 0.1 0.780 0.3 0.567
 
No evidence for a quadratic relationship between dopamine  
synthesis capacity and the effect of motivation on Stroop interference 
on  uninformed trials
Although our hypothesis concerned a linear relationship between dopamine synthesis 











Figure 6.2 led us to explore a quadratic relationship for the left and right caudate 
nucleus. To this end, we ran linear regressions (separately for both ROIs) in R using 
the lm function, including the quadratic z-scored Ki term as independent variable and 
the effect of motivation on Stroop interference in terms of RT on the uninformed trials 
as dependent variable. We applied a strict alpha level of 0.0036 (0.05÷14; 12 linear 
relationships and 2 additional quadratic relationships) to account for these additional 
analyses assessing the relationship between dopamine synthesis capacity and the 
effect of motivation on Stroop interference. We additionally ran the same Bayesian 
linear regressions in JASP to obtain a Bayes Factor for the effect.
However, there was no significant quadratic relationships between the effect of 
motivation on Stroop interference and dopamine synthesis capacity in the left (R2 = 0.05, 
p = 0.144, BF =  0.719) or the right caudate nucleus (R2 = 0.11, p = 0.028, BF = 2.271).
TABLE S6.3 | Interaction effects in terms of response times (RT) and error rates obtained from the 
rmANOVAs with dopamine synthesis capacity in each ROI as a single covariate. The dependent 
variable is Stroop interference (mean RT or error rate on incongruent trials minus mean RT or 
error rate on congruent trials). The sample is matched to the original sample from Aarts et al. in 
terms of age, resulting in N = 26.
  
Reward x information x DAsynth Reward x DAsynth
F(1,24) p BFINC F(1,24) p BFINC
RT
Left caudate nucleus 0.0 0.991 0.012 0.9 0.345 0.081
Right caudate nucleus 0.1 0.738 0.008 1.5 0.240 0.078
Left putamen 0.2 0.655 0.020 0.1 0.749 0.084
Right putamen 0.1 0.710 0.017 0.1 0.707 0.076
Left ventral striatum 0.0 0.931 0.015 0.1 0.737 0.070
Right ventral striatum 0.1 0.797 0.033 0.0 0.963 0.093
Error rate
Left caudate nucleus 0.1 0.806 0.121 0.1 0.717 0.231
Right caudate nucleus 0.2 0.683 0.180 0.0 0.848 0.281
Left putamen 1.5 0.236 0.351 0.0 0.879 0.369
Right putamen 2.4 0.138 0.391 0.3 0.583 0.432
Left ventral striatum 0.7 0.397 0.138 0.0 0.933 0.238
Right ventral striatum 0.2 0.674 0.218 0.0 0.931 0.323
Note: p-values below a Bonferroni-corrected alpha-value of 0.0042 were considered significant.
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TABLE S6.4 | Interaction effects in terms of response times (RT) and error rates obtained from the 
rmANOVAs with dopamine synthesis capacity in each ROI as a single covariate. The dependent 
variable is Stroop interference (mean RT or error rate on incongruent trials minus mean RT or 
error rate on congruent trials). The sample is matched to the original sample from Aarts et al. in 
terms of individual average RT across all trials, resulting in N = 29. 
Reward x information x DAsynth Reward x DAsynth
F(1,27) p BFINC F(1,27) p BFINC
RT
Left caudate nucleus 0.5 0.465 0.094 1.2 0.282 0.099
Right caudate nucleus 0.1 0.780 0.009 2.5 0.125 0.098
Left putamen 2.2 0.153 0.005 0.0 0.938 0.037
Right putamen 2.2 0.147 0.005 0.0 0.932 0.037
Left ventral striatum 0.6 0.459 0.004 0.0 0.935 0.039
Right ventral striatum 0.2 0.636 0.004 0.1 0.730 0.048
Error rate
Left caudate nucleus 0.2 0.651 0.016 0.0 0.884 0.041
Right caudate nucleus 0.0 0.884 0.014 0.0 0.945 0.054
Left putamen 2.8 0.106 0.028 0.2 0.697 0.082
Right putamen 5.6 0.0251 0.041 0.0 0.936 0.072
Left ventral striatum 0.4 0.551 0.013 0.5 0.490 0.073
Right ventral striatum 0.4 0.517 0.014 0.0 0.954 0.085
Note: p-values below a Bonferroni-corrected alpha-value of 0.0042 were considered significant. 
1p-value does not survive correction for multiple comparisons. However, for clarity we report the 
interaction effect of reward x DAsynth in the right Putamen on Stroop interference (error rate): 











TABLE S6.5 | Interaction effects obtained from multiple linear regression analyses assessing the 
effect of individual average RT across all trials on motivational effects on Stroop interference 
(incongruent trials minus congruent trials) in terms of response times (RT) and error rates. 










β p β p β p β p
RT
Left caudate nucleus 5.2e3 0.207 -7.3e3 0.260 -5.9e1 0.416 1.3e2 0.251
Right caudate nucleus 4.7e3 0.260 -6.3e3 0.330 -4.2e1 0.510 1.1e2 0.280
Left 
putamen
4.4e3 0.248 -7.0e3 0.249 1.8e1 0.870 1.3e1 0.939
Right putamen 4.5e3 0.219 -7.1e3 0.223 -2.7e1 0.797 8.8e1 0.602
Left ventral striatum 3.8e3 0.371 -6.5e3 0.334 -2.1e1 0.819 7.2e1 0.819
Right ventral striatum 3.1e3 0.424 -5.1e3 0.405 -5.1e1 0.486 1.1e2 0.333
Error rate
Left caudate nucleus 3.0 0.878 2.5 0.934 1.1e-1 0.738 6.3e-2 0.906
Right caudate nucleus -3.8 0.846 1.2e1 0.699 2.4e-1 0.419 -1.3e-1 0.780
Left 
putamen
-8.2 0.648 1.4e1 0.622 -2.2e-1 0.661 5.4e-1 0.501
Right putamen -1.2e1 0.505 2.2e1 0.416 -1.8e-1 0.717 4.9e-1 0.535
Left ventral striatum -3.8e-2 0.998 -2.1 0.947 1.0e-1 0.814 1.0e-1 0.881
Right ventral striatum 3.8 0.834 -5.6 0.847 2.1e-3 0.995 2.5e-1 0.650
Model: stroop_effect ~ DAsynth x reward x information x average RT
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To manage our goals, such as preparing soup, watching television and texting 
with a friend, we need cognitive control. In this thesis, I aimed to provide a deeper 
understanding of the cognitive and neural mechanisms that link cognitive control with 
motivation. Because when we focus on a task, specifically a cognitive task, it is not only 
about whether we are able to perform the task, but also about how motivated we are 
to perform well. 
Here, I focused i) on the role of the neurotransmitter dopamine in making decisions 
about whether we want to perform a cognitive task (chapter 2), ii) on the effect of 
rewards on cognitive performance and decision-making about cognitive effort 
(chapters 3-6) iii) and on whether rewards affect cognitive stability versus flexibility 
(chapters 3-5). Across the experiments, I assessed whether the effects of dopaminergic 
medication or reward varied as a function of individual differences related to 
dopamine transmission, such as trait impulsivity (chapter 5) or dopamine synthesis 
capacity (chapters 2 and 6). Below, I will shortly summarize the main findings of the 
experiments and interpret them considering previous literature, while also discussing 
limitations. This will be followed by directions for future research.  
The motivation-enhancing effect of methylpheni-
date is stronger in individuals with high striatal 
dopamine synthesis capacity
Chapter 2 examined whether the dopaminergic drug methylphenidate affected people’s 
motivation for completing a cognitive working memory task versus leisure and 
whether the extent of this effect depended on baseline dopamine synthesis capacity, 
indexed by a PET scan using the radiotracer [18F]DOPA. Methylphenidate increased 
participant’s motivation for the cognitive task versus leisure and this effect was 
stronger for participants with higher baseline dopamine synthesis capacity. However, 
administration of the selective dopamine D2-receptor antagonist sulpiride, included in 
the design to test the dopamine-specificity of the effects of methylphenidate, showed 
no significant effects. 
Interpretation and implications
These findings are in line with a role for dopaminergic medication in both cognitive 
control (Arnsten et al., 2015; Cools & D’Esposito, 2011; Goldman-Rakic, 1997) and 
decision-making (Chong et al., 2015; Le Bouc et al., 2016; Mcguigan et al., 2019; 
Salamone et al., 2009; Wardle et al., 2011). An important implication of these findings 
regarding the mechanisms of methylphenidate’s effect on cognitive control, and 
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particularly cognitive improvement, is that it acts on our motivation for cognitive 
control, rather than or in addition to our cognitive abilities. This is consistent with 
previous theorizing stating that motivation plays a role in cognitive effort exertion 
and performance improvements (Kurzban et al., 2013) and that increases in dopamine 
transmission enhance the weight on the benefits versus the costs, resulting in higher 
motivation for cognitive control (Collins & Frank, 2014; Cools, 2016; Shenhav et al., 
2013, 2017; Westbrook et al., 2020). Together with the findings reported in a parallel 
experiment, part of the same overarching study, showing that methylphenidate 
increased motivation for a high demanding cognitive task over a low demanding 
cognitive task (Westbrook et al., 2020), these data strengthen the link between striatal 
dopamine and cognitive motivation (Aarts et al., 2011; Mcguigan et al., 2019). This also 
has important clinical implications. Methylphenidate administration is often associated 
with improved attention in individuals with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD) (Volkow et al., 2012). This has been argued to involve striatal motivational 
circuits (Sergeant, 2000, 2005; Volkow et al., 2011, 2012). The current finding that 
methylphenidate increased cognitive motivation across the group might imply that the 
effect of methylphenidate on attention in ADHD patients is indeed, at least partly, due 
to motivational effects.  
The observation that the effect depended on higher dopamine synthesis capacity 
in the nucleus accumbens is consistent with earlier reports in which the effect of 
dopaminergic medication on cognitive control or cognitive demand avoidance 
depended on individual difference in baseline measures, such as impulsivity and 
working memory capacity (Clatworthy et al., 2009; Cocker et al., 2012; Cools et al., 
2007; Froböse et al., 2018; Kimberg et al., 1997; Kimberg & D’Esposito, 2003; Mehta et 
al., 2000). 
An open question is why methylphenidate exhibited its strongest effect in high-
dopamine compared with low-dopamine individuals. A question that is particularly 
pertinent given opposing results in the parallel study by Westbrook et al., showing 
that methylphenidate increased motivation for a high demanding cognitive task over 
a low demanding cognitive task, particularly in low dopamine individuals (Westbrook 
et al., 2020). While the study by Westbrook et al. examined choices between clearly 
defined costs and benefits, the study reported in chapter 2 examined decision-making 
with an emphasis on opportunity costs, which were not explicitly defined. Therefore, 
one possible explanation for these apparently conflicting results is the pivotal role of 
opportunity costs in the task applied in the study described in chapter 2, but not in 
the task of Westbrook et al. In this latter study, computational models indicated that 
methylphenidate increased motivation by biasing sensitivity to the benefits (monetary 











Westbrook et al., 2020). Moreover, a higher preference for the high-demanding option 
at baseline, particularly in high-dopamine participants, might have reduced the range 
for further increases in the weight on the benefits in those participants. Conversely, in 
chapter 2 I show that methylphenidate does not interact with the benefits of the task. 
Therefore, it is possible that methylphenidate acted by reducing the cost, particularly 
the opportunity cost of performing the cognitive task (when one would choose to 
perform the task, they would forego the option to enjoy leisure time). Participants 
indeed exhibit a strong aversion to the task, possibly reflecting strong opportunity 
costs. On placebo, individuals with high dopamine synthesis capacity in the nucleus 
accumbens, an area arguably associated with signaling opportunity costs (Niv et al., 
2007), showed a lower willingness to perform the task. This lower willingness might 
have generated an increased dynamic range for methylphenidate to reduce feelings 
of opportunity cost, thereby increasing cognitive motivation (Figure 7.1A). These 
contrasting effects of methylphenidate on benefits versus costs are concurrent with the 
neurobiological architecture of dopamine’s contrasting effects on the direct Go pathway 
and indirect NoGo pathway in the basal ganglia. Dopamine facilitates activation of the 
Go pathway, associated with the benefits of an action, whereas it inhibits activation of 
the NoGo pathway, associated with the costs of an action (Collins & Frank, 2014).
FIGURE 7.1 | Possible explanations for the effect of methylphenidate being strongest in 
individuals with high baseline dopamine synthesis capacity. A – On placebo, individuals with high 
dopamine synthesis capacity showed a lower subjective value of the cognitive task, potentially 
due to a higher experience of opportunity cost. This might have generated an increased dynamic 
range for methylphenidate to reduce feelings of opportunity cost by a certain factor, thereby 
increasing the value of the task more in high-dopamine individuals. B - An alternative explanation 
is that methylphenidate acted by shifting the value of leisure from suboptimal to optimal in low-
dopamine individuals, while eliciting a shift from optimal to supra-optimal in high-dopamine 
individuals, thereby paradoxically lowering the value of leisure and increasing the value of the 
cognitive task.
 
An alternative explanation is that methylphenidate acted by increasing the value 
of leisure, rather than decreasing the opportunity cost of the task, consistent with 
dopamine’s role in value-signaling (Collins & Frank, 2014; Hamid et al., 2016; Wardle 
et al., 2011). Methylphenidate might have shifted this value of rest from suboptimal 
dopamine level











to optimal in low-dopamine individuals, while eliciting a shift from optimal to supra-
optimal in high-dopamine individuals, thereby paradoxically lowering the value of rest 
and thus increasing cognitive motivation (Figure 7.1B). 
Thus, I speculate that a differential emphasis on the benefits versus the costs of the 
task might have rendered different results in the two experiments. 
Limitations
The study described in chapter 2 provides valuable insights into the mechanisms of 
cognitive motivation but is not without limitations. 
First, I cannot exclude the possibility that the effect of methylphenidate reflected 
changes in noradrenaline, rather than dopamine transmission, as the drug blocks 
the reuptake of both neurotransmitters. Moreover, sulpiride, which selectively alters 
dopamine transmission, yielded no significant effects. However, as already discussed 
in chapter 2, it is possible that the dosage of sulpiride was suboptimal. Together with 
the effect being predicted by dopamine synthesis capacity, I consider it more likely 
that the effect reflected dopaminergic transmission, although I would refrain from 
drawing firm conclusions. 
Second, I derive conclusions about dopamine synthesis-related effects in the striatum. 
However, I cannot address a potential parallel locus of action in the prefrontal cortex, 
as the uptake signal of our radiotracer in the prefrontal cortex is too low. Future studies 
should employ combined PET-fMRI designs to unravel potential prefrontal dopamine-
dependent effects of methylphenidate on cognitive motivation. 
Third, conclusions are based on an index of dopamine synthesis capacity. While this 
is considered to contribute to the level of dopamine transmission (Egerton et al., 
2010), it is an indirect measure. Other factors, such as transporter density, dopamine 
receptor availability and dopamine release should also be considered to provide a 
more complete picture of the baseline-dependency of methylphenidate’s mechanisms 
of action.
Fourth, as already eluded to above and in chapter 2, the study was designed to place 
more emphasis on opportunity costs. However, opportunity costs were not manipulated 
directly, which prevents me from drawing firm conclusions about the effect of 
methylphenidate on opportunity costs. Therefore, future studies could shed light on 
these mechanisms by more systematically manipulating the value of the alternative, 











Fifth, I want to highlight the fact that our study sample consisted of healthy 
participants. It is unclear what the effects of methylphenidate on cognitive motivation 
are in patients with for example Parkinson’s disease or ADHD. Apathy, characterized by 
a general lack of interest and diminished motivation, is a common behavioral symptom 
in patients with Parkinson’s disease, a disorder characterized by reduced dopamine 
transmission in the striatum. Although more studies are needed, methylphenidate 
potentially reduces apathy in patients with Parkinson’s disease (Chong & Husain, 2016; 
Devos et al., 2013), in line with the positive effects of methylphenidate on motivation 
reported in chapter 2. There is no strong evidence for a relationship between ADHD and 
dopamine synthesis capacity. Research in other populations with impulsive behavior, 
such as pathological gamblers, have been associated with high levels of striatal 
dopamine synthesis capacity (van Holst et al., 2018). The present results suggest that 
in situations in which opportunity costs are highly pronounced, methylphenidate 
particularly increases cognitive motivation in those populations. However, the relative 
lack of evidence for a relationship between ADHD and dopamine synthesis capacity 
might be suggestive of large heterogeneity in this population. An important question 
is therefore whether dopamine synthesis capacity would be a better predictor of the 
effect of methylphenidate than the diagnosis ADHD. 
Lastly, I was interested in exploring dopamine drug effects on choices between 
cognitive stability versus flexibility. Inspired by literature regarding the dynamics 
between cognitive stability and flexibility (Cools & D’Esposito, 2011; Fallon et al., 2017; 
Musslick et al., 2018), I expected that increases in striatal dopamine would result in 
a shift toward more motivation for cognitive flexibility at the expense of stability. 
However, the data showed no strong evidence for methylphenidate or sulpiride shifting 
this balance. Contrary to earlier studies, in which participants preferred a similar 
flexible update task over a stable ignore task (Froböse et al., 2018; Papadopetraki et 
al., 2019), there was no difference between the value of the two tasks under placebo, 
which might explain the lack of drug effects. Therefore, in the subsequent chapters, I 
aimed to develop a paradigm that we would use for future testing of dopamine’s effects 
on the motivational modulation of the stability/flexibility balance.  As will become 
clear, however, these novel paradigms also did not generate unequivocal results.
The effects of rewards on cognitive control are 
small and variable
In chapters 3-5 I focused on developing a paradigm with the goal to assess the role of 
dopamine in the incentivization of stable versus flexible cognitive control, rather than 
the valuation of different cognitive tasks.
General discussion
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Chapter 3 assessed whether contextual aspects modulate incentive effects on the 
stability/flexibility balance. Specifically, I tested whether incentive motivation 
potentiated strategic meta-control using the same working memory paradigm as 
in chapter 2, that distinguishes between two different trial-types, one requiring 
cognitive stability and the other requiring flexibility. I manipulated the extent to 
which participants could exert strategic meta-control by varying the frequency of one 
trial-type over the other, allowing participants to prepare for the high-frequent trial 
type. I expected participants to perform better on the high-frequent trial-type, and 
that greater incentive motivation would strengthen this effect. However, the results 
did not provide conclusive evidence for this hypothesis. Planned analyses did not 
demonstrate effects of incentive motivation on strategic meta-control in terms of 
accuracy. There were also no main effects of incentive motivation or the frequency 
manipulation. Exploratory reaction time analyses showed greater motivation-related 
slowing on flexible update trials when this was the high-frequent trial-type. However, 
we did find a performance improvement, for both stability and flexibility trial-types, 
when the majority of the trials was of the stability type. Thus, a high proportion of 
stability-requiring trials might have had a general positive effect on working memory 
by increasing task engagement, cognitive maintenance, or attention to the experiment. 
Importantly though, this effect was not modulated by incentive motivation. 
The lack of incentive motivation effects in chapter 3 does not mean that there would 
be no effects of different reward manipulations. In chapter 4, I therefore looked at 
effects of reward that are independent of performance, rather than effects of incentive 
motivation, where rewards are performance contingent. In line with prior work 
showing that reward promotes task-switching (via its action on the striatum) (Aarts 
et al., 2011), Chapter 4 examined whether highly rewarding environments are also 
associated with improved cognitive flexibility versus cognitive stability in the context 
of working memory. Furthermore, inspired by studies on foraging behavior suggesting 
that highly rewarding environments that carry high opportunity costs promote flexible 
exploration (Charnov, 1976; Constantino & Daw, 2015; Kolling et al., 2012; Le Heron et 
al., 2020), I hypothesized that highly rewarding environments would also reduce the 
subjective cost of cognitive flexibility versus stability, measured with a subsequent 
cognitive effort discounting procedure. However, I did not find evidence that the 
reward environment affected the balance between cognitive stability and flexibility, 
nor did I find any general effects of reward environment.
Because chapters 3 and 4 did not yield significant results, I wondered whether any 
effects of reward on cognitive performance and the stability/flexibility balance could 
be recovered when looking at individual differences in Chapter 5. I tested whether 











at the expense of performance on tasks requiring cognitive stability, using the same 
working memory paradigm as in the previous chapters. I measured trait impulsivity, a 
putative proxy of dopamine transmission, to capture potential individual variability in 
the effects of reward motivation. Planned analyses of accuracy revealed no significant 
effects. Exploratory analyses on reaction times revealed that participants responded 
more slowly on high versus low reward trials. However, this slowing was selectively 
reduced on trials requiring flexibility, but not on trials requiring stability, and only 
in high-impulsive individuals. Put forward with caution, this could be suggestive of 
increased cognitive flexibility versus stability. However, as will be further explained in 
the Limitations below, it is unclear how response times should be interpreted.
The lack of reward effects on accuracy in the experiments described in the previous 
chapters might suggest that the current paradigm is not sensitive enough to reward 
manipulations. In chapter 6, I therefore employed an established paradigm, a Stroop 
task which has been shown to be sensitive to reward manipulations, to look at the 
effect of reward motivation. Moreover, I also measured dopamine transmission more 
directly by looking at striatal dopamine synthesis capacity. I aimed to replicate a 
previous finding that reward improved Stroop control in low-dopamine individuals, 
while impairing it in high-dopamine individuals (Aarts et al., 2014). I re-invited the 
participants from chapter 2, whose dopamine synthesis capacity was already indexed 
using an [18F]DOPA-PET scan, to perform the exact same Stroop task, measuring the 
effect of reward motivation on interference control. However, the effect of reward 
motivation did not correlate with striatal dopamine synthesis capacity. I also did 
not find any main effects of reward motivation, independent of dopamine synthesis 
capacity. It is possible that the discrepancy between the findings of the two studies 
reflects the use of the potentially less sensitive [18F]DOPA radiotracer to index 
dopamine synthesis capacity in the current study, versus [18F]FMT in the study by Aarts 
et al., as is more thoroughly discussed in chapter 6 and in the Limitations section below. 
Interpretation and implications
After having assessed the effect of methylphenidate on whether or not participants 
wanted to perform a cognitive task in chapter 2, the studies reported in chapters 3-6 
examined the intensity of cognitive control as a function of motivational cues and 
contexts (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Shenhav et al., 2013, 2017). The ultimate aim of 
these experiments was to develop a paradigm to test the effect of dopaminergic drugs 
on the link between incentive motivation and the cognitive stability/flexibility balance. 
Yet, since I did not succeed to establish a paradigm that was sensitive to manipulations 
of incentive motivation, this goal was not further pursued. 
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Reward motivation, also called incentive motivation, refers to the motivating or 
invigorating effect of a prospective reward. Reward motivation has often been 
demonstrated to enhance cognitive control, both in terms of better accuracy and faster 
responding on cognitive tasks (Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010; 
Yee et al., 2016). Several studies have attributed this effect to reward motivation 
recruiting the frontoparietal control network to “sharpen” task-relevant information 
in a preparatory manner (Braver, 2012; Chiew & Braver, 2016; Etzel et al., 2016; Hall-
McMaster et al., 2019; Parro et al., 2018). Our results in chapter 3 differed from these 
earlier studies, showing no effect of reward motivation on such preparatory meta-
control or cognitive performance across the task. As discussed in the limitations section 
below, and in more detail in chapter 3, the incentive structure of the paradigm might 
have limited the advantage of engaging additional control to improve performance, 
rendering the paradigm less sensitive to reward manipulations. 
I therefore turned to different reward structures in chapters 4 and 5. Moreover, because 
of the association between reward and dopamine (Schultz, 1997), I hypothesized that 
reward would affect cognitive control in a task-selective manner. This was motivated 
by prior evidence indicating that dopamine impacts cognitive flexibility or stability 
depending on whether it acts on the striatum or prefrontal cortex respectively (Cools 
& D’Esposito, 2011; Cools & Robbins, 2004; Crofts et al., 2001). Thus, depending on 
whether reward primarily acts on the striatum or the prefrontal cortex, reward was 
predicted to improve cognitive flexibility or stability, respectively (Aarts et al., 2011). 
In chapter 4, I examined the effect of non-contingent reward environments on 
cognitive stability versus flexibility in terms of both performance and perceived 
effort costs. In chapter 5 I tested the effect of performance-contingent rewards, or 
incentive motivation, on the stability/flexibility balance. The lack of effects in these 
studies is at odds with earlier reports, showing differential reward-effects on stability 
and flexibility (Braem et al., 2013; Dreisbach & Fröber, 2019; Fröber et al., 2019). 
Importantly though, in Bream et al. (2013), participants performed a task-switching 
paradigm in which a randomly chosen positive or negative picture was presented 
after each correct trial. The valence of the preceding picture was used to determine 
differences between positive and negative affect on switch-costs. In other words, they 
tested the effect of a previously received reward on performance, rather than the 
effect of incentive motivation. Moreover, when a participant was correct, there was still 
a chance that a negative picture would be presented on screen. Conversely, the study 
in chapter 5 examined the effect of (positive) incentive motivation on performance, 
a difference in design that could possibly account for the discrepant results. A recent 
study investigated the effect of increases in incentive motivation, rather than high or 











incentives that remained high, increased flexible behavior, such that participants chose 
to perform task-switches rather than task-repeats. This might indicate that sequential 
effects of rewards or incentives are more important for behavior than only the current 
reward value, a topic I will return to in the Future Outlook session below. 
Prior work has suggested that individual variation in the effects of reward motivation 
on cognitive control depends on dopamine transmission or dopamine-related 
personality traits (Aarts et al., 2010, 2012, 2014; Chib et al., 2012; Mobbs et al., 
2009; van Holstein et al., 2011). However, I also did not find robust reward effects 
when taking into account trait impulsivity in chapter 5. Because thus far I had only 
used the color wheel working memory task, I then decided to employ an established 
paradigm, a word-arrow Stroop task previously demonstrated to be sensitive to reward 
manipulations, to assess effects of reward motivation in chapter 6. Even though Aarts 
et al. (2014) had previously reported effects of reward motivation as a function of 
striatal dopamine synthesis capacity in 14 individuals, using the same paradigm, I was 
not able to replicate these results in a larger sample of 44 individuals.   
While it might be possible that effects could have been detected at the neural but not 
the behavioral level (Fallon & Cools, 2014; Krawczyk et al., 2007; Soutschek et al., 
2015) and I did observe exploratory effects, albeit small and ambiguous, on response 
times, it is remarkable that I did not detect any robust effects of reward on cognitive 
meta-control (chapter 3), the flexibility-stability balance (chapters 3, 4 and 5), or as 
a function of individual differences (chapters 5 and 6). Even more surprising is that I 
also did not find any main effects of our reward manipulations. As will be laid out in 
the limitations section below, there were some weaknesses in our behavioral designs 
that should be improved before drawing firm conclusions, but the lack of robust effects 
across the four studies suggests that the effects of reward on cognitive control might 
not be as strong as previously believed. 
What does this tell us about the origin of the costs of cognitive effort, as required 
for working memory and other cognitive control tasks? Longstanding metabolic ego-
depletion accounts of cognitive control costs (Baumeister et al., 1998), which  state that 
engaging in effortful tasks depletes our mental resources, leading to lower performance 
on subsequent tasks (much like when our muscles become fatigued after physical 
effort exertion), have been criticized based on the observation that control costs can 
be reduced by incentive motivation (Botvinick et al., 2009; Botvinick & Braver, 2015; 
Braver et al., 2014; Kurzban et al., 2013). Does the present lack of motivational effect 
on cognitive control question these motivational accounts in the context of this task? 
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One possible explanation might be that incentive motivation, or pharmacological 
manipulations, only affect cognitive performance itself when someone is not already 
maximally motivated or invested in a task. Once someone is already intrinsically 
motivated or invested by, for example, a prior deliberate choice to perform the 
task, incentive motivation or pharmacological manipulations will not have a strong 
additional effect on performance anymore. In line with this argument are the findings 
in a study already mentioned above, where they did not observe reliable effects of 
incentive (either high versus low or remain high versus increasing) on switch versus 
repeat performance, only on choices for task-switches (Fröber et al., 2019). Similarly, 
methylphenidate was shown to affect choices about whether to perform a high or low 
cognitive demand task (as a function of trait impulsivity), but this was not paralleled 
by effects on performance after participants had made their choice (Froböse et al., 
2018). Of note here is that participants informally reported to enjoy playing the color 
wheel working memory task in chapters 3-5, where a rewarded paradigm was used, 
whereas they reported feelings of boredom in the unrewarded paradigm in chapter 2, 
indicative of the introduction of rewards having a general energizing or motivational 
effect on the participants. Participants might thus have been intrinsically motivated by 
the rewarded task, so that the reward cues did not have an additional effect anymore 
on the trial-level. 
Related to this theorizing is the notion of a failure-to-engage (De Jong, 2000). De Jong 
states that, given there is time to prepare, participants only succeed on a portion of 
the trials in a cognitive task, as evidenced by markedly shorter response times than 
when there is little time to prepare. On the other trials, participants fail to engage, or 
fail to prepare for an upcoming trial, with relatively long response times as a result. 
This would suggest that on trials with short response times, participants perform at 
their ceiling level, whereas they could in principle still improve on trials with longer 
response times. Thus, any effects of motivation would be primarily be recoverable on 
those trials with longer response times (De Jong, 2000; Nieuwenhuis & Monsel, 2002). 
However, an analysis of those trials in the study reported in chapter 3 did not yield any 
effects of incentive motivation. Although there was less opportunity for participants 
to prepare for the task in the subsequent studies, it would be interesting to see if any 
motivational effects can be recovered in these later studies that use different reward 
manipulations and take into account individual differences in baseline measures. 
Limitations
As discussed in the respective chapters, various features of the behavioral paradigms 
used in chapters 3 to 5 might be optimized and warrant caution. First, participants’ goal 











above a certain threshold. This threshold was very lenient, supported by a very high 
percentage of trials on which participants obtained bonus points. This might have 
limited the degree to which extra cognitive effort expenditure could increase their 
bonus points. Chapter 5 employed a more stringent threshold, which however also did 
not result in a successful reward manipulation. Another possibility for potential future 
work on this paradigm is to linearly decrease the points that are obtained as accuracy 
declines. 
Second, I primarily assessed reward effects by looking at working memory performance. 
Perhaps it is something about this paradigm in particular that makes it insensitive to 
reward manipulations. For example, the multiple consecutive phases which rapidly 
follow each other or the fact that the cues as to whether to ignore or update appear on 
the screen at the same time as the intervening stimuli. These aspects could have made 
it hard for participants to exert additional control in response to reward cues. However, 
in chapter 3 we also did not find effects of reward on performance, despite the fact 
that this study allowed for preparatory control. Thus, although it is unclear why our 
paradigm seems insensitive to reward manipulations, using other cognitive paradigms, 
such as attentional or task switching paradigms, might well have produced different 
results.  
Contrary to measures of accuracy, the color wheel task did seem to be sensitive to 
reward manipulations in terms of response times (chapters 3 and 5). The question is 
why we did observe effects on response times. It is possible that we found effects in 
chapter 3 because fast responding was emphasized. As soon as they had decided on 
the color, participants had to move their mouse as fast as possible to give a response. 
However, this cannot explain the effect in chapter 5, where they had ample of time 
to respond. Moreover, a limitation is that response times are difficult to interpret, as 
slower response times can indicate either a deliberate increase in caution, with the goal 
to improve accuracy, or poorer performance. Future studies could employ response 
time distributions, such as drift diffusion models, which simultaneously estimate 
decision thresholds, i.e. the amount of information one wants to collect before reaching 
a decision, and drift rates, i.e. the rate at which information is collected. This could 
shed more light on whether slow response times imply more caution (higher decision 
thresholds) or poorer performance (slower information collection). 
Moreover, the reward-related effect on response times we found in chapter 5 was only 
isolated when taking into account trait impulsivity measured using the self-report 
Impulsive Behavior Scale (UPPS), not another widely used self-report questionnaire of 
trait impulsivity, the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11), limiting conclusions that can 
be drawn from this finding. 
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It is possible that the discrepancy between the findings by Aarts et al. (2014) and the 
study reported in chapter 6 reflects the use of the potentially less sensitive [18F]DOPA 
radiotracer to index dopamine synthesis capacity in the current study, versus [18F]FMT in 
the study by Aarts et al. [18F]DOPA, but not [18F]FMT, can be metabolized in the periphery. 
Metabolites can then cross the blood-brain-barrier and distribute evenly throughout the 
brain, lowering the signal-to-noise ratio. Moreover, [18F]DOPA metabolites have a higher 
affinity for the vesicular monoamine transporter compared with [18F]FMT metabolites, 
leading to increased cell clearance of radiolabeled [18F]DOPA metabolites when scanning 
for extended periods of time, further reducing signal. Although entacapone was 
administered before PET scanning to inhibit peripheral metabolism of [18F]DOPA and 
cell clearance should be limited in the scanning period that was used in our study (the 
first 90 minutes after tracer injection), it is possible that another measure of dopamine 
synthesis capacity, such as [18F]FMT, would have given different results.
Future outlook
As is inherent to scientific research, several new questions arise based on the findings 
presented here. 
Does methylphenidate affect performance via its effect on motivation? 
Prior research already established that methylphenidate can modulate cognitive 
performance. Here, we have seen that this effect might at least partly be due to 
methylphenidate modulating the motivation for cognitive control. An important 
question is whether this modulation of motivation also results in a modulation of 
performance. An additional question is how this works at the neural level. Future work, 
using fMRI and dynamic causal modeling or connectivity analyses, could disentangle 
whether methylphenidate modulates cognitive motivation by affecting striatal 
activation, and whether this affects striatal output to the prefrontal cortex, thereby 
altering performance on the behavioral level. Alternatively, methylphenidate might 
directly act on both the striatum and prefrontal cortex. It might alter the signal-to-
noise ratio of cognitive representations by acting on the prefrontal cortex, and merely 
modulate the strengths of these representations by its effect on the striatum and 
striatal output to the prefrontal cortex. 
How to predict the level of dopamine synthesis capacity?
I have established that the effect of methylphenidate depended on dopamine synthesis 











pharmacological studies and further experimental research aiming at isolating effects 
of drugs like methylphenidate. However, PET scans are expensive and highly invasive, 
as it requires a radiolabeled isotope to be injected into the body. Is there a way to 
predict dopamine synthesis capacity based on different measures, such as self-report 
measures, working memory capacity or eye-blink rate? The study reported in chapter 
2 is part of a larger overarching study, in which a number of putative proxy variables 
were also collected, including eye-blink rate and working memory capacity measure. 
One goal of this study is indeed to develop a model that can predict striatal dopamine 
synthesis capacity, using a combination of self-report, cognitive and physiological 
measures. Such a proxy model could serve to facilitate decisions about the prescription 
and use of drugs of which the effects depend on dopamine synthesis capacity. 
What is the role of opportunity costs in deciding whether to exert 
cognitive control?
In chapter 2, I speculate that methylphenidate exerted its effect on cognitive motivation 
via a modulation of opportunity costs. Opportunity costs were emphasized by letting 
the participant choose between performing a cognitive task and leisure, rather than a 
different task. Yet, I did not manipulate or control opportunity costs directly. Future 
studies could more directly test the effect of opportunity costs on decisions about 
whether to exert cognitive control and whether dopaminergic medication modulates 
these effects. For example, by manipulating the value of an alternative activity, such 
as a video game in which participants can win a certain number of points. Similar to 
chapter 1, participants would make decisions about whether they want to perform the 
cognitive task for more money or play the game for less money. Another option is more 
akin to a patch-leaving task, in which participants have a certain period to perform a 
cognitive task, gaining points for each completed trial. They can quit the task any time 
they like to play another game, of which the value is parametrically modulated but 
less than that of the cognitive task, for the remainder of the time period. The number 
of trials they complete before they quit the cognitive task can be taken as an index of 
their cognitive motivation.  
What are the effects of sequential reward manipulations on cognitive 
stability versus flexibility?
The findings reported in this thesis suggest that the effect of reward motivation 
manipulations on cognitive control are not very robust. Does this mean that cognitive 
control is not affected by motivation? This thesis does not provide a definitive answer 
to this question, but paves the way to investigate different reward manipulations. 
Future studies could dive into sequential effects of rewards. For example, it has been 
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reported that reward improved the extent to which participants flexibly prepared for 
an upcoming cognitive task, but only when a high reward followed a low reward, not 
when rewards were continuously high (Shen & Chun, 2011). Other sequential reward 
effects on cognitive control have been found when manipulating the average reward 
rate. A period in which participants received more reward on average resulted in 
better cognitive (Otto & Daw, 2019) and motor performance (Beierholm et al., 2013; 
Guitart-Masip et al., 2011) compared with a period in which participants received less 
reward on average. Relevant here is that the immediate reward, the reward that was 
associated with the current trial, did not affect performance. It would be interesting 
to test whether such sequential reward effects differ for tasks requiring cognitive 
stability or cognitive flexibility. 
Cross-species research
Another opportunity is to complement human research with animal research. Even 
though not all results obtained using animal research can be directly translated to 
human research, animal research nonetheless provides us with tools that are not 
possible, or ethically responsible, to use in human research. For example, to test 
dopamine’s role in cognitive motivation or the balance between stability and flexibility, 
different doses of dopaminergic drugs can be locally injected in areas of the striatum 
or prefrontal cortex to examine effects on choice and performance, for example using 
a task-switching paradigm, in which rodents (choose to) perform task-repeats or 
task-switches. Moreover, neurotransmitter release or the activity of neurons can be 
monitored using microdialysis or voltammetry, and phasic dopamine or noradrenaline 
transmission can be manipulated using optogenetic manipulations. This way, more 
precise conclusions about the link between dopamine (or other neurotransmitters), 
motivation and cognitive control in behaving animals can be drawn. 
Concluding remarks
Cognitive control is an important hallmark throughout our daily lives. We need it to 
pursue our goals, to attend to a goal while suppressing irrelevant information and to 
flexibly switch between goals when needed. In this thesis, I have addressed the role of 
motivation in cognitive control, and how we can modulate this motivation. Specifically, 
I have assessed pharmacological approaches to modulate decision-making about 
whether to exert cognitive control, and I have manipulated reward motivation to affect 
cognitive control. Here, I demonstrated that methylphenidate increases motivation 
for cognitive control and that the extent of this effect depends on striatal dopamine 











on cognitive control are not as strong or straightforward as previously thought, which 
might have important implications for education or the workplace. The studies in this 
thesis show the importance of employing various behavioral paradigms to test cognitive 
theories, thereby also showing the importance of replication studies. As always, these 
studies have generated many more questions to the neurocognitive puzzle.  
An anecdote about trait impulsivity, expectations 
and false positives 
Doing research is not always (or almost never) a smooth process. The following 
example illustrates what the process might look like in practice, and what we can 
learn from it.
When analyzing the data for chapter 2, we wanted to explore whether the 
effect of methylphenidate depended on trait impulsivity. This was inspired 
by prior evidence demonstrating that trait impulsivity is related to dopamine 
transmission (Buckholtz et al, 2010; Lee et al, 2009; Kim et al, 2014; Reeves et al, 
2012) and earlier work from our lab, showing that the effect of methylphenidate 
on cognitive effort avoidance depended on trait impulsivity (Froböse et al., 
2018). Given the correlation between the effect of methylphenidate on cognitive 
motivation and dopamine synthesis capacity that we had already found, we 
were not surprised when we indeed found a very strong correlation between the 
effect of methylphenidate and trait impulsivity. Methylphenidate had a stronger 
positive effect on cognitive motivation in more impulsive individuals. An earlier 
version of chapter 2 included an additional paragraph about this explorative 
finding. 
Only later, when we wanted to compare our demographic data, including trait 
impulsivity scores, with those in the study by Aarts et al. (2014) (chapter 6), 
we realized that the impulsivity scores of our study sample were particularly 
high. Too high. We assumed that our scores were calculated correctly, as they 
were independently scored and verified by two researchers. We therefore dug 
deeper into the raw material, particularly the questions that were included in 
the questionnaire that we had used. One question stood out, as it was seemingly 
unrelated, or at least less related to impulsive behavior (“I have regular medical/
dental checkups”). After checking various sources, we discovered that this 
question was indeed not part of the official questionnaire. Even worse, we found 
out that we had used a different, earlier version of the questionnaire, which had 
never been validated. Some questions in this earlier version were the same as 
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those in the official version, others were left out or replaced, and some phrasings 
were reversed. Most importantly, the order of the questions was different in 
both versions. Because we had used the scoring sheet belonging to the official 
version to score the earlier version, our resulting scores were completely random 
and unrelated to trait impulsivity. This meant that the strong correlation we had 
found represented pure noise. Because the manuscript reporting this study was 
already under review, we had to contact the journal to halt the reviewing process. 
We then needed to recalculate the scores based on the correct scoring sheet and 
rewrite the manuscript. Of note here is that, based on those meaningful scores, 
there was no correlation with the effect of methylphenidate.
Of course, we all know that when we find a significant result, even when it is 
very strong, this could potentially be due to chance. After all, our inferences 
are often based on statistics. However, it is still important to realize and to be 
reminded of. The correlation we had found was strong and was expected based 
on previous literature, but it was still a false positive. Fortunately, we found out 
about it before the paper was accepted, but all the hassle that followed definitely 
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Het is een donderdagavond en ik ben soep aan het klaarmaken voor morgen. 
Wanneer de soep wat begint te sudderen ga ik op de bank zitten om mijn favoriete 
tv-programma te kijken. Alles wat er gebeurt met de deelnemers zal morgen uitvoerig 
worden besproken tijdens de lunchpauze. Dan krijg ik een berichtje van een vriendin. 
Na een aantal berichtjes heen en weer vertelt ze me over haar week. Ik wissel mijn 
aandacht af tussen het tv-programma en het verhaal van mijn vriendin. Plots wordt 
het verhaal erg interessant. Ik richt me nu volledig op het verhaal en vergeet het tv-
programma. Midden tijdens het lezen van een van de berichten ruik ik ineens een 
brandgeur en ik ren snel naar het fornuis om mijn soep te redden. 
Prestatie: kunnen of willen?
Het omgaan met verschillende doelen of taken, zoals het klaarmaken van soep, tv 
kijken en berichten lezen en versturen, is belangrijk in ons alledaagse leven. Soms 
moeten we ons focussen op een bepaalde taak, terwijl we het volgende moment 
weer van taak moeten wisselen omdat iets anders plots belangrijker is. Dit lukt ons 
soms beter dan op andere momenten en soms beter bij het doen van de ene taak 
dan de andere taak. Vaak denken we dat hoe goed we zijn in het uitvoeren van een 
taak vooral een afspiegeling is van hoe goed we iets kunnen. Het is echter ook heel 
belangrijk hoe graag we iets goed willen uitvoeren. Oftewel, hoe gemotiveerd zijn we? 
Het zal bijvoorbeeld niet als een verrassing komen dat mensen vaak beter presteren 
op een taak wanneer ze ervoor beloond worden. Bovendien zullen ze waarschijnlijk 
meer geneigd zijn een moeilijke of zware taak te verkiezen boven een simpele taak, 
als ze er maar genoeg beloning voor krijgen. Denk maar eens aan die keren dat je 
een snoepje mocht eten zodra je je kamer netjes had opgeruimd. Het lijkt er dus op 
dat onze prestatie op taken niet alleen een kwestie is van hoe goed we ergens in zijn, 
maar ook een afweging van of het de moeite wel waard is: Zijn de totale beloningen 
hoger dan de totale kosten?
Hoe deze relatie tussen prestatie en motivatie in elkaar zit is echter nog niet geheel 
duidelijk. Bijvoorbeeld, alhoewel mensen meestal beter worden op een taak wanneer 
ze hoger beloond worden, is dit niet altijd het geval en gaan sommige mensen 
hierdoor juist slechter presteren. Bovendien hebben eerdere onderzoeken uitgewezen 
dat beloning ervoor kan zorgen dat je beter wordt op bepaalde taken, maar slechter 
op andere taken. 
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Doel van het proefschrift
Het doel van dit proefschrift was om meer duidelijkheid te scheppen over deze relatie 
tussen motivatie en prestatie. Ik heb me hierbij specifiek gericht op cognitieve taken. 
Ik heb dit benaderd vanuit twee perspectieven: 1) Zien we effecten op cognitieve 
prestatie wanneer we motivatie manipuleren en 2) zien we effecten in de keuzes die 
mensen maken over het wel of niet uit willen voeren van cognitieve taken wanneer we 
motivatie manipuleren? Dat manipuleren van motivatie heb ik getracht te doen door 
middel van verschillende manieren om mensen te belonen en door middel van het 
toedienen van medicatie. 
Dopamine 
Het medicijn dat ik heb gebruikt is methylfenidaat, ook wel bekend onder de merknaam 
Ritalin®. Methylfenidaat verhoogt de hersenstof dopamine en mensen met ADHD, maar 
ook bijvoorbeeld studenten, gebruiken dit vaak om beter te kunnen presteren. Recente 
onderzoeken wijzen er echter op dat methylfenidaat niet alleen het vermogen maar 
ook de motivatie om cognitief te presteren kunnen beïnvloeden. Methylfenidaat is 
daarom bij uitstek geschikt om mijn onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden.  
Zoals gezegd kan beloning ervoor zorgen dat je beter presteert (of iets graag wilt doen), 
maar kan het er ook voor zorgen dat je het juist slechter gaat doen (of iets minder graag 
wilt doen). Een aantal eerdere onderzoeken benadrukt dat het wel eens zo zou kunnen 
zijn dat de effecten van beloning en van methylfenidaat afhangen van de hoeveelheid 
van de hersenstof dopamine die al in een diepgelegen gebied, het striatum genoemd, in 
je hersenen aanwezig is. Ik heb daarom in een aantal van mijn onderzoeken gemeten 
hoeveel dopamine mensen aanmaken in hun striatum door middel van een hersenscan 
(een PET scan).
Het experiment
Om de link tussen motivatie en cognitieve prestatie te onderzoeken heb ik veel gebruik 
gemaakt van een werkgeheugenspel dat onderzoeks-deelnemers speelden op de 
computer (zie Figuur 1). Deelnemers speelden een spel waarin ze elke beurt opnieuw 










FIGUUR 1 | Het werkgeheugenspel
In het werkgeheugenspel krijgen deelnemers eerst een aantal vierkanten te zien waarvan ze de 
kleuren moeten onthouden. Later krijgen ze een tweede groep met gekleurde vierkanten te zien. 
Als de letter in het midden een “N” (negeer) is, moeten ze deze nieuwe vierkanten negeren en de 
kleuren van de oude vierkanten blijven onthouden. Als de letter in het midden een “U” (update) is 
moeten ze juist de nieuwe kleuren onthouden en de oude vergeten. Tenslotte moeten ze op een 
kleurenwiel aangeven welke kleur hoorde bij het omlijnde vierkant. In het geval ze de letter “N” 
hadden gezien is dat dus de kleur paars, maar in het geval ze de letter “U” hadden gezien is het 
de kleur roze.  
Er waren twee verschillende versies die altijd hetzelfde begonnen: Deelnemers kregen 
kort een aantal vierkanten te zien waarvan ze de kleuren moesten onthouden, wat 
gevolgd werd door een grijs scherm. Daarna verschenen er, steeds op dezelfde plek 
als eerst, nieuwe vierkanten in nieuwe kleuren op het scherm. Afhankelijk van de 
letter die in het midden van het scherm stond moesten ze andere dingen doen met 
deze nieuwe kleuren. Als er de letter “N” (negeer) stond moesten ze deze nieuwe 
kleuren negeren en de oude kleuren blijven onthouden. Als er de letter “U” (update) 
stond moesten ze juist deze nieuwe kleuren onthouden en de oude kleuren vergeten. 
Dit werd opnieuw gevolgd door een grijs scherm waarna er een kleurenwiel op het 
scherm verscheen. Op de plek van een van de kleuren was de omlijning van een 
vierkant te zien en deelnemers moesten op het kleurenwiel aangeven welke kleur 
daarbij hoorde. Bijvoorbeeld, als er rechts boven een omlijning te zien was en er was 
aangegeven dat ze de nieuwe kleuren moesten negeren, dan moesten ze de kleur van 
het eerste vierkant rechtsboven aangeven. Als er was aangegeven dat ze moesten 
updaten en dus de nieuwe kleuren moesten onthouden, dan moesten ze de kleur van 
het tweede vierkant rechtsboven aangeven. Aangezien de kleuren maar erg kort op 
het scherm te zien waren (500 milliseconden) en het dus een grote mate van aandacht 
van de deelnemer vereiste, was dit een moeilijk spel. Door het gebruik van dit spel 
kon ik kijken naar de prestatie op taken die verschillende vormen van cognitieve 
vaardigheden testen: cognitieve stabiliteit (je focussen op informatie terwijl je nieuwe 
informatie moet negeren) en cognitieve flexibiliteit (het wisselen van je aandacht door 
nieuwe informatie juist binnen te laten).
Dit werkgeheugenspel heb ik gebruikt in vier van mijn vijf onderzoeken, gerapporteerd 
in de hoofdstukken 2 tot en 5 van dit proefschrift. In hoofdstuk 2 heb ik gekeken naar 
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hoe medicatie de keuze van deelnemers beïnvloedde tussen het moeten spelen van 
dit moeilijke spel of te doen waar ze zin in hadden. In de hoofdstukken 3 tot en met 5 
heb ik gekeken naar hoe verschillende vormen van beloning de prestatie op de twee 
vormen van cognitieve vaardigheden beïnvloedde. Omdat er weinig tot geen effect 
van beloning leek te zijn op de prestatie op dit werkgeheugenspel, heb ik in hoofdstuk 
6 een ander, al veel getest spel gebruikt om te kijken naar hoe beloning prestatie 
beïnvloedde. In de volgende sectie bespreek ik kort elk van de vijf onderzoeken en 
mijn bevindingen. 
Methylfenidaat verhoogt motivatie voor cognitie vooral in mensen 
met veel dopamine in hun hersenen
Voor het onderzoek in hoofdstuk 2 moesten deelnemers een reeks keuzes maken 
tussen het spelen van het moeilijke werkgeheugenspel voor een bepaald geldbedrag 
of het mogen doen wat ze wilden voor een lager bedrag. Ze mochten dan bijvoorbeeld 
hun telefoon of de computer gebruiken voor een periode die gelijk was aan de tijd 
die het zou kosten om het spel te spelen. Deze reeks keuzes voeren ze eenmaal uit 
na het innemen van methylfenidaat en eenmaal na het innemen van een placebo pil. 
Op deze manier kon ik testen wat het effect was van methylfenidaat, dat dopamine 
verhoogt, op de motivatie van de deelnemers om het cognitief moeilijke spel te 
spelen. De resultaten wezen uit dat mensen een sterkere voorkeur hadden om het spel 
te spelen na het nemen van methylfenidaat dan na de placebo, maar dit effect was 
eigenlijk voornamelijk aanwezig in mensen met veel dopamine in hun striatum. Dus, 
om te weten wat methylfenidaat zal doen met je motivatie voor een cognitieve taak is 
het belangrijk om te weten hoeveel dopamine je al in je hersenen hebt. 
Het is onduidelijk wat de effecten van beloning zijn op cognitieve 
prestatie 
In de hoofdstukken 3 tot en met 5 heb ik gekeken naar de effecten van beloning op 
cognitieve stabiliteit (negeer) en flexibiliteit (update), gebruikmakende van het 
werkgeheugenspel. In hoofdstuk 3 beloofde (en gaf) ik deelnemers extra geld als ze het 
goed deden op het werkgeheugenspel. Hoeveel extra geld dat was verschilde per beurt. 
Ik zag echter geen verschil in prestatie tussen het beloven van veel of weinig geld. 
Ook was er geen verschil tussen het effect van beloning of stabiliteit of flexibiliteit. In 
hoofdstuk 4 heb ik daarom de beloningsregel aangepast, zodat mensen sowieso extra 
geld kregen, onafhankelijk van hoe goed ze het deden. Ik vond echter ook geen effect 
van deze vorm van beloning op prestatie of op stabiliteit versus flexibiliteit. Ik heb 
toen in hoofdstuk 5 weer gekeken naar beloning die afhankelijk is van je prestatie, 










over hoe impulsief ze zijn, een eigenschap die waarschijnlijk gerelateerd is aan 
dopamine gehaltes in je hersenen. Opnieuw vond ik geen duidelijke effecten. Tenslotte 
heb ik in hoofdstuk 6 een ander, al veel getest spel gebruikt. Uit een eerder onderzoek 
was gebleken dat beloning ervoor zorgt dat deelnemers beter op dit spel werden als 
ze weinig dopamine in hun striatum hadden, maar dat ze slechter werden als ze veel 
dopamine in hun hersenen hadden. In hoofdstuk 6 heb ik deze bevindingen echter niet 
kunnen repliceren in een grotere groep deelnemers. 
Conclusie
Samengevat heb ik in dit proefschrift op verschillende manieren getracht de relatie 
tussen motivatie en cognitie te beïnvloeden. In hoofdstuk 1 heb ik gevonden dat 
het dopamine verhogende middel methylfenidaat de motivatie om je cognitief in 
te spannen verhoogt, maar dat dit voornamelijk zo is als je al veel dopamine in een 
bepaald gebied van je hersenen, het striatum, hebt. Methylfenidaat werkt dus niet bij 
iedereen hetzelfde, wat belangrijk is om rekening mee te houden als je als student even 
een pilletje methylfenidaat (Ritalin®) wilt nemen voor een examen of wanneer je het als 
arts voorschrijft aan een patiënt. 
Vervolgens heb ik in de hoofdstukken 3 tot en met 6 op verscheidene manieren getest 
of een financiële beloning een effect heeft op cognitieve prestatie, en belangrijker, 
of dat dit verschilt voor taken waarbij je een stabiele focus moet hebben en taken 
waarbij je juist steeds nieuwe informatie toe moet laten. Ik vond echter geen effecten 
van beloning. De open vraag is of dit ligt aan de specifieke taken die ik heb gebruikt 
of dat de effecten van beloning veel kleiner, of veel variabeler zijn dan we altijd 




Promoveren is een lange weg en doe je niet alleen. Dit proefschrift was er niet geweest 
zonder de hulp en toewijding van anderen, in de vorm van kennis, nieuwe ideeën, 
een luisterend oor, motiverende en opbeurende woorden, en gezelligheid. Mijn dank 
hiervoor is groot. 
Allereerst natuurlijk RoRo. 
Roshan, Roshan Cools, Da Rosh, Lil’ Sab, de vrouw van de duizend-en-één nieuwe 
ideeën. Gelukkig ging jij op precies het juiste moment met zwangerschapsverlof en had 
je genoeg vertrouwen in mij om me de kans te geven een PhD in jouw lab na te streven. 
Met al jouw kennis, enthousiasme, enorme betrokkenheid en steun heb je mij al die 
jaren begeleid. Wat heb ik veel aan jou gehad, van jou geleerd, en wat ben ik blij dat 
je altijd openstond voor een gesprek over het project, mijn carrière, of gewoon om me 
even uit de put te trekken. Bedankt voor je wijze woorden en je geduld.
Robbert-Jan, we leerden elkaar al kennen voordat ik bij het Donders begon, en wat is 
het goed geweest dat we elkaar tijdens het VICI-project weer tegenkwamen en jij mijn 
promotor werd. Je hebt heel veel voor mij betekend. Met je klinische, realistische en 
pragmatische blik zorgde je er steeds weer voor dat ik de onderwerpen vanuit een 
breder perspectief kon bekijken en ik niet verdronk in de details. Bedankt voor je steun 
en je rust.  
Bram, Koffie-Koning, het eerste gedeelte van mijn PhD heb jij mij begeleid en was jij 
mijn wetenschappelijke leermeester. Je hebt me veel geleerd over hoe de wetenschap 
in elkaar zit, of zou moeten zitten, en hoe ik als jonge onderzoeker mijn beste beentje 
voor kan zetten om het systeem te verbeteren. Wat heb ik in die laatste jaren vaak 
gewenst dat je er nog was. Bedankt voor al je methodologische, statistische en 
programmeeradvies (commenten, commenten, committen!), maar vooral je persoonlijk 
advies.
Jessica, Ruben, Danae, Britt, the VICI-testers. Together we have tested 100 participants, 
5 (or more when the cyclotron broke down) sessions each and probably had over a 
thousand phone calls with (potential) participants. I cannot express how much your 
support and collaboration has meant to me. Basement-days were long, repetitive, 
lonely and daylight-deprived, but you helped me through them by checking in 
from time to time, by acknowledging and sharing the struggle and by showing your 
friendly faces in the morning when collecting all materials from the cabinet. After the 










brainstorming about ideas and analyses, trying to find solutions to the endless series 
of problems we encountered and cheering me up. An immense thank you to all of you, 
you have been crucial. 
My time at the Donders would have been empty, boring and very hard without the 
help and support from all (extended / former) lab members and all the fun chats in 
the canteen. You adopted me right away and I have always felt extremely comfortable 
around you all. Thank you for all the good advice, fun conferences, wonderful lab 
retreats and incredible memories: Andrew, Annelies, Bram, Britt, Ceyda, Danae, 
Dorianne, Elena, Eliana, Emma, Esther (Thank you for your courage to support a risky 
replication study. You are a great example.), Guillaume, Hanneke (I wouldn’t have had 
a place to live in Nijmegen without you.), Iris, Iris, Jennifer, Jessica, Johannes (Thank 
you for all your instant help whenever I had a question about my analyses. I don’t think 
the group would run as smoothly without you.), Joost, Jorryt, Laura, Lieke, Lieneke, 
Lola, Marieke, Marije, Marpessa, Mojtaba, Monja, Naomi, Nina, Patricia, Payam, Ping, 
Rebecca, René, Romain, Roshan, Ruben, Ruth, Sophie, Vanessa, Xiaochen. Because 
when you get a feel for the … 
Dan, Jasper, Joey, Mao, Margot, Sophie, thank you for your company and the 
interesting chats and discussions in the office. You made 2.269 the peaceful and fun 
room everyone needs.
I spent a considerable part of my Donders time in the canteen, and with good reason: 
Andrew, Anne-Kathrin, Annelies, Bram, Britt, Claudia, Danae, Erik, Floortje, Iris, Iris, 
Jennifer, Jeroen, Jessica, Joey, Johannes, Jorryt, Lieke, Lieneke, Lonja, Marisha, Mats, 
Monja, Nader, Naomi, Patricia, René, Ruben, Sophie, Tim, thank you for all the laughs 
and smiles. Getting up early to take the train was bearable because I would see you in 
a few hours.
Ayse, Berend, Betty & Mora, David, Erik, Femke, Jessica, Marek, Mike, Nicole, Paul, 
Peter, Sabine, Sandra, Tildie, and all the people behind the scenes, thank you for 
running the Donders and for making it such an extremely well-organized, special and 
awesome place. 
Lola, Marije, Irene, Michiel, Sara, bedankt dat ik jullie mocht begeleiden, wat mij de 
mogelijkheid gaf een hoop te leren en alles vanuit een ander perspectief te zien. 
Bedankt voor al jullie goede ideeën en hulp. 
Britt, Iris, Lieke, Ruben, jullie waren er door dik en dun en met jullie heb ik lief en leed 
gedeeld. Door jullie ging het niet alleen om het afronden van het boekje – want die 
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zijn er al genoeg – maar ook om het elkaar verwittigen van de laatste interessante 
informatie, om alle misgun en om het relativeren. Het woord koffie was genoeg om 
weer een uur in de kantine door te brengen (maar de modellen zijn aan het runnen, dus 
we zijn aan het werk). Veel te snel zijn we uit het Donders weggerukt. Wat ben ik blij 
dat jullie mijn paranimfen willen zijn. Bedankt, Queen B, Duif, Andere Lieke/Liekacha, 
Rubencha. 
Zonder een leven buiten het onderzoek was het allemaal zeker niet gelukt. Op volle 
snelheid over de baan. Bedankt Nijmegen Atletiek en de Sprinters van Ries. Bedankt 
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Het voelt elke keer weer als een uitje. Ries, lockdown of niet, elke keer staat er gewoon 
een schema klaar. Vooral die 400 meters afgelopen winter, erg van genoten... Jouw 
toewijding, enthousiasme en verhalen hebben me op de been gehouden. Bedankt, 
trainert. En natuurlijk Suzie, trainingsbuddy, PhD-buddy. Jouw support voor, tijdens 
en na alle loopjes (“Nog maar 6, we zijn al bijna op de helft”; “Misschien zijn we te hard 
begonnen”), sprintend op de fiets net na een zwaar programma om nog snel even een 
gin-tonic te kunnen drinken, een oliebol om de training mee af te sluiten en het delen 
van alle PhD-drama, ik had het allemaal nodig. Bedankt.       
Bie, Andy, Bibi, Thijs, Lars, bedankt voor alle leuke avonden, etentjes en wijntjes. 
Anna, samen op avontuur in Hong-Kong, en niet meer uit elkaar gegaan. Even mocht 
ik genieten van je als bijna-buurvrouw, voordat je weer naar het Zuiden ging. Bedankt 
voor alle bemoediging en het vragen hoe het met me gaat.   
Merel, sinds jaar en dag. Als kleine meisjes met spillenbeentjes vonden we elkaar bij 
ACW. Bedankt voor al die jaren gezelligheid, alle feestjes, alle sportieve uitjes, al je 
vrolijkheid en al je steun. Op naar de apenkooi. 
Sophie en Simone, samen op school, samen bij de Chinees en nu nog steeds zijn we 
een geoliede machine. Bedankt voor al die jaren plezier, voor het delen van allerlei 
verhalen en voor alle steun. 
Papa en mama, jullie steun heeft mij zover gebracht. De grote kast vol met speelgoed, 
het aanmoedigen van mijn eeuwigdurende waarom?-fase, alle flauwe grapjes, het 
steeds maar weer op en neer rijden voor trainingen en wedstrijden en jullie trots en 
liefde was een ideale voorbereiding op het grote-mensen leven en heeft de onderzoeker 
in mij aangewakkerd. Nooit hielden jullie mij tegen als ik plots weer van studie wilde 










ideeën had: laat maar vallen, die staat vanzelf wel weer op. Tanita, bedankt voor al het 
spelen, al het ruziën, al het bedenken van nieuwe spelletjes samen met Mieke en al het 
trainen. Oma Gerry, opa Egbert, oma Tela, opa Fiets, bedankt voor alle logeerpartijtjes, 
het bekijken van de rapporten en het komen kijken naar de wedstrijden. Ik hou van 
jullie. 
Mijn schoonouders, Tuan en Lien, bedankt voor al het zorgen. Viet, Sue, Vivian, Dylan, 
Tung, Hien, Ron, Thijs, Tim, Hoa, Majanka, Ly, Daan, bedankt voor alle nieuwsgierigheid 
en gezellige feestjes.   
Tan, altijd daar om me te troosten en op te beuren als ik weer eens Roshan wilde 
opbellen om te zeggen dat ik morgen zou stoppen. Altijd daar om me te kalmeren 
als ik aan het stressen was. Altijd daar om me weg te trekken van de computer als 
ik tot midden in de nacht doorging, of om juist die error weg te werken die ik niet 
opgelost kreeg. Altijd daar om al mijn computerproblemen op te lossen, want die 
domme computers doen nooit wat ik wil. Altijd daar om te koken, zodat ik meteen aan 
kon schuiven, of om ontbijt klaar te zetten, zodat ik snel naar de trein kon. Altijd daar 
om mijn eerste proefpersoon te zijn, mijn teksten door te lezen of presentaties door 
te kijken, wat soms leidde tot discussies over of iets nou een normaal woord was of 
moeilijke neuro-taal. Jij hebt net zo goed een promotietraject voltooid, en ik ben blij 
dat ik niet in jouw schoenen hoefde te staan. Wat ben je lief, zorgzaam, slim en grappig. 
En je had gelijk: Stiekem vond ik al die problemen heel erg leuk, ik zou niet anders 
willen, en natuurlijk ga ik een postdoc doen. Ik hou van jou. 
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This research followed the applicable laws and ethical guidelines. Research Data 
Management was conducted according to the FAIR principles. The paragraphs below 
specify in detail how this was achieved.
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DAC = Data Acquisition Collection, RDC = Research Documentation Collection, DSC = Data Sharing Collection
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“Too much of anything is bad, but too much champagne is just right.”
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